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A B S T R A C T 
Islamic Banking has both classical and modern connections. Guidehnes to acceptable 
behaviour with regard to money and property were offered in the Quran whilst the 
compilation of further material and its interpretation is a process that began with 
the death of the Prophet and continues to the present day. 
Upon the establishment of the first Islamic bank twenty-five years ago, Islamic 
finance passed beyond the realm of jurisprudence and has since gained the respect 
of Western economis1;s and bankers alike. This period has spawned a considerable 
volume of theoretical works which detail the wide-ranging benefits particular to an 
interest-free financial system, and yet, little has been addressed to the experience of 
Islamic banks themselves. 
One of the problems for Middle Eastern banking in general is that an Arab mar-
ketplace, similar to the US or European example, still does not exist. By examining 
the performance of Islamic banks in Bahrain, the Arab world's closest equivalent, it is 
possible to assess the degree of success that a move to Western markets has allowed. 
The introductory chapter investigates the relationship between Islamic eco-
nomic theory and practice while chapter two considers Islamic banking theory and 
comments upon the financing methods available in this sphere. The third chapter 
looks at the Euromarkets in the context of n6a-oriented finance and the opportuni-
ties that exist there for Islamic banks. Chapter four views Islamic financial activity 
in London and Geneva which contrasts with the experience of Islamic offshore in-
stitutions in Bahrain, the content of chapter five. A separate chapter studies the 
role of the Islamic Development Bank in promoting the spread of Islamic finance and 
considers how successful the bank has been in Islamic terms. The concluding chapter 
draws on the experience of nia-free financial institutions over recent years to assess 
the future status and activities of international Islamic banking. 
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C H A P T E R O N E 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1.1 Rat iona le of I s lamic Economics 
Islamic economics has recently gained a great deal of exposure through the appear-
ance over the last two decades of banking conducted according to Islamic principles. 
Although Islamic finance is considered a mould-breaker, right from the outset, it is 
possible to identify a correlation as well as the more obvious dissimilarity of the strains 
of thought present in Islamic and Western economic theory. Just as the Bible and the 
Quran share many characters, events and injunctions, at one time the interpretation 
of economic thought was a shared one. 
A section on riba looks more specifically at the pattern of Islamic economic 
behaviour and highlights its shared background with Christian doctrine. On a broader 
front, a brief examination of the rationale behind Islamic economics should more 
quickly illustrate the point at which the two interpretations diverge. 
A key to the definition of Islamic economics can be found in knowledge and 
appUcation of the Islamic Holy Law, the shari'a. However, although those minded to 
conduct their lives in accordance with that of the prophet Muhammad have a number 
of precedents to follow, in the form of the Quran and the Sunna, interpretation and 
adaptation to new situations is far from easy. 
So it is that we can observe that the structure of the Meccan economy during 
the rise of Islam is still considered relevant today. This fundamental link between 
moral behaviour and economic theory does however make the paradigm of the Is-
lamic economy very different to the Western model. This has led Volker Nienhaus to 
observe: 
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"Islamic economics offers so far, disregarding the critique of western economics 
and economies, no theories about the empirical world, but only models of ideal, 
sometimes even utopian, worlds, which do not help us understand realities in Mushm 
countries and which also do not explain how a transformation from the present day 
egoism and materialism to the altruistic and value-orientated behaviour could be 
managed."^ 
To this effect, the same author observes: 
"The first experiment in Islamic banking was launched in the 1960s in Egypt, 
and the initiators drew their inspiration not from Islamic economics, but from the 
theory and experience of German co-operative and mutual savings banks."^ 
Before assessing the effect of the separation between positive and normative 
economics, it is worth noting that the two strands were interwoven in Western eco-
nomic thought until recent times. In the West, economics is a comparatively new 
discipline; prior to the eighteenth century, it would have been clustered together with 
ethics. In fact, it is possible to class Adam Smith as a moral philosopher and it is only 
from the neo-classical period that economics can be considered as a neutral, amoral 
science. 
This is a sticking point for Islam which works on a different set of assumptions. 
The motive of self-interest, for example, is not an attractive one unless it is in the 
wider context of society or humanity. 
Viewed alone, the manifesto of Islamic economic theory makes for comparatively 
tedious reading for precisely the reasons quoted above. No complete society can be 
expected to behave entirely in harmony with the elaborate ethical system of a major 
religion. It is surely too much to expect that social responsibiUty and altruism should 
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cast out and replace self-interest and materialism. No such considerations can have 
passed through the mind of next piece's author: 
" The practice of Islam will not only solve the multiple problems facing the 
third world Muslim countries but also show the right path for the emancipation of all 
worldly evils, both economic and non-economic."^ 
Statements such as these do little for the theoretical credibility of Islamic fi-
nance, given the less than one hundred percent adherence to the Islamic code of ethics 
worldwide. Nevertheless, this makes the investigation of banking within this sphere 
considerably more interesting and challenging than it might otherwise be. Fervour 
and fanaticism for an idea is initially impressive but is not a phenomenon from which 
much can be learned by the West, at least in the case of financial practice. Pragmatic 
treatment of religious injunctions on the other hand, makes the experience of Islamic 
banks in particular, one which may be of interest to conventional banks working in a 
non-Islamic economy. 
1.2 T h e Prohib i t ion of Riba 
It is the prohibition of usury that provides the greatest contrast between Western 
and Islamic finance. Undoubtedly, it restricts the choice of investment methods and 
instruments that are available to Islamic financial institutions, yet, based upon this 
prohibition, an important player has joined the field of international finance in recent 
years. This has been neither a flash in the pan nor an event of small importance to 
those not directly involved. Considering the problems that conventional banks have 
encountered through debt financing, the attraction of mutual fund investment and 
even the shortcomings of the interest rate tool, it would appear that Islamic bank 
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operations and the implications of usury are of interest to a far wider group than 
Islamic economists alone. 
There is no definitive meaning of the Arabic word riba, which has led to a great 
amount of debate as well as controversy when the different concepts of usury and 
interest are tarred with the same brush. In the West, we may be prepared to accept 
that some forms of interest constitute unearned profit. Nevertheless, profit at no risk 
provided by all manner of commercial bank accounts remains a fact of life and may be 
considered a reward for delayed consumption. In any case, the tables are turned when 
one becomes the borrower, which, for the private consumer, is a matter of choice. In 
a non-Islamic sense, usury and interest are only related when the rate is considered 
unjustly high. 
Translating riba from the Arabic produces such innocuous sounding terms as 
'increase', 'growth' and 'gain' but, as defined in Islamic jurisprudence, it is inter-
changeable with interest of the most unattractive sort, namely usury or unjust profit. 
However, the interpretation of riba provided by present-day schools of thought are 
as varied as the definitions given by dictionaries. At one end of the scale lies those 
who are convinced that any return on financial transactions constitutes riba. The 
'Uberated' view at the other end of the scale makes a distinction between simple and 
compound interest, stating that only the latter represents unearned profit and is un-
fair to the borrower. In between these poles of opinion lie a great many middle of the 
road, compromise views. 
To some, a distinction should be made between interest on loans for consump-
tion and loans for production. Although the definition of riba as interest holds fast, 
a relatively convincing argument in recent years states that the Quranic prohibition 
of riba concerned only the taking of exorbitant interest. Modest interest charges 
would be acceptable in areas such as the financing of trade, government inducement 
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to encourage savings and for loans made to finance productive investments.^ 
The permutations appear endless, although a theme of discerning apphcation 
of interest is becoming evident. Many views on the subject favour the abohtion of 
the interest charge in transactions between individuals whilst viewing it as acceptable 
between non-human entities such as banks, companies and corporations. 
The most insidious interpretation asserts that bank, interest is acceptable as 
banking per se was unknown at the time of the Quranic prohibition. Nevertheless, 
at the same time as calling into question the present-day validity of the Quran, the 
argument is also self-defeating as it does not allow for interpretation by analogy, a 
respected Islamic tradition. History clearly shows that qiyas and tafsir (analogy and 
interpretation) continued in the centuries following the revelation of the Quran and 
the death of the prophet Muhammad. 
In a comparatively recent commentary on the Quran, Sayyed Quttub illustrates 
the broad scope of the ban on usury: 
"...Having determined the principle we proceed to this description and say that 
in fact it is not only a historical description of dealings upon usury which prevailed 
in the Peninsular which was intended by the Prophet (God's prayer and peace be 
upon him), in this particular place, but is also a description attendant on the hated 
system of usury, regardless of the rate of interest. The nature of the usury system 
satisfies always this description; it is not confined to dealings that prevailed in the 
Peninsular of the Arabs but is a description associated with the system at every time 
and place." ^  
From the time of revelation, the Quran itself has been refreshingly unequiv-
ocal in its condemnation of riha and, as the revealed word of God, its instructions 
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are considered binding; Numerous references exist both here and in the Prophet's 
Traditions— the second' sura of the Quran gives the most comprehensive treatment 
to the subject: 
"Those that live on usury shall rise up before Allah like men Satan has demented 
by his touch, for they claim that usury is like trading. But Allah has permitted trading 
and forbidden usury." ^  
The issue of usurers trying to compare their behaviour with that of legitimate 
traders bears a close comparison with the continuing assessment of new financial 
practice by the Islamic banks' shari'a boards. Islamic bankers would be the first to 
admit that they trail the West in banking development and that any progress towards 
closing the gap will be as a result of consultation and co-operation with Western ex-
perience. Consequently, new investment procedures tend to be in some way related 
to the practice of non-Islamic banks. Yet whilst the newcomers to the financial scene 
are eager to broaden the range of services they provide, it is imperative that finan-
cial instruments derived from the West should not simply be a riba scheme under an 
Islamic name. Thus, both the spirit and the letter of Islamic law must be followed. 
However, this still leaves room for interpretation; what constitutes Islamically accept-
able behaviour and what does not has been the subject of considerable debate. The 
difficulties that this has created are explained throughout this work and are a major 
theme within it. 
1.3 A n Invest igation Into T h e Internat ional Role O f Is lamic B a n k s 
In order to study the operational experience of Islamic financial institutions compet-
ing alongside conventional banks, this work has involved a continuous comparison 
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between the two parties. To state that Islamic banks are newcomers to the inter-
national banking arena hints that the esta,blished players dominate an unchanging 
market. This is far from being the case and it makes the task for Islamic banks 
to compete successfully even more difficult; in effect, they are aiming at a moving 
target. No investigation into the specific problems that Islamic banks encounter in 
entering this market has been undertaken before and would now seem logical as many 
important considerations are involved. Primarily, there is the religious factor: how 
much of a restraining influence does this have over entry into a market dominated 
by riba institutions? Moreover, is it possible to argue that a stress on competition is 
un-Islamic? Considering the power and influence of the established market players, 
is it not likely that Islamic banks will be forced to deal with riba of some description? 
There is after all, little room and even less cause to make allowances in a market of 
this sort for another man's rehgion. However, the increased Western interest in ethi-
cal investment makes the Islamic contribution to financing procedures in the market 
relevant to others than the Islamic banks themselves. 
Chapter three examines the fast-changing environment of international financial 
markets and highlights the demands of potential clients in terms of the flexibifity and 
competitiveness that they expect as investors and borrowers. Later chapters look at 
the extent to which selected institutions have penetrated the market and the point at 
which it becomes unacceptable for them to operate. A further and similarly important 
point of contact with the West is the status of Islamic financial institutions abroad, 
in particular their relationship with central banks. No Islamic bank operating in 
England for example, can claim the status of a licensed deposit taker. An interview 
at the London office of Al-Baraka discusses the reasons behind this restriction and the 
resultant focus of this bank's activities. A section is devoted to the future of Islamic 
finance in the West and the circumstances that would surround institutions such as 
Al-Baraka competing with conventional banks on an equal footing. 
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So far, this introductory chapter has very briefly examined the broader aspects 
of Islamic finance from the point of view of its connection with Islamic thinking on 
economic matters. Consideration has also been given to the rehgious background 
that helps form its foundation. Further themes that are particularly relevant to 
Islamic financial practice are highlighted here before being studied more closely in 
later chapters. 
1.3.1 L iqu id i ty Constra int 
The problem of managing liquidity has been a long standing one for Islamic banks; it 
is also one of the major questions to be examined in this work. Many other issues are 
connected with this one, amongst which is is the absence of a central bank for Islamic 
financial institutions. This has two main results: the prohibition on borrowing at 
interest prevents firstly the raising of funds via the central bank and secondly, the 
inability of that institution to act as a lender of last resort. No preferential treatment 
is given to Islamic banks in their country of origin and so this is as much an issue in 
the Middle East as it is in Europe. 
Inevitably, the extraordinarily high level of liquidity that Islamic banks are 
required to maintain has a profound effect upon their investment policy. Unless a 
competitive means of investing and borrowing short term funds can be found, the 
problem of finding and maintaining an equilibrium between incoming and outgoing 
funds will continue to eat away at the profitability and the attraction of Islamic banks. 
This subject is studied from different angles in separate chapters; from an in-
vestigation into the shortcomings of what is presently available, an overview of the 
conventional interbank market, to the criteria for developing an inter-Islamic bank 
market. It appears that such major structural developments rely not only on co-
operation amongst the commercial banks but also on the technical and financial 
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impetus of a truly international institution such as the Islamic Development Bank. 
A n assessment is made of the IDB's contribution to the growth of Islamic finance as a 
viable alternative to riba banking and the part that it has yet to play as the motiva-
tion behind projects that are beyond the reach of institutions of a smaller size. This 
latter point receives attention in a section devoted to the development of a secondary 
market for Islamic securities. 
1.3.2 Part ic ipat ion Partnerships 
The prohibition of riba, defined as a positive and predetermined return on capital, 
does not mean that investment of all descriptions is discouraged. Nor does it mean 
that the provider of capital should not benefit financially from a project in which he 
has invested. In chapter two, a detailed account is given of the ways in which the 
principle of participation is practised by Islamic banks both for funding operations and 
in the form of tradeable securities. The form and degree of partnership is discussed 
in addition to the ways in which profits and unexpected losses are shared. 
This form of investment is particularly attractive to Muslims as it involves the 
theme of co-operation through shared effort and shared risk, combining two of the 
factors of production for mutual benefit. Zakat or alms giving is one of the five 
pillars of Islam, designed to sustain the less fortunate. Whilst banking of any sort 
cannot operate on the basis of charity. Islamic financial principles maintain that an 
entrepreneur should not face double jeopardy when undertaking a venture with bank 
funding. A partnership with the bank entails the sharing of resources, expertise and 
the sponsored project's fortunes. A failure is the responsibility of both partners and 
in such a case, it is considered unjust for the individual to have expended time and 
effort, to have lost whatever capital he was able to contribute and at the same time 
be obliged to repay the bank with interest from non-existent profits. 
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Although profit and loss sharing is undertaken by Islamic banks in the form 
of musharaka and mudaraba, this activity should not be regarded as the mainstay 
of their financial activity. The theory is attractive from many points of view but 
in practice, the situation is different: The Islamic Development Bank has expended 
13.5% of its total financing budget to date on equity participation schemes. Much of 
this proportion was filled in the first few years of operation out of enthusiasm for the 
procedure's principle. Having approved a total of ID43 million for equity participation 
operations in 1980-1981, the figure for 1988-89 stood at only ID1.4 milUon for three 
projects.^ The IDB states that a major review of its equity portfolio is under way. 
Material taken from interviews with the Islamic Development Bank as well 
as with branches of international Islamic banks in Europe and Bahrain has helped 
piece together reasons for dwindling enthusiasm about a mode of financing that was 
initially strongly favoured by these institutions. The fact that profit and loss sharing 
arrangements have also gained the attention of non-Islamic financial institutions as 
large as the World Bank begs the question of the competence of Islamic banks to make 
the system work. A trend away from PLS arrangements over the long term may be 
seen to cast doubt upon a real separate identity for Islamic banks— it is arguable 
that their adaptation of conventional instruments of finance makes them reactors to 
Western trends rather than financial innovators on a grand scaJe. 
1.3.3 Mfirk Up and Profit Margin Operations 
For a number of reasons, those expecting the newly created Islamic banks of the early 
1980's to be providers of risk capital on an international basis were soon proved wrong. 
The drawbacks of participation finance activity led Islamic banks to seek alternative 
ways to employ their funds. The result is now plain to see: a very meagre proportion 
of banks' budgets are spent on long and medium term corporate sponsorship and 
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most of the activity is centred around domestic and international trade financing. 
What then are the major' benefits of trade finance to the bank, and to what 
extent can i t be considered a genuine Islamic activity? 
A brief answer to the second question can in part be provided by referring 
to the Quran which is quite thorough in its information on trade and commerce. 
Particular stress is placed on fair and honourable behaviour as well as on the perils of 
" I I , , • . I . 
concentrating on commercial activity to the exclusion of religious obligation. For as 
long as a suitable balance is maintained between the two, aJlowances may be made, 
such as the permitting of trade during the pilgrimage, but the balance should always 
remain in favour of God rather than family and possessions: 
"Say: ' I f your father, your brothers, your wives, your tribes, the property you 
have acquired, the merchandise you fear may not be sold, and the houses you love, 
are dearer to you than Allah, His apostle and His cause, then wait until Allah shall 
fulf i l l His decree. Allah does not guide the evil-doers.'"^ 
Such detailed information clearly leaves no doubt that the activity itself is an 
acceptable enterprise. Interpreting the modern-day adaptation produces a less sure 
answer. Legally, the mark-up technique of murabaha cannot be considered as interest 
by a different name. The economic result suggests that there is little, if any difference. 
By concentrating on the legal rather than the economic distinctions, perhaps Islamic 
banks obey the letter rather than the spirit of the Quranic law. 
The question of why mark-up is favoured over the PLS arrangement requires 
more gradual examination and is addressed throughout this thesis. It will be observed 
that even in longer term operations, equity participation is avoided while banks opt 
instead for hire purchase or leasing contracts. 
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The final aspect of this general trend in financing policy covers the broader 
factors of supply and demand as well as the wider economic results of the banks' choice 
of investment mode. To a certain extent, this choice is governed by competition; the 
need to make profits and satisfy the consumer. However, Islamic finance is supposed 
to distinguish itself by its socio-economic impact as well as by its financial success. 
Neglect of such considerations compai-es Islamic banks to those early Muslims who 
are warned against favouring their possessions over Allah and His Prophet. Hence 
the conclusion to this work weighs up the success of Islamic financial institutions in 
terms of their international competitiveness as well as examining the extent to which 
Islamic finance is achieving its broader aims. Are the two mutually exclusive? 
Looking ahead to the experience of those Islamic financial institutions with 
whom interviews were conducted, it would appear that western scepticism of their 
ability to compete successfully is unfounded, even though this has indeed been some-
what at the expense of its developmental aims. Western bankers have pointed out 
that its initial success in the Gulf came as a direct result of the region's property 
boom, providing a quick and easy return on investment. Critics also hinted at an 
expansive attitude locally towards a system based on Islamic ideology. Statements 
such as these are based upon confused logic; perhaps it is valid to state that outside 
economic factors, such as a regional recession, are partly to blame where Islamic fi-
nance has fallen short of its aims. I t is, however, inconstructive to suggest that the 
reverse holds true. In the work that follows, it is hoped that some of the wilder claims 
and accusations will be answered in the light of actual experience. 
1.4 Summary 
In such a large subject, of which little has received any serious attention, it is difficult 
to be both informative and concise. I t is hoped that a comparison with estabUshed 
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conventional bank practice in existing markets will help to define the problems Islamic 
finance faces in trying to gain a foothold. A study of banking theory and the practical 
experience of Islamic financial institutions in London, Europe and the Middle East is 
the basis for an evaluation^ of the performance of Islamic finance in general over the 
last two decades and a prognosis for its development into the next century. 
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C H A P T E R T W O 
B A C K G R O U N D T O I S L A M I N T H E E C O N O M I C S P H E R E 
2.1 Scope 
In addition to a brief theoretical account of some of the wider issues that are involved 
in Islamic economic conduct, this chapter addresses some of the practical aspects of 
Islamic finance as carried out by Islamic banks and finance houses. Specifically, the 
aim is to examine the instruments and methods of investment that are available to the 
financier working within the framework of Islamic economics as well as the method in 
which they are practically employed and to what extent the theory of Islamic finance 
coincides with banking practice. Particular attention will be paid to the suitability 
of interest-free banking practice with respect to international trade finance, multina-
tional and portfolio investment. The final section of the chapter addresses the ways in 
which Islamic financial institutions could augment their client appeal and profitability 
by offering a wider range of services as well as the role that a supranational organi-
sation such as the Islamic Development Bank can play in fostering the development 
of those new financial instruments. This would go some way towards meeting the 
banks' statutory liquidity requirements while at the same time presenting the institu-
tion with investment opportunities for the profitable employment of excess liquidity; 
a recurrent dilemnia for non interest-based banks. 
When considering a set of rules and injunctions such as those to be found in a 
system of economic behaviour, i t is not unusual to see its practical application differ 
somewhat from the seemingly straightforward predictions and patterns found in its 
theory. The introduction has illustrated that Islamic economics is no exception to the 
rule, other than that its economic theory still bears the strong imprint of reUgious 
dogma wheras the West has separated the two disciplines. However, even before an 
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examination of the theory in question is carried out, it is logical to define the value of 
the driving force behind the creation of an economic system which differs so greatly 
in many ways from the capital-based system of the West. 
2.2 Islamic Economics and Finance 
Islam as an inspiration for a set of economic principles cannot be. viewed as a reUgion 
alone. Mannan points out that beyond this, Islam is a social system, a composite 
code and a civilization in which religion is just a part.^ Most importantly within 
the economic sphere, Islam has forbidden the taking or charging of interest which i t 
places in the same catejgory' as usury, most often translated as riba. Even here, a 
discrepancy arises, for h6a'as found in the holy Qur'an is equally well translated as 
increase which, in the form of profit, is positively encouraged under Islamic tradition. 
Apologists for the continued use of interest in the Muslim world are apt to declare 
that the prohibition of riba in the Qur'an applied only to usury, and not to the taking 
of interest; numerous passages on the subject exist within the Qur'an, and it is from 
the interpretation of these passages that those holding differing viewpoints are able 
to defend their opinions. 
Whatever may be the ultimate opinion of the 'ulema', the prohibition of the 
taking of interest stands at present and i t is in the absence of this tool that the 
economics of Islam must operate. I t is not simply a bUnd religious fervour that 
prompts the abolition of interest, but rather a conscious determination on the part 
of the 'ulema' to live within the spirit of Islam as a whole, as defined by Mannan 
above, where the ultimate objectives are socio-economic justice and an equitable 
distribution of income and wealth. It is believed that the presence of interest in a 
financial system only serves to exacerbate the problems of the gulf between rich and 
poor. Yet the theory of Islamic economics is not simply a pale and pruned adaptation 
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of the western model. The rules and exhortations of Islam as a seventh century religion 
are reflected in the instruments used for maintaining the movement of money within 
its socio-economic framework today. Within the banking system, interest is seen as 
a hindrance towards the realization of the goals outlined above and steps have been 
taken both to obviate the need for i t , and to provide a suitable equivalent. To avoid 
confusion, what may be labelled interest accruing from, for example, a fixed asset 
capable of providing a service is allowable in Islam. It is permitted even at a set and 
predetermined rate which is called rent to avoid the connotations of the word riba 
amongst Muslims. Rent from the fixed asset remains acceptable in an atmosphere 
of certainty pertaining to the returns to the lessee from that asset for as long as the 
lessor is prepared to waive rent from his property, i f the asset should break down or 
the market change. I f these circumstances pertain, then any uncertainty of livelihood 
for the lessee remains irrelevant and the fixed rent is Islamically allowable.^ 
Two fundamental value judgements within Islam are particularly pertinent to 
its way of banking and they concern the attitude to savings and investment. Islam 
stands firmly against conspicuous consumption such as spending on luxury goods. 
These are not only surplus to the purchaser's requirement but also serve to illustrate 
his high position in society whereby he can treat such goods as status symbols to vainly 
assert his social superiority. On the other hand, i t does not encourage meanness and 
the hoarding of money. Investment and consumption serve to stimulate the economy 
whereas hoarding is conducive to stagnation. This latter trait is discouraged in two 
ways. Firstly, the absence of interest on deposits removes a positive incentive to 
maintain 'idle' money in a bank account, and secondly, the imposition of zakat as a 
wealth tax leaves unused money open to speedy erosion. This, coupled with inflation 
leaves the uncreative use of money a singularly unattractive proposition to the investor 
under an Islamic economy. Mannan does not believe that this is a solely negative move 
which is liable to erode savings as he maintains that the rate of savings is determined 
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by the rate of investment rather than the interest rate.^ 
The ways in which funds may be used to stimulate economic activity domes-
tically and internationally as well as providing the investor with the opportunity of 
making a profit, will be examined in the following section. Before moving ahead to 
the next topic, however, i t seems reasonable to make one further comment on the 
force and effect of Islam on the economy and this concerns the rate of growth as a 
representation of the efficiency of an economy. In this circumstance, the proof of the 
system's efficacy is not necessarily to be observed through external indicators such as 
may be employed towards the same purpose in the West: in effect, the comparatively 
slow growth rate experienced generally in Muslim countries is not necessarily indica-
tive of poor economic theory and policy. Firstly, the concept of growth in Islam and 
its importance is liable to be different to that found in a capitalist economy; a factor 
which will become more apparent as the instruments of Islamic finance are discussed 
as well as the stress placed on other issues such as social welfare. Moreover, the rate 
of growth should not be confused with a country's development which is not governed 
simply by economic policy; within the Middle East particularly, development is prone 
to the interference of outside factors, social, political and historical. I t is within this 
sphere that the examination of financial instruments takes place. 
2.3 Islamic Bank Operations: Investment and Commercial Financing 
Islamic financing operations can be placed in three main categories. Firstly, by means 
of investment financing— funding an enterprise where the bank shares in any profits 
while bearing a proportionate risk of loss. The second area is trade finance, again 
divisible into three sub-sections, discussed below. Finance by lending forms the 
third main division and, although it constitutes a significant part of the Islamic 
Development Bank's activities in the form of the Special Assistance Account, its 
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application is based more upon charity than on competitiveness. Socio-economic 
impact is, of course, intrinsic to the ideology of Islamic finance but in the sphere of 
international banking where profits are necessary for survival, i t does little to improve 
the competitiveness of Islamic banks themselves. 
Some of the methods of financing that will be examined in this section cannot 
always be accurately defined. That is to say that the practices adopted by institutions 
offering Islamic finance are not standardised and therefore any definition of these 
practices is necessarily a guideline. A distinction is made here between traditional 
investment on an Islamic basis and the financing of commerce and trading operations. 
Amongst the procedures examined below, only mudaraba and musharaka fall into the 
former category. A bri,ef survey of Islamic financing procedures follows, outUning the 
mechanics and rationale behind each one, and where appropriate, information on the 
apportioning of finance and any shortcomings encountered is given. 
2.3.1 Mudaraba 
The theme of partnership between bank and client is a strong one which runs through 
the fabric of Islamic financing operations and is clearly seen in the terms of mudaraba 
and musharaka. The two methods have much in common; both are fiduciary contracts 
requiring the provision of capital as well as time, effort and management skills from 
the partners in the operation, either singly or with both sides providing all these 
factors. Furthermore, both rely on good faith, honesty and fairness without which 
there would result dissatisfaction, conflict and destabilisation. More specifically, they 
are a contract in profit sharing with the bank acting as the sahib al-Mal or financier 
and the client as mudarib or entrepreneur. I t is not always simple to decide which of 
these methods of financing is the appropriate one in a given situation and indications 
given by the Muslim jurists often attached to financial institutions are not always 
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positive, as seen in the exhortation to limit mudaraba to trading activities such as 
bu3dng and selling.* Furthermore, in the case of financing current Islamic banking 
operations the appHcation of mudaraba is limited again by scholars who argue that 
i t should be limited to self-liquidating transactions. These are encouraged because 
on liquidation, i t becomes easy to ascertain and distribute the assets involved in a 
contract and thus the rights and liabilities of the partners can be settled without 
dispute before any new contract is undertaken. 
The question of adaptc^bility regarding this profit sharing arrangement is an 
important one. Some scholars riiaintain that the principle involved in the mudaraba 
arrangement could be used to provide ,credit advances via the central bank to commer-
cial banks in the event of a credit squeeze.^  This is, however, an artificial solution to 
the problem with the comrnercial banks being required to set aside a certain amount 
of reserves to fund a 'common pool' to be used in such an eventuahty. More feasible 
and practicable is the use of a profit sharing arrangement to fund business expansion 
in preference to private or corporate investors. I t has been pointed out that fam-
ily businesses in Muslim countries sometimes forego expansion by public quotation 
fearing this would result in the control of the business passing out of their hands.^ 
The resultant venture capital gap could be met in part through mudaraba financing 
by Islamic banks whereby a separate company is set up by the bank and its cUent, 
involving no risk of the chent losing control of his original business. 
I t is inevitable that some scholars, proud of a socially responsible economic 
system, are apt to make much of certain aspects of the theory involved without 
giving enough consideration to the practical side. For instance, Abdeen and Shook 
observe: 
" Modarabah is popular in Islamic banking because i t is a mechanism for eco-
nomic development in which monetary assets are introduced into the production 
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process in order to tra;nsform them into real factors of production... The adoption 
of Modarabah by the Islamic bank stems from the realization that i t provides an Is-
lamic solution to the economic dilemma of how the owner of monetary assets and the 
businessman can be brought together on common ground,"^ 
Just how useful does this distinction prove in practice? Although it may be 
considered commendable to bridge the gap between financier and entrepreneur, i t 
should be remembered that this is also the function of western banks although of 
course the terms of the latter's arrangement will be significantly different, mudaraba 
is, in some cases, a clumsy way of financing a business operation. In an open economy, 
as for example exists in Kuwait, "trade financing requirements are mainly for imports 
from the industrialised West., and the traders generally require short term finance. 
Similarly in Saudi Arabia, in part arising from an open economy, the production 
base is limited and local independent credit demand is not great. Those who do seek 
credit are much more likely to turn to the Saudi Investment Development Fund whose 
generous terms leave the commercial banks ignored to a large extent by business. 
Inevitably, the role of Islamic banks seeking to operate in the area is likely to be 
similarly restricted and the lure of overseas investment would be a strong one. 
2.3.2 Musharaka 
Before examining instruments which may be available to Islamic financial institutions 
and adaptable to a new purpose, i t seems reasonable to complete this brief survey 
of those procedures in financing that are presently in use and recognised. Similar in 
characteristics to mudaraba is musharaka where the difference between the two Ues in 
the nature of the contribution of the partners involved: whether the partners assist 
with finance as well as management as in the case of musharaka, or with one factor 
21 
only as described above. Abdeen and Shook point out the benefits of musharaka 
financing quite succinctly: , : 
" One of the main advantages oimusharaka is the understanding that the bank is 
a participating partner and behaves as such if expectations of sale of the commodities 
or the manufactured products are not fulfilled and more time is needed."^ 
Defined as equity participation, musharaka would be more attractive to an 
expanding business as described under the mudaraba section, in preference to private 
and corporate investors. This procedure is necessarily not a predatory one as the 
Islamic bank is merely interested in obtaining a return, not in controlling the company. 
In addition to investment projects, musharaka can be applied to other activities such 
as a negotiated profit sharing arrangement arising from an overdue payment on a letter 
of credit. The bank may decide not to charge interest on the postponed payment, 
sharing instead in the profits of the importer at a ratio agreed in advance. 
This method of fina,ncing is.also adaptable to the purchase of property or real 
estate with the bank assessing the incoming rent from the property and sharing it 
with the client according to the share of each partner in the financing of the project. 
Gradually, the bank's share is reduced as the client pays up the instalments of the 
loan, resulting ultimately in the transfer of the whole property to the client. 
There is no fixed formula for the distribution of profits in accordance with the 
amount of capital put forward by the partners but they agree to divide profits in a 
proportion determined in advance as well as deciding the duration of the operation. 
The project may last a matter of weeks, months or years and in the case of a long or 
medium term operation, i t is likely that some form of decreasing participation may 
be agreed upon, as described above so, that the ownership of the whole operation 
finally passes to the client, the bank having been paid back the principal as well as a 
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satisfactory share of any profits. 
I t should soon become apparent that although this procedure of profit sharing, 
either by mudaraba or musharaka is both Islamically desirable and in theory likely to 
return a profit to both sides, its chief drawback must be the cost of implementation. 
Once in operation, the running costs are unlikely to be significantly greater than 
any other investment undertaking by the bank, but the cost and additional expertise 
required to vet a prospective client's credit-worthiness and to carry out a feasibiUty 
study of the proposed project is hkely to be high; a daunting situation to all but 
an estabhshed and already profit-making institution. A further consideration for the 
successful operation of this financing method is the abihty of the bank to follow up the 
project \fith. proper aiidits and periodic business decisions that befit the bank's dual 
status in the enterprise as both partner and provider of capital. Needless to add, the 
bank is not covered against the possible failure of the project it is financing. Under the 
shari'a, the lending iiistitutipn may ask for collateral to insure the bank against the 
partner's neglect or irresponsible procedures, but this does not cover normal business 
risks. i , , 
In the case of the Islamic Development Bank, an institution to which a later 
chapter is devoted, the costs of appraising the proposed scheme as well as the process 
of initially attracting the entrepreneur may well be sidestepped in future leaving others 
to do the spade-work and reducing the bank's role to one of indirect participation.^ 
The IDB certainly cannot be classed as a high street bank. Islamic or otherivise, but 
the sharing of the project's inception costs with other institutions better able to carry 
out the sort of detailed analysis required under such circumstances is a way of cutting 
expenses whilst remaining involved in the project; it is a procedure that may be of 
considerable benefit to mainstream banks. Participation solely in providing capital in 
twenty out of fifty eight equity schemes undertaken by the IDB up to 1987 changes the 
classification of this tool from direct to portfolio investment and illustrates the need 
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for adaptabiUty of Islamic methods of finance where it may otherwise be impractical 
for the financial institution to become involved in an investment. 
Further problems cbnfroiit the' concept of equity financing. One major source of 
frustration to investors, institutional or private, concerns the dearth of stock markets 
in the region. The difficulties arising from this situation are complex, but basically 
stated, it is difficult to make liquid or sell an equity stake in an economy which 
lacks a market in which to trade the stake. This problem confronts governments 
in the Middle East as well as investment institutions when faced with the problem 
of financing budgetary deficits.. Unlike the United Kingdom for example, Middle 
Eastern governments, have no developed capital market on which to sell bills and 
bonds. Banks would be jobliged to provide a guaranteed rate of high return via high 
interest rates in order to persuade customers to hold such assets and this, of course 
would be Islamically unacceptable. To counter this deficiency, it is not surprising 
that banks find the prospect: of entering Euromarkets the only possible alternative. 
In this section there yet rernains a further internal Islamic procedure to examine. 
2.3.3 Murabaha 
The rapid and reasonably predictable turnover of murabaha operations makes it a 
profitable means of using surplus funds on a short term basis with the option of 
depositing such funds in interest bearing accounts unavailable to Islamic banks and 
the alternative of leaving such funds stagnant equally unattractive. In his paper, "How 
to Islamise the Kuwaiti banking system", Kabbara suggests that the introduction of 
this tool should constitute the first step in the process of such a transformation: 
" The application of murabaha at the early stages of Islamic finance stems from 
its simplicity and clarity. Moreover, it requires minimal alterations of the existing 
system of trade finance and minimal training of bank employees. More significantly, 
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the introduction of murabaha facilitates the provision of Islamic short-term finance 
in an economy which is predpininantly trade orientated." 
Originally, the Isla,mic Development Bank used murabaha to mop up surplus 
funds, employing them! for trade financing in a method directly related to the docu-
mentary letter of credit. On the theoretical side, it is a popular method of encouraging 
trade between Muslim countries and improving the balance of payments situation that 
exists between them. Murabaha is encouraged by the Saudi-based Islamic Develop-
ment Bank as a method of trade financing amongst its member countries, particularly 
those in the oil sector, but besides oil, commodites such as refined petroleum prod-
ucts, palm oil, cement and cotton ahcl jute products are traded and financed in the 
short term by murabaha] these being particularly desirable IslamicaUy as they are 
commodities for production riaither thaii consumption. 
For the banks themselves, however Islamically motivated they may or may not 
be, murabaha is attractive to them as a means of providing short-term credit whose 
return on investment is all but guaranteed whilst still conforming with shari'a law. 
The mechanics of a mura6a/ia are relatively simple: the bank agrees to buy goods from 
an overseas supplier on behalf of its client, the 'real' importer, and thus opens a letter 
of credit to the supplier. The imported goods received by the bank's client are in fact 
owned by the bank which sells back the goods to its client at a slight profit. This 
mark-up on sale cannot be deemed interest as the profit is raised on real goods, not 
simply borrowed money. In respect of the shari'a, this is not a profit received at no 
risk, as despite expressing an intention to repurchase the goods acquired on its behalf, 
the cUent is under no legal obligation to do so. I f the repurchase is not undertaken, 
the problem of an anticipated loss on further sale, particularly on a capital good for 
which there may be no market, is a very real one. In Saudi Arabia for example, 
those lucky enough to receive an Industrial License are Ukely to be operating in a 
near monopolistic situation as the Saudi government does not set as much store by 
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competition as we do in the West, i f only because of the limited size of the internal 
market which may justify only one producer. Under these conditions how is a bank to 
find a customer with similar requirements to coincide with their unsold capital good? 
However, the risks, although real, are not perceived to be as high as those 
involved in equity financing and moreover, the returns are regular. Prom day to day, 
banks are more able to anticipate their needs for liquidity to such an extent that 
trade credit infringes only marginally on the inter-bank market: that is to say that 
banks are unlikely to run out , of money through advancing trade credit on which they 
receive no return. 
Furthermore, this is no icosy sideline to convince banks that they are operating in 
an Islamically desirable manner whilst attaching little importance to this investment 
method and i t has become' more than a means of investing funds not required for 
project finance. Between 1977 and November 1982 the IDB financed 145 murabaha 
operations totalling $USl,949.56 million, representing approximately two-thirds of 
the total amount of funding operations approved by the bank. A paper presented in 
1981 by Dr Fahim Khan showed that the banks included in his survey had a preference 
for financing trade and investment in real estate, both of which provide quick returns 
on funds i nves t ed . In the early stages of the development of Islamic Finance, i t was 
necessary to show good profitability so as to provide a credible alternative to the 
interest-based banks operating in the region. This progress was continued up to 1987 
when the 4,355 million Islamic dinars worth of foreign trade operations represented 
more than twice the size of the bank's c a p i t a l . A similar trend can be seen in the 
increase of murabaha clients at the Dubai Islamic Bank between 1980 and 1982. The 
number grew from 335 in the first year to 953 in 1981 and up to 3300 in 1982.' 13 
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2.3.4 Ijara/Ijara wa Iktina (Hire Purhase and Lease Financing) 
One of the main attractions of leasing operations to Islamic financial institutions is 
that i t provides opportunities to work with leading international corporations which 
serves to boost the banks' reputation and inculcate a sense of confidence in the minds 
of undecided clients. I t also has the advantage of producing regular returns and being 
less risky in the long term than an equity participation scheme. 
Banks may purchase machinery or production equipment on behalf of a client, 
agreeing to let the client rent i t back. The bank is paid either in instalments that 
represent payment for borrowing equipment that it owns, or alternatively, the leas-
ing is conditioned to purchase by the customer with the rental payment fixed or in 
proportion to the rented asset's contribution to profits of the enterprise in which i t 
is being used. By this method, the customer becomes owner of the asset when the 
rental charges are the same as the cost of that asset. This instrument of finance has 
gained popularity in some countries where the rental payments are tax deductible.^'* 
This method of financing best lends itself to the longer term funding required for 
capital goods, with commodities and raw materials the domain of murabaha. 
2.4 Practical Aspects of Islamic Financing Procedures 
I t has been stressed in the preceeding sections that the financing methods examined 
are those which are available in theory and which have been given a clean bill of health 
Islamically by the 'ulema'. This should not suggest either that all these methods are 
presently employed by Islamic banks operating in the Middle East or that no other 
instruments are being considered as a means of making Islamic banking a more viable 
alternative to conventional banks which provide a wider range of services. As has been 
illustrated, many factors conspire against a greater use of musharaka, for example, 
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in some countries of the Ara,b Gulf particularly where the local credit demand is not 
great, where more appealing terms are off"ered to the few who do require credit and 
where the banks have neither the experience nor the personnel to carry out intricate 
feasibility studies of proposed schemes. Conversely, such a climate is conducive to 
the financing of trade by the instrument of murabaha. 
In addition to considerations of the commercial climate required in which Is-
lamic finance will flourish, there are cases where a mode of financing has been tailored 
to meet the banks' needs while at the same time disadvantaging the cUent by allowing 
him to bear a disproportionate share of commercial risk. The weight given to trad-
ing instruments in the contemporary practice of Islamic banks, although acceptable, 
becomes a little less desirable when it is established just how little risk the bank is 
actually shouldering. A financial institution can almost rely on obtaining profit from 
the mark-up on sale invplved in murabaha because it is unlikely that a cUent, having 
approached the bank to purchse goods on his behalf, will renege on the agreement 
and miss out on a trading opportunity, as well as souring relations with the bank 
simply to exercise the Islarnic right not to buy. Thus, cases of non-repurchase must 
be rare, and with thi? in mind,.the profit earned by the bank is almost risk free and 
as such, strongly reminiscent of riba.. 
Where other forms of financing are undertaken, according to Fahim Khan,^^ 
actual malpractices are identifiable. Most involve a sidestepping of the risk-bearing 
responsibility by the bank in some way. In the case of leasing, clients have been 
obliged to undertake the insurance of the asset against all risks at his own expense, 
legally the responsibility of the bank. The same author cites abuses in profit and 
loss sharing arrangements whereby a Reserve Account is established by the cUent 
and profits above a lower than expected percentage margin are paid in annually, 
providing the bank Avith a reserve from which to draw in case profits fall below the 
set percentage. I f the account is insufllcient to meet the bank's return requirement, 
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he adds, then the client is obliged to make up the short fall by selling its equity shares 
to the bank. 
With this in mind, i t 'is not surprising that even in the case of a complete 
transformation of banking practice from the n'6a-based banking system to the Is-
lamic model, such as occurred in Pakistan, a traditional attitude to bank clients stiU 
pertains. Similarly, there remains a reluctance on the part of the banks to taice part 
in equity sharing schemes. As Presley observes: 
" Equity participation and musharaka accounted for less than 15 per cent of 
the total, owing in part to a lack of appropriate institutional and legal infrastructure, 
experience, and trained staflF to evaluate projects requiring participation by the banks. 
In view of the predominance of the short term mark-up based operations, bank 
managements did not encounter serious adjustment difficulties; the basis of banking 
operations has remained the banker's knowledge of the cHent and famiUarity with 
their creditworthiness rather than the expected profitability of the activity for which 
the financing was sought." • : 
Once again, the problems of initiating equity participation schemes, not to 
mention the effort of maintaining them, leaves the Islamic bank providing a less than 
complete service to its clients, even in the absence of competition from interest-
charging institutions. Moreover, the former is not achieving a level of profitabihty 
which would make i t a viable player in the inter-bank market, even i f the latter's 
activities were conducted in an Islamically acceptable manner. 
2.5 Further Development of Islamic Financial Instruments 
I t may be true that in practice some of these methods of halal financing are open 
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to abuse, and that Islamic banks neither offer the same wide range of services to 
their clients, nor provide themselves with the same investment opportunities in the 
wholesale market. There is nonetheless a perceived need on the part of conventional 
commercial banks to offer specifically Islamic financial services to satisfy a growing 
number of prospective Muslim clients. The National Commercial Bank of Saudi Ara-
bia, for example, offers Islamic trade finance to its customers as one of its services. 
Similarly, links between Islamic and conventional financial institutions have been 
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strong, due in part to the trading situation between the Islamic Middle East and the 
West, as described above, and also the links are as a result of the more developed 
nature of Western financial markets which allows greater diversification in portfoUo 
investment than may otherwise be found in the Islamic World. Thus, instead of forc-
ing the instrument to fit a situation which has no real appeal to an Islamic bank, it 
may be beneficial from the point of view of earning an efficient and halal profit to 
investigate and emulate in an Islamically acceptable manner the way in which West-
ern financial institutions make their money, achieved as a result of flexibility through 
diversification. 
That this may involve not just the evolution of the banks themselves, but also 
the economic environment in which they operate is a significant consideration. Banks 
cannot operate in a vacuum, and to increase their scope of operations as well as their 
profitability, they will need outside assistance both for the creation of new financial 
instruments, and for the creation of markets in which to trade them. The idea of 
a central bank, or more particularly, a development agency, in this role may not 
be as fanciful as it sounds. The creation, in 1986, of an Islamic Unit Trust by a 
leading English merchant bank is a good indicator of how strong the demand for 
Islamic finance can be, i f only realistic investment opportunities are presented. Nor 
can the altruistic dimension of a profit redistributing organisation such as the Islamic 
Development Bank be ignored. 
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Further conside'ra;ti6ns iiivdlve the relationship of Islamic banks with their con-
ventional counterparts, nationally and internationally. From the account given in this 
chapter, i t is possible to see that much thought has gone into the concept of Islamic 
banking and that its friimewdrk is well-developed, especially with regard to the retail 
sector and the choices presented to the potential investor. In the wholesale market, 
the structure is less than adequate; The heavy reliance on external trade both within 
and outside the Islamic world makes cogent some degree of cooperation between the 
two banking systems, especially with the Western institutions, as most trade from 
Muslim states is with Islamic rather than non-Islamic states.^* Yet it is difficult for 
a relationship to evolve, legally and practically without there being a standard code 
of practice and a sense of unity among the Islamic banks within a given country and 
amongst such banks in general. 
The two banking systems can be considered compUmentary in many ways, 
rather than mutually exclusive. In most Islamic countries. Islamic and riba banks 
operate alongside each other although not necessarily in conjunction. The practical-
ity of their co-existence in the market place is attested to by the fact that both return 
profits and remain in business.To break even, however, is a situation quite different 
from achieving a substantial share of the market. With very few exceptions. Islamic 
banks must compete with conventional banks for profits in the retail sector, whereas 
in wholesale markets, no exceptions are to be found. Even after the complete Islami-
sation of the Iranian economy in 1983, the interbank market continued to operate 
under the same interest-based system that had prevailed under the Shah's regime. 
The contention ran that the charging of interest between financial institutions did 
not constitute riba. This being the most favourable climate regarding competition 
in which the development of Islamic banking must take place, it becomes clear that 
outside assistance is vital. 
Part of the role that a supranational body may play in accelerating the maturing 
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process of Islamic finance is contained in the following remarks: 
" Islamic banks are at a considerable disadvantage in facing competition with 
conventional banks because they do not have access to the money markets and may 
even face hostility froiri the conventional banks in these markets. The conventional 
banks can always resort to other banks and to the central bank when they face a 
difficult situation; this is not often the case for Islamic banks. A solution to this 
problem is to make provision for central bank assistance to the Islamic banks on a 
basis compatible with the shari'a." 
Islamic Banks requiring cash at call presently have no option but to hold cash 
reserves which yield no profit, inter-bank deposits being unlawful because of their riba 
element; the same holds true for government securities. Clearly, something similar to 
conventional securities is required although operating within the regulations imposed 
by the shari'a, one to be traided amongst Islamic banks, the other would involve 
tradable debt instruments issued by governments of Muslim states. The mechanics 
of these instruments as well as the markets in which they may be traded are topics 
which will be examined as a conclusion; to the chapter, with particular emphasis on 
the role that the Islamic Development Bank could play in this context. 
2.6 New Islamic Financial Instruments and Their Market 
There are many considerations that govern the question of new developments that 
may transform the ways in which Islamic financial institutions conduct business in 
the 1990's. Not only would there be the need for sufficient buyers and sellers in the 
market, it would also be necessary for a market structure to be created in the first 
place and for an institution, probably in the form of co-operating central banks, to 
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provide a regulatory framework. This would not only involve the need to observe 
correct commercial procedure by, the participating banks, but would also require an 
understanding of what constitutes Islamically acceptable practice; one set of rehgious 
guidelines would help to make the practice of Islamic finance more homogeneous 
and convincing to partisans of conventional finance. The issue of a central Islamic 
bank or regulatory a,uthority is a thorny one. The Islamic Development Bank is 
often projected into this role; doubtless, there are ways in which this supranational 
institution can aid the progress of ,Islamic banking, and a section devoted to the IDB 
discusses them. For now, it should suffice to state that present circumstances make 
the assumption of a central bank role by this institution extremely unhkely. 
In this sphere, perhaps the most significant contribution that the Islamic De-
velopment Bgjxk can proyide| is that of principal market maker and the guarantee to 
repurchase any certificates that it might issue. The necessity of this latter undertak-
ing cannot be over-emphasised. In the absence of a secondary market, the purchasing 
of shares is likely to be slow owing to investors' awareness of the lack of a trading 
place in which to offload their certificates. The possibility of repurchase by the bank 
will provide the prospective investor with the liquidity element required by him as an 
owner of assets. 
The new instruments mentioned at the end of the previous section would doubt-
less meet the pre-requisite of tradeability, but they would be presented to the market 
at different levels. Whilst the market in government debt instruments would have to 
be at the national level, i t has been suggested that the market in Islamic certificates 
of deposit would operate internationally.^^ Increased co-operation between Islamic 
banks is necessary to launch this instrument in an extremely competitive market; 
once again, the international dimension turns attention towards the Islamic Devel-
opment Bank. Chapter six assesses the extent of this institution's contribution to 
the development and marketing of new financial instruments as well as the creation 
33 
of their market. In mbre geiieral terms, the chapter makes a practical assessment of 
the Islamic Development Bank's role in promoting Islamic finance worldwide. With 
this in mind, more detailed examination of new financial instruments is deferred until 
then. 
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Chapter Three 
T H E E U R O M A R K E T S 
3.1 Structure of the Euromarket 
3.1.1 Definition 
Stated in the most basic terms, a market exists when buyers wishing to exchange 
money for a good or service are in contact with sellers wishing to exchange a good or 
service for money. In this instance, a market is defined by the forces of supply and 
demand without necessarily being confined to a specific geographical location. The 
concept of the market is a fundamental one in contemporary economics because, in 
a free market economy, this is the mechanism by which resources are allocated. 
The Euromarket differs very little in concept. It is, by definition, unrestricted 
by geographical boundaries and rehes on the basic forces of supply and demand for its 
continuing existence. A very important consideration for the operation of an offshore 
estabhshment is the necessity of good communications. I t will be seen that the po-
litical and economic stimuli applied to Eurobanking activities in the post-war years 
were accompanied by great improvements in communications technology. Bearing in 
mind that a Euromarket is not a tangible institution, being in fact separate entities 
linked by telex and computer, it is reasonable to state that communications are a 
prerequisite for operation. However, the most significant factor contributing to the 
existence of Euromarkets is the way in which they differ from traditional banking 
facilities within a given country. In this context, for 'Euro' one should simply read 
'external', showing that the financial institutions dealing in a Eurocurrency are not 
part of the domestic banking system and as such are not subject to domestic bank-
ing regulations. The important advantages that this status incurs will be examined 
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shortly. Nevertheless, although Euromarket centres enjoy this difference in status and 
can be distinguished by the services they offer, it is equally important to acknowledge 
their link with domestic markets. The Eurocurrency market, which will be examined 
first, is not a banking system in itself but rather an extension of the major countries' 
domestic banking system. To clarify this series of statements i t is necessary to investi-
gate how the Euromarkets work, looking specifically at the markets for Eurocurrency 
and Eurobonds. 
The origin of the Eurocurrency market had little to do with the Arab world, 
although the OPEC states played ari important role in its later development. United 
States dollars, the first major currency to be found in this market, were first held in 
this external capacity shortly after the Second World War by Communist countries. 
Fearing the appropriation of their dollar assets by the United States, these countries 
preferred to hold them in Paris and London, outside the control of their country of 
origin. The US dollar is not the sole currency unit used in this market's transactions. 
However, the currency involved must be freely convertible: one that will appeal to 
the greatest number of financial institutions in the market. Therefore it is usual to 
see deposits and loans denominated in Deutsche Marks and SterUng in addition to US 
dollars. The Eurocurrency market is thus composed of financial institutions bidding 
for Deutsche Mark deposits and making Deutsche Mark loans outside West Germany, 
financial institutions outside the UK which perform similar services with sterling— 
and so on. When considering the size and unrestricted nature of this market, it is 
also worth noting that the currencies loaned need not necessarily be those of either 
borrower or lender. 
3.1.2 Some Features of Euromsirket Operations 
The greatest advantage to be found in Euromarket operations is the lack of domestic 
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banking regulations, indeed, this is the key to their success. The constraint most 
significant by its absence is that of a minimum reserve requirement. Without this, 
Eurobanks are able to make profitable use of all deposited funds rather than keeping 
aside a fixed percentage with the central bank or federal reserve at minimal or zero 
interest. As a result of this maximal use of funds, the Eurobanks are able to offer 
slightly higher deposit rates and lower lending rates to their clients. Consequently, 
one observes that the Euromarkets are fully a wholesale operation with profits being 
made on the sheer volume of business passing through the participating financial 
institutions on the interbank market. Below is an example given by Adrian Buckley of 
a typical Eurodollar transaction. ^ A US corporation with a $2 million surplus notices 
the more attractive rate offered on dollar deposits outside the US where the surplus 
was originally held in a time deposit at a local US bank. Having switched the time 
deposit's now matured funds to a demand deposit, the funds are then transferred 
to the bank's London branch where a time deposit is made. The route taken by 
these funds is not particularly intricate, but in order to observe who gains from the 
transaction and how this is so, it is important to chart carefully the course of the US 
company's dollar deposit. 
" ..This process creates a Eurodollar deposit, substituting for an equivalent time 
deposit in a US bank. The London branch of the US bank deposits the cheque in 
its account with a US bank. The US company holds a dollar deposit in a bank in 
London rather than in the USA. The total of deposits of the banks in the US remains 
unchanged. However, investors hold smaller deposits in the US and larger deposits in 
London. The London bank now has a larger deposit in the USA. The increase in the 
London bank's deposits in the US is matched by the increase in dollar deposits for 
the world as a whole. The volume of dollar deposits in the USA remains unchanged 
while the volume in London increases."^ 
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I t is now that the real value of a deep market for a given currency becomes 
apparent. The dollars can be passed on between many banks although it may not be 
necessary for each bank to havis a regular contact with more than a couple of other 
institutions. Should the London bank not have a commercial borrower which requires 
the funds, i t will place them on the Eurodollar interbank market. This process can 
continue through a number of Eurobanks until a final non-bank borrower is found. 
Each bank in the lending process pays a slightly higher rate than the previous one 
but, at around one eighths of one percent, margins on the interbank market are very 
small. I t is also important to note that the passing on of funds on the interbank 
market has no effect on the extension of credit until the funds are passed on to a 
non-bank borrower such as another corporation or a government. 
Within the currency loan rnarkei, the lending poUcy of the Eurobanks differs 
significantly from that of domestic banks. This raises a number of issues. Firstly, 
the practice of lending large siirris to few customers is vital to the profit-making 
capacity of financial institutions in the Eurocurrency market. These profits rely on 
the continuing attraction that the offshore sector holds for its clients; substantial 
loans at competitive rates. These rates could not be maintained if Eurobanks were 
to serve the smaller customer whose marginal cost would be greater than a larger 
one. As a result, in comparison with domestic banks who offer a much wider range 
of services to a wide cross-section of clients, Eurobanks maintain significantly lower 
overhead costs, aiding profitability. In addition, being beyond the control of their 
host country's government, Eurobanks are not obliged to undertake the financing 
of projects considered important for that country's economic well-being, but not 
necessarily a profitable venture by the bank. The social benefits and costs of Euro-
finance are not issues of primary importance to participating financial institutions. 
The second observation concerns how Islamically justifiable a policy with such a 
narrow outlook may be. There is no welfare dimension to Eurocurrency transactions 
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which favour those with an impeccable reputation for creditworthiness rather than 
those who may be equally deserving if only the bank would undertake an examination 
of the financial record of such a case. This of course would raise overhead costs and 
change the complexion of the bank's overall pohcy. 
Customer contact is on a very much smaller scale than in the retail sector with 
most of the transactions taking place on the interbank market. A separate study will 
be made of the role of Islamic banks within a market involving interest charges and 
what may arguably be classified an inequitable code of conduct. This in itself requires 
further exploration. Whilst ,a long term securities market such as the US debt market 
revolves around the credit rating assigned by agencies such as Moody's and Standard 
and Poors, customer status is shghtly less well defined in the Eurocurrency market 
and is based on reputation. As we enter the 1990's, financial institutions of all kinds 
should be aware of the. brittle nature of reputations; what may appear to be a sound 
lending opportunity can often turn put to be just the reverse. 
Moreover, all basic Eurocurrency loans are unsecured credits and while in prac-
tice borrowers of unimpeachable reputation may well deserve such a credit rating, 
the much wider availability of funds for loan, owing in part to the expansion of the 
market over the last decade, has allowed less highly rated borrowers to enter the mar-
ket. For example, what may be classed as economically suspect governments have 
entered the medium term Eurocredit market seeking funds for infrastrucure projects 
and for financing balance of payments deficits. Lessons are soon learned on a smaller 
scale, too. Although a quite distinct entity offering its clients different services to 
domestic banks, the Euromarkets nevertheless cannot afford to ignore the trends that 
the latter observe in their domestic and international 'regular' transactions. Indeed, 
the fact that banks can arbitrage between domestic and Euro-business leaves the 
Euro interest rates subject to banks' behaviour rather than directly by the supply 
and demand for money by non-banks in the Euromarket.^ 
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In the case of Eurocredits with a maturity date of up to ten years, the problem 
becomes more acute. Due to the fact that loans on the Euromarket rarely fall below 
one million dollars in value, with profit being made through large movements of 
money rather than via a high rate of interest, it is important to have reliable up to 
date information on the filial borrower. It may be stated that the risk involved in 
lending above a certain figure to a single borrower, putting all the eggs in one basket, 
can be lessened by syndicating the loan with other banks. Nevertheless i t should 
always be borne in mind that an bank has the capacity to over-lend, in which case 
i t leaves itself open to crashing. The spectre of a widescale run on banks for this 
reason is unpleasant to contemplate. Further prudential and economic objections to 
the existence of an unregulated banking system will be studied in a separate section. 
Before an examination of ,the practice of Euromarket operations, it is logical to 
note the political and economic factors;, contributing to its growth, why it continues 
to thrive and the role the OPEC states played in its evolution. 
3.2 Development of the Euromarket 
The Eurocurrency market was conceived for a variety of somewhat negative reasons 
and its expansion is partly due to similar considerations. Just as the Communists in 
the 1950's sought to keep their dollar assets free from the risk of US confiscation, po-
litical factors conspired in the 1970's to keep Arab funds from being directly invested 
in the US, a country which had recently been the object of an Arab embargo.^ 
Economic restrictions provided another part of the impetus allowing the obser-
vation that much of the energy for development came from the supply side of the 
market. In the late 1950's, sterling's weak position, along with the restrictions on 
its use for financing third country trade, led to the British bankers' use of dollars 
in this capacity and consequently their interest in the Euromarket to provide those 
42 
dollars. The US added to this gtowth during the 1960's as regulation Q restricted 
the rate of interest US banks coii l i pay on deposits.^ The American answer to the 
ensuing credit shortage resulting from the flow of funds to London and Europe was to 
establish branches in European financial centres and channel funds back to the USA. 
The mechanics of this arrangement.has been explained above. 
The 1970's saw the arrival of the Arab world on the Eurobanking scene. This 
was in great part due to the huge OPEC surplus following the 1973 oil price increase. 
OPEC's devotion to Eurobanking faciUties stemmed from the massive size of the 
surplus which had to be recycled somehow and the system's safety, efficiency and 
competitiveness in this process. The large OPEC surplus meant corresponding deficits 
in the oil importing countries. This switch in fortunes left deficit countries with a 
number of choices as Adrian Buckley observes: 
"They might recognise that their deficits would not be temporary and attempt 
to restructure their economies to lessen dependence on oil and to stimulate new ex-
ports, using reserves and borrowing to finance the restructuring. They might deflate 
their economies by holding down domestic consumption and investment, Umiting 
demand, and thereby minimising borrowing. The option most widely chosen by de-
veloped countries involved a combination of financing and deflation." ^ 
Irrespective of the course chosen, the impact of the oil price rise and its possible 
future use as an economic weapon was undeniable. It is also reasonable to state that 
the role of the Euromarket in bringing oil-importing countries to this realisation is a 
significant one. Furthermore, its continuing use for the financing of deficits seemed 
assured. In January 1974, France arranged a $1.5 billion credit that would fund 
approximately one third of its estimated current account deficit for 1974.^ Although 
the loan was not drawn on in 1974, Daniel Kane observes that the market's capacity 
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to provide credit of this size after billion dollar credits of 1973 gave an indication of 
its depth and flexibility as an international capital market. 
Having traced the development of the Euromarket to a position of maturity, it 
remains to study some practical considerations of its operation. 
3.3 Euro—Finance in Practice 
3.3.1 The Attraction of Eurocurrency Transactions to Borrowers 
and Investors 
I t should not be assumed from the outset that the Euromarkets are an ideal place 
for borrowing and investment for all those who qualify to make use of the markets' 
services. Several factors pertain that contradict such an assumption. The risk factor 
is relevant to both the borrower and the investor as well as the market as a whole. In 
theory, i t is possible to argue that Euromarkets both increase and reduce risk exposure 
on the part of the investor. One line of reasoning suggests that a host government may 
sieze the assets of a Eurobank operating within its country or somehow restrict its 
activities for reasons of political expediency or to drastically alter its foreign exchange 
position. This is known as sovereign risk. In simple terms, because Eurodeposits are 
located in a diflPerent country, they are in some respects subject to the jurisdiction of 
that country. Consequently depositors may be deprived of their funds at maturity by 
an unexpected action from either of the two countries; or indeed from any country 
involved in the chain of interbank transactions. Adrian Buckley offers the example 
of a US depositor in the Eurodollar market holding a claim in London but ultimately 
receiving payment in the USA. 
On the other hand, holding a deposit in an offshore market may be considered 
prudent where there is the fear that new capital controls may be imposed on the 
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disposition of residents' funds. This latter consideration is however only one amongst 
many; it is unreasonable to suggest that the main attraction of the Euromarket lies in 
its capacity to reduce risk. In effect, the different domestic and offshore interest rate 
levels may arise through the latter market being perceived as more inherently risky. 
To add weight to this claim, one should consider the differing position of central banks 
to domestic banks and their external counterparts. Whereas the central bank of a 
certain country may undertake to rescue troubled domestic banks, why should it do 
so for an offshore branch? After all, having gained an enviable commercial position 
by operating outside the financial law,, i t is unreasonable to summon the law-maker 
when such behaviour has led to difliculties. Furthermore, it is not easy to ascertain 
who should be the lender of last resort; when difficulties originate from loans on the 
books of foreign affiliates. This contentious issue is more thoroughly assessed in the 
later section on the case for control of the Euromarkets. 
In addition to the risk factor we observe the problem of exchange controls. 
These take many forms ranging from the requirement for residents to surrender all 
holdings of foreign currency to restrictions on the acquisition of assets and Uabilities 
denominated in a foreign currency. In a wider sense, the controls may involve the stip-
ulation that foreign companies meet certain requirements for setting up business in 
the host country to restrictions on remittances out of that country. The effect of such 
controls made in order to maintain an artificially high currency value is particularly 
evident in some parts of the Middle East. Here, governments restrict foreign borrow-
ing by domestic companies as well as making it difficult for depositors to invest abroad 
and the resultant increase in black market activity, both in currency exchange and 
unavailable foreign goods, is only one symptom of restrictive economic poHcy. This 
apparent digression does however illustrate a point. In countries fortunate enough 
not to require them, absence of exchange controls allows non-bank institutions to tap 
the Euromarket, creating an economic condition wherein the creation of a Eurobank-
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ing centre in the Middle Ea!st'made good sense to the region's inhabitants. Neither 
Bahrain nor any of the adjacent oil-exporting states of the Arab Gulf are hindered 
by any kind of exchange control. Further details of Bahrain's diversification from its 
limited oil reserves to its position as a thriving oflJishore banking centre are provided 
in chapter five. 
3.4 Euromarket Interest Rates: Further Considerations 
I t has been established that interest rates within the Eurocurrency market are fun-
damentally determined by the nature of the market's composition. To this remark 
has been added the existence of a strong link between domestic and off'shore interest 
rates. This section aims to look more carefully at this link in terms of why and how 
it is maintained; a logical examination for it is within this interest-dominated sphere 
that Islamic finance houses must operate if they are to play a role in the lucrative 
interbank market. 
Eurocurrency markets per se face further competition from what may be termed 
the intermediate position held by International Banking FaciUties (IBF's). These 
arose in 1981 out of a desire on the part of the US authorities to attract off'shore 
funds to internal institutions which shared many of the characteristics of fully-fledged 
Eurobanks whilst still being subject to a certain amount of control from the host 
country.* With these offering a lower sovereign risk than Eurobanks and domestic 
banks looking even safer, it is plain that there is more than one segment in the total 
market for credit denominated in a given currency. These various financial institutions 
merely act as intermediaries within the market for taking deposits and making loans. 
At least the method of switching funds between domestic and offshore markets, 
namely arbitrage, is Islamically acceptable as i t is not in itself speculative. Unfor-
tunately, this is of course an arbitraging of interest rates, occurring to make use of 
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profit opportunities available in the international markets. An arbitrage flow of funds 
will take place between the two markets if the difference in their rate of interest is 
greater than the foreign exchange differentials involved in the new market.^ Under 
conditions that are free from such obstacles as exchange controls described above, 
arbitrage between the two segments of the money market ensures that interest rates 
remain parallel both in their level and in the size and timing of their changes. Adrian 
Buckley observes the evi(dence of this, correspondence: 
"The close cleavage of rates has regularly been demonstrated in empirical work; 
but where exchange controls or the like are in place, the tendency for the close move-
ment of rates in domiestic and external markets is to be found much weaker. Indeed, 
an indication of the efficiency of capital controls can be seen in the degree of di-
vergence of interest in the two markets. Wide divergences are associated with tight 
capital controls, and vice versa." 
For reasons of differing levels of risk observed in the markets by depositors and 
the lower costs to borrowers through lower costing external transactions, the rate of 
interest posted by the two (or three) sectors is very unlikely to be precisely equal 
at any given time. However the value of this link with domestic markets is, to the 
unregulated Euromarket, an important one. What then governs the rate of interest 
on the various classes of securities that Eurobanks offer? 
The relevance to this discussion of term structure centres on the market's vary-
ing preference for securities of differing maturity: whether there is a preference for 
long term securities reflected by higher expected interest rates than may be found on 
a series of shorts over the same period, or vice versa. In equihbrium, the interest rate 
for all securities, short and long, can be the same showing that short term borrowing 
and lending is just as expensive and profitable respectively as it is over the long term. 
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The reasoning behind the term structure theory is fundamentally the same for 
both markets. Prices on the London Stock market, for example, are primarily based 
on what investors, institutional and otherwise believe is likely to happen. Differently 
put, it is based on their expectations. Thus, in equiUbrium, the investor finds that 
he achieves the same result from consistently re-investing in shorts over a set period 
as he would by investing in a long-term security that covered the whole period. 
However, in practice investors need some kind of encouragement for exposing 
themselves to the risk of lending long. In these circumstances, the liquidity prefer-
ence theory suggests that longs will give higher yields than shorts. Related to this 
supposition is the inflation premium theory, similarly indicating that interest rates 
on long-term securities must be higher than on shorts to compensate for a longer 
exposure to savings erosion. This time then, i t is a matter of possible loss rather than 
a deprivation of choice through fund illiquidity that contradicts the theory of interest 
rate parity over the ful l range of rnaturities. 
After establishing the reasons for varying returns on investment determined 
by an assessment of risk and provided for by a different rate of interest per unit of 
investment, it is considered worthwhile to inspect the market for longer-term credit. 
3.5 The Eurobond Market 
This section gives an indication of the Eurobond market's characteristics— what is 
available, how the market works and its advantages to the players involved. Thus 
only those features that are distinct from Eurocurrency markets, providing investors, 
banks and borrowers with a significantly different service, are discussed. 
A small amount of space must be devoted to an analysis of how the Eurobond 
differs from any other bond, in particular the international bond with to which it bears 
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a close relation. The similarity between the latter two ends when it is observed that 
the Eurobond, in addition to being offered for sale in a variety of different countries, 
is also underwritten by more than one organisation. Thus, they may be raised in one 
country by a non-resident company and placed in a currency common to neither the 
company nor the country in which the bond is issued. Importantly, they are offered 
for sale in more than one country with international syndicates of underwriting and 
selling banks appearing on the tombstones. Whilst some international bonds are 
bought by residents of more than one country, Eurobonds are intended for sale to a 
broad spectrum of international investors. 
To be attractive to a wide range of potential investors, Eurobonds must be 
denominated in a strong or well-known currency, investors having trust in its fu-
ture value. The same of course holds true for bonds denominated in more than one 
currency; i t is also common to have ECU's or SDK's as the unit of denomination. 
Eurobonds are generally issued by corporations or governments needing secure, 
long-term funds. Herein lies oiie of the chief advantages for investors. Although 
not subject to the stringent entry requirements of the US debt market, the Eurobond 
market is nevertheless very much a 'name' market: it is perceived as safe, and needs to 
remain that way for a market cannot continue to function without trust. Those per-
mitted to issue Eurobonds must already have a high reputation for credit-worthiness 
before they may do so, be they governments or multinational companies. In addition 
to this, owing to the offshore nature of Eurobond issuing, interest can be paid free 
from income tax. 
On the borrowers' side, considerations such as possible government restriction 
on foreign investment and lower lending rates than in the domestic bond market 
combined with less red tape which results in capital being raised more quickly are 
among the more obvious factors contributing to a preference for the Eurobond market. 
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There are however, questions of 'policy' rather than tangible and direct economic 
advantages that encourajge the raising of long term capital in the Euromarkets. In the 
case of smaller companies, these include a desire to spread its name in the international 
financial community, to keep foreign operations separate from and independent of 
domestic operations, or to distribute its stock as widely as possible. This last aim 
can be achieved i f the company has issued convertible bonds, allowing the part-
substitution of stock for dividends. 
A final look at the Eurobond market reveals that it comprises both a primary 
and secondary market, the latter having been rapidly expanded and integrated in the 
late sixties and early seventies by correspondingly rapid advances in communications 
technology. This is an essential feature for assuring the liquidity of Eurobonds. Fur-
thermore, a secondary market is not only essential for day to day operation but it 
also has obvious advantages over restrictive domestic stock exchanges. 
"By direct international dealings among professionals, bypassing the exchanges, 
the mechanisms and the rules of which are too local in character ... the Euro-Bond 
market has created i i i the age of telex a' new form of secondary international market 
far better suited to the geographical diversity of the international investors than what 
can be accomplished in traditional national markets." 
3.6 The Interbank Market 
Closer scrutiny of the interbank market as opposed to a broad overview of the Eu-
romarkets involving the provenance and destination of funds reveals a number of 
interesting features. Although to note every movement of money within the whole 
Euromarket system would involve worthless double-counting and give a false indica-
tion of the size of the market, the customary netting out of interbank transactions 
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ignores a fundamental factor in the successful operation of the Euromarket. This is 
the worldwide redistribution of liquidity; the efficient Unking-up of lenders with a 
surplus to borrowers. An examination of interbank market operation shows that this 
market serves a number of econpmic functions which turn on its efficiency as mediator 
between lender and borrower. 
The efficiency of this Unkage is the primary contribution of the interbank market 
to the world economy; its broad base and speed of transaction also provides an efficient 
means for managing foreign exchange and interest risks. In addition, this market 
helps players in the rrioney'market avoid a certain amount of red tape as well as taxes 
and other constraints found in domestic money markets. Islamic banks and financial 
institutions must consider very carefully their attitude to how the interbank market 
works as well as its advantages and drawbacks. It is inadequate to look in isolation at 
the ethics of each transaction between Eurobanks without prior consideration of why 
the transaction is being made. That each time the money is passed on it incurs an 
extra increment of interest is one factor: that i t may benefit the economic well-being 
of a whole money market centre is another which highlights a need for pragmatism 
amongst the Islamic banks' religious supervisory boards if successful inclusion in this 
lucrative market is to be achieved by these institutions. 
In the case of the Eurocurrency market, banks are able to exercise a certain 
degree of choice in their field of operation. Despite the huge size of this market, which 
by 1981 had reached an estimated $1.6 triUion in deposi ts , the mechanics of an 
essentially interbank market allows different banks to specialize in different functions 
and credit transformations, all of which contributes to the efficient movement of funds 
from net lender to net borrower. The interbank market operates on the process of 
information and delegation; an institution which has access to a non-bank depositor's 
funds will take them on the strength that someone at the end of a fink of banks, of 
whom the original deposit taker need only know one, will require these funds. I t 
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is arguable that Islamic banks may be best suited to a role in which they either 
solicit the original deposit or pass it on to the final borrower. These banks are thus 
involved in the interbank market but rather than awkwardly fulfilling their role as a 
link in the chain, they may be able to, make profitable use of their Islamic identity, at 
least regionally and become the .all-important link between banking institution and 
non-bank borrower or lender. 
I t is worthwhile considering how a bank can achieve an advantage, first of all 
in soliciting deposits, The advantage may arise from a number of different consid-
erations, among which may be the bank's reputation for prudent investment. More 
specifically to Islamic,banks, the advantage may be due to a shared ethnic or reUgious 
identification with potential investors. Banks taking deposits in Bahrain may benefit 
from a combination of the previous two factors with the comparatively unregulated 
environment of the area; or for example with an the attitude of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority which appears to have the blessing of a reUable lender of last 
resort. 
Similarly, a bank rriay have an advantage in lending money at the end of the 
chain which arises because of either historical ties to corporate or government bor-
rowers or simply because a bank may be located in a region which is suffering from 
a current account deficit.^* While no bank. Islamic or otherwise, can have much ef-
fect on the latter situation, they can nevertheless benefit from having available wide 
information about borrowers or having a good propensity for quickly assembling and 
corrrelating information about the credit-worthiness of potential borrowers. Islamic 
banks, still relative newcomers to the international banking scene, cannot claim all 
of these advantages: they may benefit from reUgious identification with an important 
proportion of investors and borrowers as well as the chance of location in a favourable 
international banking environment such as is found in Bahrain. However, they cannot 
hope to have established a solid reputation for financial acumen as well as prudence 
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that will lead to their being chosen in preference to banks with a proven record and 
reputation for both by any other ..group than Muslims. Whilst this need not preclude 
the involvement of Islamic banks in the interbank market, it does at the same time 
present a strong case for the combination of experience from riba banks with the local 
advantages (for the Ar9.b Gulf at least) offered by Islamic operators. An historical 
parallel has been provided by the Saudisation of foreign banks operating in Saudi 
Arabia in the 1970's. In this circumstance, one would observe a situation of mutual 
co-operation as opposed to unilateral nationalisation that led the two types of banks 
to combine forces. 
Before making judgements on the feasibility of a combination such as is de-
scribed above or on the deeper involvement of Islamic banks in the Euromarkets as a 
whole, by way of conclusion it seems logical to observe the risks involved in the whole 
structure of Euro-finaince ahd to examine the possibiUty of wide-ranging supervision 
of the Euromarket system. • I ' 
3.7 The Case for Supervision 
There are three sides to this discussion on controlling the Euromarkets. The first is 
an examination of the perceived need for the supervision of Euro-Finance in general 
and is followed by a brief study of what controls might be implemented and how. 
In this context, i t is considered appropriate to study the probable result of these 
attempts to change legislation governing the international movement of money as well 
as the controversy that surrounds the issue of control or supervision of the financial 
institutions themselves. Thus, the discussion will include not just restrictions placed 
on capital mobility within the Euromarket in general, but also the possibihty of an 
international central bank being set up to monitor the performance of banks' offshore 
branches and the feasibility of such an institution acting as lender of last resort. 
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There are three basic objections to an unregulated Euromarket. The first is put 
forward by those countries who believe that inflation results from the Euromarkets' 
capacity to increase the velocity of credit circulation as well as the debatable ability 
of the market to create credit. ^ .^  Whilst domestic inflation may or may not be at-
tributable to offshore banking activity, the results arising from a banking crash which 
may be prevented by regulation are very much easier to identify. "Existing regulatory 
policies," observes Guido Carli, "are basically oriented towards 'benign neglect.'" 
In a situation of such loose supervision, it is argued that unregulated banks will tend 
to over-lend and, that the interbank market which so efficiently redistributes Uquid-
ity on a global scale will also quickly transmit credit shocks i f there is a default at 
any stage of the interbank chain. Of course, banks are not the only ones to suffer: 
depositors feel the cost as does the economy in general under a situation of unstable 
credit. 
The third major argument concerns international capital mobility which clearly 
frustrates monetary policy and exacerbates exchange rate variability leading to the 
endless wrong-footing of international trade,^^ However, whereas monetarists may 
cite these important principles, the political inertia and logistic difficulties of imple-
menting any kind of supervision back up the understandable determination of most 
international bankers to maintain the status quo. 
Thus, the vested interests of bankers on one side and monetarist opinion on the 
other provide two opposing views to the question. However, it would be inaccurate 
to define the controversy in such polarised terms. There is a 'grey' area occupied 
by those shifting opinion according to the prevailing economic chmate. For instance, 
when a crisis of confidence in credit has occurred or is predicted, calls for a more 
responsible lending policy and a sensible reserve ratio are at their most audible. Such 
calls in the late 1980's however would most likely have been deemed over-bearing 
while economies benefitted from the results of a liberal lending poUcy. 
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Clearly, external supervision which encourages rather than stifles the transmis-
sion of credit is appropriate but it should have the capacity to restrain irresponsible 
lending that would daimage the reputation and compromise the stability of the Euro-
markets. Herein lies the crux of the question: the supply of credit is determined by 
investors' confidence in the system that distributes and returns i t . 
"Money is like a lady who, in order to remain such, does not tolerate being 
talked about... in order to etablir le silence de la monnaie, a lender of last resort has 
to stand behind it in order to 'cut the gossip short.'"^^ 
Whilst the statement that money (in this case Eurocurrencies) must remain untar-
nished by gossip in order to remain viable is accurate, is it not possible to look to the 
opinion of the domestic central banks of the Euromarkets and guage the likely sta-
bility of the offshore money markets from that opinion? These institutions after all, 
conduct transactions on the Eurocurrency market and a brief look at their motives 
for operating there may help to guage their real reaction to a market which, on the 
surface, detracts significantly froin their authority. 
The central banks of underdeveloped countries are most likely to make deposits 
in the Eurocurrency market, the returns being more attractive than for example gold 
(zero) or US treasury bi l ls .Euromarkets can be employed as a tool of domestic 
monetary policy, in trying to prevent an increase in the exchange rate value of the 
dollar for instance. This can be attempted by the central bank increasing the supply 
of its dollar holdings to the Eurocurrency market. Similarly, i f a central bank dislikes 
the prospect of an increase in interest rates in the Eurodollar market, it may try 
to influence that interest rate by supplying dollars.These three examples illustrate 
three different reactions to the Euromarkets by central banks. Only one of them shows 
a reaction to a situation that would not have existed had there been no Euromarkets. 
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I t does not require the immature state of an LCD to lead a central bank to 
gamble in the Eurocurrency market. Below is cited a speculative failure by the 
German Bundesbank in 1961: 
"Eurodollar facilities haV^ e been used extensively not only for speculation against 
a currency, but also for speculation in favour of a currency. This was done, for in-
stance, in 1961 when Eurodollars were borrowed and sold against D. Marks and Swiss 
Francs in anticipation of a revaluation of these currencies, rather than a devaluation 
of the dollar." 
The German monetary authorities, by supplying the Eurodollar market with 
dollar deposits through the interrpediary of German banks, increased the difficulty 
of their own task in resisting the presisure for a second revaluation. In fact they 
initiated and maintained a vicious circle when lending their unwanted dollars to the 
German banks, and, through them, to the Eurodollar market, for much of the self 
same dollars were sold bj/^  ^he borrowers against D. Marks, so that they found their 
way back into the Bundesbank's reserves, only to be re-lent again to the Eurodollar 
market throught the German banks.^ '^  
Mistakes of this sort illustrate that there is occasionally the mentality among 
central banks of ' i f you can't beat them, join them.' Yet factors other than the 
possibility of manipulation for benefit conspire to make this a matter of accepted 
fact. When one considers the problems facing the creation of a central bank for 
the European Community;^^ certainly much nearer to being a single identity than 
the Euromarket, the obstacles involved in setting up a 'bankers' central bank' look 
insurmountable; to wit the painfully slow machinations of that other international 
financial body, the IMF. Moreover, it is surely better for central banks to play along 
with a system that they can at least observe openly. After all: 
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"...regulation in some form is necessary for stablity, yet in a flourishing market 
system, regulation tends to spawn deregulated centres because people want to get out 
from under, and escape to areas of greater freedom." 
The picture of future Euromarket stability should not, however, be seen as a 
gloomy one. The Euromarkets grew and prospered as a result of their separation 
from the political and economic constraints of domestic financial practice; any at-
tempt to control and regulate such a financial market would result in an even looser 
and potentially more volatile system. There is, however, a significant difference be-
tween regulation and supervision and, in a market so reliant on information and 
co-operation, i t is not unreasonable to believe that reforms seen as aiding efficient 
practice as well as restraining imprudent pohcy would be universally welcomed. A 
financial market needs the confidence of its bankers no less than the confidence of its 
non-bank players. 
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C H A P T E R F O U R 
T H E R O L E OF I S L A M I C BANKS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL M A R K E T S 
4.1 Interview Methodology 
This work has so far examined the modus operandi of the Islamic banker and investor 
wi th in an arena which is at least positively disposed towards Islamic finance. Subse-
quently, i t has observed the workings of a Western financial market that wi l l tolerate 
the presence of Islamic banks only so long as they are able to compete successfully 
w i th in that market. This section combines the information f rom the previous two 
chapters w i t h a case study of Islamic financial institutions, two operating in London 
and one in Geneva, to observe how amenable is the West to the principles of Islamic 
finance. This is based upon the success of these three companies in competition 
against Western banks. The problems encountered in this sphere and the prospects 
facing Islamic banks in the West wi l l be discussed in reference to interviews given by 
the three banks. This is a study of competition, cooperation and innovation. 
The role of the three Islamic financial institutions, namely the Al -Ra jh i Com-
pany for Islamic Investments Limited, the Al-Baraka group and Dar al-Maal al-Islami 
( D M I ) , comes under scrutiny in this chapter. Although a similar line of questioning 
indicated an interest in how these three institutions operated in Western financial 
markets, i t soon proved impractical to approach all three wi th the same prepared 
questionnaire. Several factors conspired to prevent such a uniform approach; one 
which may at first have appeared to be the most logical one for the sake of a com-
parative analysis. Firstly, what may well be a homogeneous set of questions was 
certainly not answered by a homogeneous group of bank oflicials. However, this does 
not suggest that the information obtained f rom one source can be considered supe-
rior or the last word on a given subject simply because one individual holds a high 
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position wi th in the company, or that another, involved in the theoretical side of bank 
operations is less able to provide practical information on the day to day running of 
the bank. , 
Secondly, in view of the fact that there does exist a divergence in the activity 
of these three banks, i t would have been impossible to follow up in detail the same 
questions at each interview. What may be the crux of one bank's stategy may be a 
matter of comparatively small importance to another. 
Thirdly, experience quickly demonstrated that an interviewee may care to de-
velop ideas on a subject of particular current importance to his bank, one which may 
either have been total ly missing f rom a set questionnaire, or a subject on which the 
discussion could provide more eloquent and informative answers than may have been 
obtained through brief, and often tedious, separate questions. As in any hne of ques-
tioning, leaving the subject to speak freely and without unnecessary interruption can 
lead to a more productive discussion and a more accurate assessment of what the 
subject deems important. Furthermore, in this case i t allows the subject to convey 
information wi thout the feeling that an interrogation is taking place. 
I n short then, i t is the search for qualitative rather than quantitative information 
that leads to an approach involving questions tailored, often during the interview, to 
each separate case. Discussions were based around three main questions involving 
the nature of the company's business. How, in the case of Al-Baraka does its London 
office differ in funct ion f rom the Bahrain operation? Who are the main depositors 
and borrowers? How much weight is given to a separate function; are more funds 
used i n murabaha-hased trade finance, for example, than in equity investment? A 
more general conversation touched on topics which called for opinion rather than 
hard facts. I t is perhaps unsurprising that this part of the interview yielded the most 
useful information on the nature of the companies' activities. Questions concerning 
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the development of new Islamic financial instruments and the future of Islamic finance 
i n general tended to produce the most varied response. 
4.2 Al-Rajhi 
Fourteen centuries ago, the spread of Islam led to a vast increase in trade between 
nations and i t was moneychangers, similar in most respects to Al -Ra jh i , were in-
strumental in facil i tat ing this trade. The Al -Ra jh i Company for Islamic Investments 
Limi ted has progressed a long way f rom its origin as a suq money changer although as 
a sizeable Islamic financial inst i tut ion, i t continues to play a role in the finance and 
development of trade, albeit a more v i ta l one than that to which the average money-
changer would aspire . The relatively humble origin is of some significance in itself, 
for the company has mirrored the progression of Islamic banking f rom its infancy 
to a system of matur i ty w i t h a far broaider outlook than simple moneychanging and 
lending activities. Its growth is attributable to a number of factors that differentiate 
this company, and indeed moneychangers in general, f rom conventional financial in-
stitutions, even wi th in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself. Moneychanging activity 
has taken place in an atmosphere where customer loyalty, family involvement wi thin 
each company and a lack of aggressive, Western-style competition amongst firms and 
this has ensured that a present day moneychanger operates in a way that is virtually 
unchanged f rom the time of the prophet Muhammad. Moneychangers may diversify 
to a small extent in order to offset the effects of seasonal downturns in currency ex-
changing activity, but i t has not been seen as necessary or certainly wi th in the spirit 
of Islamic teaching to buy out or merge wi th the competition and so attempt to corner 
the market. Nor does the comparative success of one company such as Al -Rajh i sour 
the atmosphere of peaceful co-existence that obtains amongst the traditional cluster 
of suq moneychangers. I n the suq in Jeddah, the up to date exchange rate information 
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of the Al-Rajhis brought about by the breadth of their international contacts puts 
them in a position of what may be termed price leadership wi th in the suq economy;^ 
a position f rom which the other moneychangers stand to gain. 
Act ing in their tradit ional role as moneylenders, institutions such as Al -Rajh i 
continue to enjoy a popularity amongst merchants that appears to be in inverse 
proportion to the actual cost of borrowing f rom this source. A number of reasons 
help explain this situation, amongst which are the flexibility of loan repayment, a 
closer relationship between borrower and lender, personal and commercial privacy 
and speed of transaction. Furthermore, although one may accept the assertion that 
borrowing charges are indeed higher than those of commercial banks,^ the difference 
is not necessarily a great one because of the low overhead costs of the moneylending 
establishments in comparison w i t h the banks. Lastly, moneylenders are unregulated, 
which most significantly absolves them of the need to keep an unprofitable reserve 
requirement w i t h the central bank. 
I t would however, be a mistake to identify the Al -Ra jh i corporation as the 
most successful establishment in a quaint system that is a microcosm of national 
economic operation. There is much more to this corporation than a parochial pop-
ulari ty which is based upon social and religious identification wi th its cUents. W i t h 
more than two hundred and seventy five outlets in the kingdom, Al -Ra jh i boasts a 
more extensive network than the National Commercial Bank, Saudi Arabia's largest 
banking enterprise. I t has grown to such a size that i t is now a registered Islamic 
financial insti tution,^ a step not only important for the status i t conferred but also 
in regard to the new restrictions that would accompany such a change in status. The 
second factor which points to its maturi ty and international reach is the extent of 
this company's contacts outside Saudi Arabia. Such links bring advantages that do 
not accrue to tradit ional banks. For instance, whereas the banks generally obtain 
their foreign exchange via SAM A, A l - R a j h i works through European centres such as 
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Zurich and obtains foreign exchange at favourable rates. The company, acting as 
wholesale supplier to other moneychangers, is also eligible for the standard discount 
that accompanies bulk purchase."* 
Having examined the place of the tradit ional moneychanger and lender wi thin 
the suq economy of Saudi Arabia as well as some of the reasons that explain the 
pre-eminent position of the A l - R a j h i corporation wi th in that framework and their 
subsequent transformation to a registered financial insti tution, i t is a logical progres-
sion to observe its purpose and performance abroad. 
Al though prevented by Bri t ish banking law f rom soliciting deposits in the 
United Kingdom, there is much else that an inst i tut ion such as Al -Ra jh i can perform 
even wi th in the confines of such a restriction. The premises at 2, Copthall Avenue 
are a representative office only. I t serves as the eyes and ears of the Headquarters in 
Saudi Arabia, not just to identify prospective corporate borrowers in this country but 
also as a ' th ink tank' internationally. I t is significant that A l -Ra jh i st i l l has confi-
dence in London's status as an important international financial centre. The office is 
staffed by bankers whose primary purpose is to make Islamic financial practice more 
acceptable to prospective clients who may not necessarily be fired wi th enthusiasm 
for a means of financing simply because i t takes place wi th in the framework of Islamic 
principles. Consequently, i t is considered reasonable to assert that, in order to attract 
large non-Musl im clients as borrowers, the stress placed on the social benefits of Is-
lamic financial practice may take second place while the financial benefits of banking 
w i t h regard to Islamic social conduct are brought to the fore. Outside Saudi Arabia, 
A l - R a j h i is a t iny player i n the international financial field and requires good results 
just to stay on the pitch and in order to do so, this company's activities must appeal 
to prospective clients as well as to the shari'a committee. I t would however be a mis-
take to conclude that the two considerations are mutually exclusive: individuals wi th 
experience f rom mainstream banks combine their knowledge of the Western markets 
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w i t h that of those responsible for maintaining an Islamically acceptable method of 
operation. 
I n identifying the main thrust of this bank's lending operations, i t was first 
necessary to ascertain the source of loanable funds, the financial activity of Islamic 
banks i n Western markets being determined by the nature of their deposits at home. 
I n this respect, A l - R a j h i fits into a pattern found by many of its competitors in 
the Middle East. A very large proportion of its liabilities are short term, coming in 
this case f r o m deposits of expatriate workers i n Saudi Arabia. In fact, at one time, 
expatriate workers counted for fifty percent of the population and i t was important to 
attract their custom. The proportion may have decreased relative to the indigenous 
population but the same principles apply. These workers, of mixed nationality, are 
generally single status work permit holders performing menial tasks but for whom 
the remuneration is relatively high. There being l i t t le i n the way of outgoings for 
these workers, most of their earnings can be regarded as surplus and they seek a 
way in which to remit the funds home. A Bangladeshi worker for example, may pay 
i n his riyal-denominated earnings to A l - R a j h i which in turn transfers the worker's 
funds to a branch of his own bank, the Bank of Bangladesh, for instance. In this way, 
depending on the speed of this three way exchange, Al -Ra jh i may have the funds for 
any amount of time between two days up to two months at the outside. These must 
be invested over a similarly short space of time. 
Hence the workings of murabaha, a popular short-term method of investing 
funds, has been further streamlined by the ' think tank' at Copthall Avenue so as 
to make its operation even more straightforward and thus attractive to prospective 
borrowers. For three of the factors that influence the decision of companies to borrow 
funds f r o m a particular source are of particular importance to an Islamic bank. The 
most directly relevant is that of experience. How much is known about murabaha 
financing? A source of funds that appears cheap must be proven to remain that way. 
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As this is basically the same as Bankers' acceptance, no major problem is encoun-
tered. The cost of borrowing itself must be competitive; in this respect, murabaha 
must be able to compete w i t h US commercial paper, the cheapest alternative. I t 
is recognised by the staff at 2, Copthall Avenue that a competitor, new to the in-
ternational financing scene must be prepared to forego some amount of profit i f i t 
is to retain the custom of a Blue. Chip company. Thirdly, while murabaha is cost 
attractive, administratively i t is ugly as i t involves a great deal of paperwork; this 
may prove a baulking point to inany otherwise satisfied clients. I t is not unusual for 
large corporations to have their own treasury departments whose dealers are there to 
put through transactions and who are actively uninterested in paperwork. Al -Ra jh i 
makes life easier for the dealers, either handling the paperwork itself or having i t done 
by someone other than the borrowing company. 
I n addition to making the whole financing package more simple and attractive 
to the borrowing client, by retaining control of the paperwork, the bank can ensure 
that funds are being used towards the purpose for which they were suppUed and not 
arbitraged towards a different investment. This safeguard serves also to reassure the 
shari 'a committee that both the letter and spirit of Islamic law is being observed. Staff 
at the London office were eager to stress that this committee should not be looked 
upon as a body of unrepentant academics who place religious objections in the way 
of financial progress. I was informed that i t is all too often assumed by those who are 
unaware of the true nature of Islamic finance that professional bankers operate despite 
the restrictions placed upon their activity by the scholars who make up the reUgious 
supervisory committee, rather than in conjunction wi th them. I t is evident that this is 
not just company loyalty to an Islamic employer. Although Islamic banking practice 
may occupy a niche here in the West, for depositors in the Middle East there are 
a number of other institutions oflfering an Islamic method of financing wi th whom 
a deposit may be placed. The presence of the shari'a committee assures Islamic 
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legitimacy to depositors and wbuld prevent a sudden run on the bank's reserves in 
a situation of public doubt as to whether funds were being utilized in an IslamicaUy 
acceptable manner^ This consideration more than makes up for the contention that 
the existence of such a committee denotes a lack of trust in the bank's ability and 
desire to identify what is and what is not Islamic. 
4.2.1 Longer Term Operations 
I n consideration of the short term nature of the bank's deposits, i t was unsurprising 
to find that medium and long term lending took a much smaller portion of the bank's 
funds. Funds invested over a longer period of time were placed in asset-backed 
facilities such as shipping and real estate and other leasing operations where the 
dividend was shared between b?iiik and client. Significant, i f perhaps unsurprising by 
its absence, was equity participation, nonetheless recognised as the operation most 
in keeping w i t h the social values of Islam. I t was indicated that experience had not 
been generous to the cause of musharaka financing packages and consequently the 
company was unwilling to undertake this kind of investment. This statement was 
tempered w i t h the comrrient that i t is not the method at fault but the purposes for 
which i t has been applied. Most experience has come f rom the Islamic Development 
Bank which A l - R a j h i considers is sometimes obliged to undertake funding of projects 
as a development assistance agency rather than as a bank and consequently may not 
always expect a return on its investment. 
Musharaka funding of a top-grade Western project would indeed be desirable 
but the competition to fund such a project would be very stiff and i t is unlikely to 
be on the basis of profit sharing in any case. A company wi th an excellent record 
would be almost certain to earn a profit at a later stage and may be wilUng to pay a 
large interest b i l l rather than share furure profits. The obverse of this equation looks 
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slightly ominous: what is set out above suggests that only a bad risk seeks equity 
participation f rom a bank as, in the comparatively unlikely event of a profit accruing, 
the entrepreneur w i l l not mind sharing i t w i t h a partner who may have shouldered 
the lion's share of the financial risk. 
Similarly, jo int venture operations may be considered desirable, but when one 
considers the delaying of decisions taken by the Imperial Bank of Japan and the Three 
I's (Investment I n Industry),^ i t is not reasonable to expect Islamic banks to identify 
opportunities for a good investment any more speedily than this corporate bundle 
can manage. 
The legitimacy of share dealings remains a problem area. I t is not only A l -
R a j h i that believes the present situation of a ban on investing in a company that 
includes interest at some point on its balance sheet should be adjusted, or at least 
tempered. Can mutual funds be set up for the purpose of buying equities for example? 
This is for investment rather than trading purposes, of course. In this respect, A l -
R a j h i considers that the setting up of an Islamic fund by Kleinwort Benson in 1986, 
despite its present dismal returns, may further the development of Islamic finajice in 
a different way to that which may be supposed. In addition to the very important role 
of bringing Islamic financial practice to the attention of the Western world, Kleinwort 
Benson and Union Bank of Switzerland are opening a window to buying stocks which 
has found favour wi th those Muslims who have actively sought out what they accept 
to be Islamically acceptable investment. This view is strongly held by D M I and wi l l 
be examined in the relevant section. 
The involvement of a large Western inst i tut ion in such projects suggest a desire 
on the part of Western finance houses in general to become involved wi th Islamic 
banks i n order to ident i fy lending opportunities for a growing number of clients; 
ethical investment of all kinds enjoying popularity at present. Leaving aside the 
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question of equity, such opportunities may arise through other forms. For example, 
a fund could be put together for the leasing of aircraft or housing, rental income 
being perfectly acceptable in Islam. A n idea was put forward by a consultant wi th 
A l - R a j h i which suggested the setting up of an offshore Islamic mutual fund for banks 
to invest surplus l iquidi ty on a unit basis. Evidently, this would require organisation 
and co-operation to ensure that the fund is not drained overnight but would help 
w i t h the perennial problem of how to put spare funds to use as well as illustrating 
the desirability of bank co-ordination towards more effective financial practice. 
4.3 Al-Baraka 
The Al-Baraka group has an altogether different background to that of Al -Rajh i . 
Most obvious is the difference in age of the two institutions. However, although set 
up as recently as 1982, the Al-Baraka group includes banks, investment companies, 
financial advisory and management companies and affiliated institutions in Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Luxembourg, Denmark, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Mauri tania as well as Great Bri ta in . By 1987, the group boasted a total balance sheet 
of over $1.5 bil l ion. 
The activities of Al-Baraka's London office i n Cavendish Square reflect this 
difference in status and maturity. Al-Baraka might be described as a tailor-made 
international banking conglomerate, whereas the Al -Ra jh i corporation has built itself 
up f r o m more humble origins. The most important difference between the two groups 
i n London is the nature of their activities in the city. Al-Baraka more closely fits the 
conventional definition of an investment bank due to the broad reach of its activities. 
A l - R a j h i and D M I , on the other hand, place greater emphasis on money market 
activities such as currency swaps; this makes them appear more as specialised F X 
institutions than an al l-round investment bank. I n Cavendish Square, M r Hamdi 
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outlined the purpose of having a base for the company in London. 
Primarily, he explained, the bank served as a correspondant for other Islamic 
non-bank financial institutions i n Great Bri ta in , arising f rom its size and the ex-
tent of its international connections. Another side to its role was observing local 
financial practice and where possible, adapting i t to fal l wi th in the guidefines of Is-
lamic principles. This role also involves the promotion of Islamic financial practice 
amongst Western banks. Indeed, i t may be conceded that the route to a more general 
awareness of the benefits of Islamic finance Ues in the adoption of Islamic methods of 
handling money by the mainstream banks, so bringing i t to an existing wide cUent 
base. The reverse relies on the abili ty of Islamic banks not only to prove their own 
wor th by performing well, but also to entice investors away f rom the more traditional 
interest-based methods of making money. A wider appraisal of this task is examined 
as part of the conclusion to this chapter. W i t h this in mind, observation and coop-
eration between Al-Baraka and the local and established financial institutions is of 
great importance. 
The th i rd and perhaps most simple function of the Al-Baraka office i n London 
is to encourage trade w i t h the Middle East. In this respect, its aim i f not its method 
differs l i t t le f rom any other office of Al-Baraka. 
Bearing in mind the aim of this chapter to examine the role of Islamic banks 
situated in Europe w i t h particular regard to wholesale financing operations, the dis-
cussion held w i t h M r Hamdi centred on the second purpose of the office as described 
above. I t w i l l be observed that material relating to actual decisions and action taken 
tends to refer to trade financing of some description. Al-Baraka after all is l i t t le 
different to any other Islamic bank in that its liabilities tend to be very short term 
and that murabaha financing packages appear to be the most efficient way of putt ing 
such l iquidi ty to a profitable use. Moreover, i t is attractive to borrowers who are 
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happy to commit their custom to an Islamic inst i tut ion as long as they do not find 
themselves paying over the odds for the privilege. I t wi l l also become apparent that, 
i n the case of longer-term financial activity, the discussion becomes more academic 
than practical, particularly in the case of equity financing packages. This suggests 
that while much thought is devoted to this activity, i t needs some important changes, 
mostly via the education of borrowers and lenders to make i t a feasible method of 
financing and a significant part of any bank's activities. 
One hundred percent of this bank's depositors are Muslims f rom overseas. The 
make-up of borrowers is however, very diflFerent. These latter are mainly Br i t i sh -
based private investors or international companies. Al-Baraka w i l l lend to any client 
who is prepared to accept the Islamic formula for handling money, in this instance 
involving large corporations such as I C I as well as mid-sized and small companies. 
Overseas businessmen are regular borrowers, particularly those f rom Turkey, Sudan 
and Bangladesh for whom Al-Baraka is the primary bank. 
The creation of new financial instruments has been based around the adaptation 
of established ones. In the case of murabaha financing, the adjustment has entailed 
a streamlining as in the case of Al -Ra jh i , as well as a tightening up of the process 
because the bank has had the nagging suspicion that funds provided for trade finance 
are not being used for that purpose. I t was pointed out that Islamic banking is asset-
related and as such, i t is logical that the inst i tut ion that provides the funds for a 
specific purpose should desire to see this carried out. To clarify the situation, the 
process involved in a murabaha financing deal was reiterated. 
I n the case of a bank or commodity broker being asked to conduct trade in 
a soft commodity such as copper, the individual concerned wi l l look for a contract 
wait ing to be financed and then inform the Islamic bank of the increment involved; 
one over L I B O R , for instance. The Islamic bank then authorises a trading bank to 
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sponsor the transaction. 
The suspicions hinge on the matter of how the Islamic bank deals wi th the 
acceptances which may be traded up or discounted— being used as a financial instru-
ment i n fact. I t is, of course, Islamically unacceptable to buy a debt at a discount 
price and later redeem i t at a higher price. Consequently, Al-Baraka finances the 
trade b i l l ( i t buys the virgin acceptance and can be sure of exactly what i t is financ-
ing) and then keeps i t . I n this way, there is no unlawful benefit brought about by the 
bank's in i t i a l action, profi t only accruing to the bank itself as a result of the original 
mark-up on sale. Speculation unrelated to the asset financed is avoided. 
Much of the interview at Cavendish Square covered problems of l iquidity man-
agement i n the Middle East as the view was held that this was directly relevant to the 
bank's operations in this country. However, as this topic involved a discussion about 
the lack of a secondary market in the Middle East and the possibility of rectifying 
the situation w i t h the help of the I D B , this w i l l be included as part of the chapter on 
tha t ins t i tu t ion. 
4.4 Policy and Education 
I t was unsurprising to hear that none of the three banks concerned were wiUing 
ident i fy anything other than the most general trends in their activities. One individual 
admitted even before the interview had started that he would be playing his cards 
close to his chest; a curious choice of phrase for an Islamic banker, but one that is 
nevertheless quite understandable. As a result, i t was the general discussion that 
tended to distinguish one interview f rom another, opinions and trends being much 
more assimilable and memorable, at least to this writer. M r Hamdi was more than 
wi l l ing to discuss the finer points of Al-Baraka's financing operations, but indications 
for the future of Islamic finance in Europe appeared more clearly stated in the general 
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discussion that concluded the interview. 
Two themes ran through the discussion. The first was co-operation wi th the 
Western financial institutions and , the second was the natural progression to the 
future of Al-Baraka's operations f rom its European base. The themes are of course 
directly related as both are the concern of Al-Baraka's London office and because 
progression is seen as impossible without cooperation. I t is obvious however that in 
an atmosphere of such strong competition. Western banks are unlikely to aid Islamic 
financial institutions merely for the sake of good relations. A continuing 'internal' 
dialogue, most recently occuring at the February 1990 conference in Algiers on Islamic 
banking ensures that Islamic financial practice does not stagnate, instead investigating 
new areas i n which to operate and defining the degree of participation in Western 
financial practices that may be, allowed.^ Islamic banks already trade stocks on the 
Euromarket, on the surface a notably un-Islamic system, but in Mr Hamdi's opinion, 
i t is not the advances made into what may be termed Western financial strongholds 
that chart the spread and influence of Islamic banking. Rather, i t is the extent to 
which Western banks feel the need to cooperate w i th their Islamic counterparts. 
M r Hamdi struck a chord w i t h other bankers who were interviewed. He believed 
that the guidelines set for Islamic financial practice should not be viewed as a hin-
drance to profitable operation. I n fact, these 'restrictions' conspire to place Islamic 
finance in a profitable niche; one which Western banks are eager to emulate. Ini t ial ly 
i t was surprising to hear such enthusiasm, again f rom all three institutions, for the 
Islamic investment funds set up by Western banks, especially in view of the unre-
markable performance of Kleinwort Benson's Islamic Unit Trust.^ The significance of 
Western interest in this sort of investment as well as the issuing of leasing certificates 
by Barclays bank is greater than i t may appear; the important matter being that a 
two way traffic can be established. Western expertise can be aided by the knowledge 
of Islamic acceptability of such investment which would come wi th in the domain of 
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banks such as Al-Baraka. Muslims are more likely to commit funds to a Western-run 
fund if it has the approval of an Islamic bank's religious supervisory board. If progress 
is made on the acceptability of investment in public quoted companies, banks in the 
United Kingdom can in turn identify lending opportunities for Islamic banks; namely 
companies for whom interest receipts are not the crux of their profit-making ability. 
I t should once again be noted that there exists a close parallel interest in ethical 
investment on the part of both Islamic and hta-based banks; the gap between what 
has come to be called 'green' investment and Islamic investment is not, in concept, a 
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wide one. 
The last subject tq be discussed was the preponderance of short-term trade 
financing when an analysis is macje of the investment structure of Islamic banks. 
This point was conceded, perhaps lamented, but it is in this area that the impor-
tance of Islamic banking flourishing in the West was given the most emphasis by Mr 
Hamdi. There is a world of difference between the one-ofF financing of the dry dock 
in Bahrain for instance, and the cpuntless longer-term lending opportunities that 
exist in England. Yet, in this country, the problems involved in promoting the idea 
of participation finance go beyond convincing investors to make available funds that 
may be totally lost if an enterprise should fail. Islamic banks that operate musharaka 
finance as a means of investing depositors' funds can receive no backing or hcense 
from the Bank of England. Indeed, as such institutions are not beholden to their de-
positors, they are considered more as a mutual company and as such come under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Trade. Moreover, viewed as a threat to the stabihty 
of the British banking system, they are barred from soliciting deposits as banks. It 
is unsurprising therefore, that Islamic banks must hold such high cash reserves. 
Once again, the onus is on the West. This is not an obligation to inculcate 
British investors with Islamic values but is the most effective way of bringing what 
is, on paper, undoubtedly a more equitable way of sponsoring business initiative. 
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Mr Hamdi cites a parallel between the uncomplaining way in which we watch the 
deduction of tax from our income with only the most indirect say on where those 
taxes should be spent and the way in which savings are deposited in an Islamic bank. 
The depositor has, in the latter case, voluntarily shown similar trust and is rewarded 
for i t , either through dividends paid, or through the treatment he can expect to 
receive as a borrower of funds from the same bank. British banks rightly subject any 
prospective enterprise to a most comprehensive feasibility study in which is included 
a market sensitivity analysis, .legal cpntrols and a cost benefit analysis; after such a 
rigorous examination, it appears unreasonable to Mr Hamdi that the bank should 
not shoulder some of the financial responsibility for what it has deemed a worthwhile 
lending opportunity. Equally, it should be simple to add a PLS account to the existing 
choices provided by banks to depositors: why should a central bank doubt the public's 
ability to distinguish between a 'safe' deposit account and one tied to the fortunes of 
a bank? 
Concluding the interview, it was made clear that it is not only the entrepreneur 
who benefits from such a policy but the financial health of the lending bank which 
learns to lend according to merit instead of solely on the strength of reputation and 
the interest receipts that will surely accrue from lending on a large scale to companies, 
no matter how improbable the purpose of the loan or near to bankruptcy the company 
may be. Developing a theme, these considerations bear upon the economic well-being 
of the whole country. I t will take a great deal of time, positive results and education 
before such an attitude becomes common currency outside Islamic banks. 
4.5. Dar al-Maal al-Islami 
4.5.1 Background 
The third big Islamic banking house to be examined in this section is Dar al-Maal al-
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Islami (DMI) whose headquarters is in Geneva. This company is a true conglomerate 
with a variety of institutions and branches around the world. Founded in 1981 by 
Prince Muhammad al-Faisal A l Sa' ud. Chairman of the International Association 
of Islamic Banks ( lAIB) in Jeddah, five years later, DMI wholly or partly owned 
twenty one shari'a-hased institutions in thirteen countries. This tally includes eight 
Islamic banks, seven investment companies, three insurance and three business firms 
with a capital investment of over US$1,00 million.* Private and institutional savings 
of more than US$1.7 billion, coming mostly from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia have 
been mobilised globally. After a run of losses peaking in 1983 and 1984 resulting 
from losses in commodity dealing, the fortunes of this giant company appear to be 
improving again. 
I t was surprising to hear the huge losses of 1983 (US$45 milUon in unsuccessful 
gold trading) mentioned so readily by Moustapha Sakkaf, Executive Vice-President 
of DMI's Treasury Department. He did not regard such a colossal mistake as a 
real embarrassment however, knowing firstly that it did not reflect poorly on Islamic 
finance as a system, there being nothing specifically Islamic about commodity dealing. 
Secondly, he added wryly that such a mistake was unlikely to happen again. Nor had 
the episode wrought any permanent damage on the fortunes of DMI whose financial 
health now looks fine. The most important figures are quoted below. 
D M I has approximately one hundred thousand clients and forty thousand share-
holders. Dividends have tripled from their 1986 price of 50 cents per share— funds 
under management have also tripled, now standing at US$2.6 billion. 
Experience has also shown this institution that equity participation on a grandiose 
scale, for example funding agricultural projects in Sudan or purchasing shipping fleets 
for Saudi Arabia, has proved unprofitable. This is undoubtedly better suited to a de-
velopment institntion whose capital is cheap, that is to say provided by government 
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subscription. Whilst being equally eager to receive a return on its investment, such 
an organisation is not answerable to shareholders who require a dividend. Moreover, 
i t was added that some development agencies are prepared to undertake funding of 
projects considered necessary but unlikely to be profitable. Mr Sakkaf was at pains 
to explain that despite being a MusUm institution in every sense of the phrase, DMI 
was unable to operate as a charitable institution. Smaller projects, identified as rea-
sonable are wilHngly entered into and syndication with other banks to spread the risk 
is also common practice. 
4.5.2 Liquidity Management 
Treating the symptoms of excessive liquidity is not an occupation peculiar to DMI. 
However, much of the interview was spent discussing exactly how surplus Uquid funds 
are employed. Consequently, i t seems logical to devote a separate section to the 
discussion. 
Once again, a comparison between the current situation of Islamic and main-
stream banks gives the clearest indication of the problem. It was pointed out that 
about ten percent of the funds held in a Western bank are liquid. This compares 
with a seventy percent figure in the case of DMI. Just as in the two previous cases, 
the short term nature of depositors' funds was alluded to, chents committing funds 
for an average of three days. Almost fifty percent of this liquidity is used in money 
market swaps of foreign exchange. 
Options and futures trading was discussed and raised a noteworthy point. Opin-
ion diflFers on the acceptability of such practice and the extent to which it may be 
employed. To clarify this statement, there are some who believe that the whole sys-
tem is governed less by the process of prudent risk taking than by the presence of 
players whose sole involvement is for pure speculation. This is ceded up to a point; ar-
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guably, the speculators provide vital Uquidity, but the question that arises is whether 
an Islamic bank can involve itself in a system that caters for speculators, even if they 
themselves do not fall into such a category. Moreover, there is some doubt as to 
what degree of involvement is permissible in a market which may not serve any real 
economic purpose in terms of growth and services. Certainly, the situation is far from 
clear but D M I allows itself some freedom of choice in the field, in spite of giving a 
degree of recognition to the objections raised. Basically stated, there are a number 
of religious texts which prohibit deferred payment on the exchange of money as well 
as some food commodities. This led to some jurists placing a ban on any forward or 
future dealings in currencies. 
Less strident jurists distinguish between currency exchange where a spot price 
is paid for one currency and the other currency is paid later, whereby the rate of 
exchange may include an element of interest to compensate for the deferred payment. 
This compares unfavourably with currency exchange where an agreed rate is paid 
simultaneously for the two currencies at a later date, thus avoiding doubt about the 
loan element involved. 
D M I recognises that clients of an Islamic bank undergo the same business risks 
as any other client and consequently desire to lessen their risk where possible and 
seek a favourable way of doing so. Few businessmen after all, are able to purchase in 
advance the currency they need for the future, nor do they wish to expose themselves 
to the risk of price fluctuation of commodities in which they are dealing. With this 
in mind, D M I maintains that profits arising from keeping businesses covered to some 
extent against risk are perfectly legitimate. Options trading is considered 'al-Bai'bi'l-
Arbun! or selling with the opportunity to make profit. If the option is not taken up, 
i t is simply an opportunity which has been foregone. 
Commodity trading was mentioned again, but this time in a more optimistic 
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light. It hardly needs mentioning that no Islamic bank will deal in haram goods, 
and D M I is no exception. Although last year, trading in allowable commodities was 
unsuccessful, Mr Sakkaf believes that his bank was not the exception; very few banks 
made money due to a 'choppiness' in the market. This year the situation is diff'erent 
with the identifiable trends, upward or downward visible. For reasons of stabiUty as 
well as dubious legitimacy, the stock market is out of bounds for this finance house. 
While there are those who wish to see the stigma Hfted from share trading, there 
remains a marked coolness towards stock markets in general since the slump of 1987. 
4.5.3 Venture Capital 
D M I sees itself as a leader amongst Islamic banks in the field of venture capital. In 
such a high risk area, i t is impressive to note that this company has committed even as 
much as one percent of its funds under management to such operations. Certainly, the 
rewards can be high, but a long term commitment is required with up to three years of 
negative return on investment, even in the case of an ultimately successful operation. 
D M I is involved at all levels of venture capital, from seat finance, through mezzanine 
to more mature finance— obviously receiving less proportional return according to the 
greater maturity of its entry stage. A successful project sponsored from its inception 
will present larger and larger returns and the bank will remain with the company 
until it has reached the stage of going public, at which time D M I may 'cash in ' so as 
to avoid share dealing. 
Venture capital operations are considered by this company to be of the utmost 
importance and the attention i t receives makes it eligible for further development. 
This is particularly so with regard to following up on the initial investment. In the 
West, a firm may be brought into being through the sponsorship of a bank which 
then may provide funds for expanding operations and, at a later stage, the bank may 
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help defend against hostile takeovers as well as advising the firm on its own plans 
for expansion. I t is a pity that knowledge gained through guiding the firm from an 
early stage should become instantly obsolescent at the moment shares are offered for 
sale. The thrust of Mr Sakkaf's argument was that, in order to operate efficiently. 
Islamic banks must eventually come to terms with the financial market. This may 
involve some sort of discrimination between firms for whom interest payments are 
an important part of the balance sheet and those who may be involved in interest 
payments merely through the traditional borrowing process that is currently offered 
by non-Islamic banks. This is basically a question of intention on the part of each 
business; a combination of caution following the 1987 crash and informed deliberation 
on the part of the religious supervisory board must necessarily precede any move made 
towards investment in publicly quoted companies. 
4.6 Prospects and Problems for Islamic Banking in Europe 
A substantial portion of interview time was spent discussing the future and problems 
faced by each institution. Most, features of these discussions, such as Mr Hamdi's 
call for the increasing education of Westerners to the claimed personal financial gain 
as well as wider economic benefit of Islamic finance, have been noted previously. 
However, it was evident that many opinions on this subject were shared, the salient 
features appearing below. 
Must unequivocable was the belief that Islamic banking had found a niche 
which was worth exploiting; one that is strengthened by the interest expressed by 
the Western financial institutions. Having established this niche within the global 
banking system, it is important to be aware that the US$90 million invested worldwide 
by Islamic banks constitutes a drop in the ocean. This can hardly be construed as a 
threat to the status quo of international banking operations; while Islamic finance is 
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unlikely to supercede interest-based operations, it is also unlikely to infringe upon the 
transactions of the riba banks. The 'Islamic windows' of the latter demonstrate that 
i t is considered worthwhile to tap a new source of investor. In order to achieve the 
best results in this area, all three of the finance houses involved in this chapter have 
no doubt that a phase of (Cooperation for mutual benefit is under way. Islamic banks 
can help identify lending opportunities and add legitimacy to a riba bank's Islamic 
activities, while contact with Western financial practice may help 'educate' Islamic 
banks by observing the operation of ethical financing as conducted in an unregulated 
situation. ; i ; 
Mr Sakkaf of D M I was aware of the results of Western ignorance of Islamic 
banking. In Europe, individuals tend to import the politically-charged situation into 
the rule books of Islamic banks. Catchwords such as 'fundamentalism' are bandied 
about in a context that includes finance when it should remain firmly at home 'with 
the new AyatoUah in Iran'. Such a mentality has led people to associate the run on 
Faisal Finance in Cairo with a lack of confidence in the principles of Islamic finance 
rather than with the simple, if unfortunate fact of the company being managed by 
men of dubious reputation. Yet the lOS scandal of the early 1970's did not cast doubt 
on the credibility of Swiss banking. 
The familiar problem of the lack of a central bank was mentioned and given as 
one of the major reasons for requiring such a high degree of liquidity amongst Islamic 
banks. Although the size and international nature of the Islamic Development Bank 
should help to make it an ideal candidate for assuming this position, so far, experience 
has shown that this role has not been aspired to. D M I was obliged to pay cash in 
1983 for its losses on the commodity market and the IDB showed no interest in baling 
out the Kuwait Finance House in 1987. These facts were presented as such, not as a 
disparagement of the IDB and helped illustrate a further point. The direction taken 
by an institution such as Al-Rajhi is firm and clear as employees answer directly to an 
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homogeneous group of owners. It is unreasonable to expect firm and swift decisions 
from a body composed a such a variety of nations, each bidding for their national 
interest and all of very different economic strength and maturity as in the case of the 
IDB, and here a conflict of interest in direction is inevitable. Moreover, the addition 
of the role of central bank to the existing one of development assistance agency cannot 
be achieved in a short space of time. 
Meanwhile, Islamic finance must continue to perform successfully in order to 
grow. In the opinion of the staff at Al-Rajhi, one of the best areas of operation 
ideally suited to them is the investment of mutual funds. It is recognised that the 
attraction of nbn-Muslirri inyestors will not be easy, at best a lengthy process. The 
most cheering prospect should be the conducting of business with large international 
corporations. In this respect, contacts; as well as indications of past performance are 
important. Personnel joining Al-Rajhi have been known to take chents with them, 
and this can do nothing but good. 
Almost everything that concerns the future of this enterprise hinges upon recog-
nition and reputation; if a good deposit base can be built up, international Islamic 
banking should in future continue to reflect its solid record of growth in the Middle 
East over the last decade. With administration streamlined, the availabUity of large 
deposits from Muslim investors at home, and a price competitiveness that originates 
from funds placed on a profit and loss basis, Islamic finance houses situated in the 
West should be able to establish the sort of reputation that leads to their continuing 
success abroad. 
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Footnotes 
1 Rodney Wilson, Banking and Finance in the Arab Middle East, Macmillan, 
1983, pp.11-12. 
2 ibid, p. 14. 
3 This took place in 1983, in a royal decree. 
4 Rodney Wilson, op cit, p.18. 
5 See Financial Times, 11 Apri l 1990. 
6 Such as options trading, although the degree of restrictions applied to this 
activity remains uncertain. 
7 Which, after three years has experienced a fifty percent drop in value. 
8 "Islamic Banking", Aramco World Magazine, May-June 1987. 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
B A H R A I N 
5.1 Background. The Creation of Bahrain as a Money Market Centre 
Broadly speaking, there are two factors that account for the emergence of Bahrain 
as a financial centre for the Middle East. The first concerns its desire to diversify 
into such an area and the second concerns its suitability to do so and the existence 
of a climate conducive to the emergence of a banking centre anywhere in the Middle 
East. Bahrain was ideally placed, historically and geographically, to take up this role 
and the authorities recognised the need for diversification into an activity that did 
not involve heavy capital investment. A solution in the field of financial services both 
took account of, and answered the problem of a very limited reserve of oil and the 
dangers of reliance upon this industry. 
The major historical influences concern Bahrain's experience as a centre for 
trade and commerce which is linked to the history of British involvement in the 
island. Other than via the marketing of pearls through the British empire, the island's 
links with Britain were as a result of the strong military presence maintained there, a 
presence which continued up until the 1960's and led to the widespread use of Enghsh 
as a second language on the island. 
Prior to the discovery of oil, pearling was the islands primary industry; one on 
which it relied too heavily. After the collapse of this industry following the entry 
of Japanese cultured pearls into the market, it became clear that strong dependence 
on one industry was short-sighted. Consequently, on the discovery of oil in the 
1930's, the island did not experience an unfocussed spending bonanza, the need for 
diversification, especially in view of the limited nature of the oil reserves, being clearly 
recognised. 
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Oil was discovered in Bahrain shortly before the rest of the Arab Gulf, giving 
the economy a head start on the neighbouring countries and this, coupled with the 
high level of human resource development, was another factor that led to Bahrain's 
foundation as money market centre, a role that called for such a combination of 
features which would give the island the necessary maturity in financial practice. 
Domestic banks had been present in Bahrain since the estabhshment of the 
Eastern Bank in 1920, shaking the financing monopoly of the traditional moneylenders 
and was soon followed by the advent of another British bank and the later creation 
of the National Bank of Bahrain. This latter development occurred less out of any 
deep-seated nationalist feeling than to prevent Bahrain being the odd one out during 
the poUtically sensitive 1950's. 
Ironically, it was not a local institution that set the scene for financial diversifi-
cation in the area. Whereas the National Bank of Bahrain concentrated on developing 
a wide retail network, the British banks placed more emphasis on offering a wider 
range of services to larger business clients as well as serving local trading interests 
and the requirements of personnel from the oil companies and the military. 
Put briefly, with the development of oil, the role of the state in the economy 
increased dramatically. Hitherto, a hands-off' approach to regulation had prevailed 
but with the increase in royalties accruing to the government, balancing the budget 
became far more complex. Also, the maintaining of liquidity given the lure of higher 
returns on assets abroad was a job suited to a monetary agency which was set up in 
1973, coinciding with the first oil boom of the early 1970's. 
Bahrain's geographical position left it well placed to take advantage of the 
effects of the boom, particularly in the neighbouring states of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia which allowed no foreign banks to be located on their soil. Thus, in response 
to the factors mentioned above and a desire to diversify into a service field, Bahrain 
85 
obtained a more stable financial independence from its dwindling oil reserves when 
legislation was passed in 1975 permitting Offshore Banking Units (OBU's) to estabUsh 
themselves on the island. I t is also important to observe that, although serving as 
more than a simple replacement for Beirut, with the onset of the Lebanese civil war, 
Bahrain conveniently replaced that city as the Arab world's most important banking 
centre at the optimum time for such a transition. The scene was set for nearly a 
decade of thriving financial activity in the Arab Gulf, an area that the international 
financial community could not afford to ignore. 
5.2 The Development of Financial Activity in Bahrain 
An indication of Bahrain's regional importance is given by the number of Arab banks 
operating there. Excluding the branches of foreign. Western-owned institutions, fif-
teen OBU's are situated in Bahrain at present along with six locally incorporated 
ful l commercial banks (FCB's). The domestic market is a fraction of the size of its 
offshore counterpart. Working from statistics given by the Bahrain Monetary Agency, 
Capital Intelligence quotes end assets of only $4.5 billion compared with $65 bilUon 
for all OBU's (including foreign branches).^ It is worthwhile remarking that, in terms 
of customer deposits, the OBU market is only six times larger than the domestic 
market. 
Bahrain as a local money market centre is essentially a wholesale market to 
serve banks and other financial institutions rather than private individuals or even 
governments. Its main aim is to attract clients' deposits and to lend to others, 
particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It is reasonable to state that it is the 
existence of an appropriate legislative background that makes Bahrain viable as a 
money market centre. The deposit and lending rate is determined by market forces 
rather than imposed by the Bahrain Monetary Agency and thus, rates on deposits 
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are higher than in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and similar to Euromarkets elsewhere. 
Another characteristic shared with Euromarkets in general is the absence of a banks' 
reserve requirement, allowing all funds to be profitably used and leading to a lending 
rate that can be competitive with those in neighbouring countries. This atmosphere 
proved ideal for OBU operation and the market expanded rapidly after 1976. Assets 
and liabiUties peaked in 1983 with one hundred banks having established offshore 
units on the island. 
Bahrain is important for its role in recycling although it would be a mistake 
to place too much emphasis on this role; most of the recycling of surplus petro-
funds is carried out directly in the London and New York Euromarkets. The real 
flows of funds were at one time concentrated between Bahrain and other Euromarket 
centres, principally London, the former a,ccounting for approximately two percent 
of transations on the world interbank market. During this high point in wholesale 
banking activity with such a stroiig presence of competitors, many foreign banks felt 
the need of some representation on the island in order to avoid giving away business 
to their rivals simply through being absent. A general downturn in banking activities 
on the island has left this philosophy somewhat dated. The reasons for the changing 
situation will be examined later. Lately, it is increasingly the local institutions that 
have the most significant role in the region with American and European-owned 
OBU's losing business to joint venture banks as well as to their Japanese and Far 
Eastern rivals. 
A number of factors combined to affect the normal activity of the OBU's and 
slow the rate of growth after the 1983 peak. The effects of a worldwide recession 
were added to by mainly regional developments amongst which were a drop in the 
region's oil revenues, the crash of the suq al manakh unofficial securities market in 
Kuwait and the continuing Iran Iraq war. This latter problem had a great many 
more ramifications than a simple loss of confidence in the region's stability. I t was 
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Iran's political overtures to Bahrain which it considered to be part of its territory 
without conquest that helped to shape Saudi Arabia's remarkably lax attitude to riyal 
trading occurring on its own doorstep but beyond its control. That said however, the 
downturn in OBU activity was accompanied by tighter restrictions on lending to Saudi 
Arabia and a curbing of the internationalisation of the riyal by SAMA. Although it 
is fair to state that the commercial banks of the region had by this time become 
increasingly sophisticated, particularly in Saudi Arabia, they were not in a position 
to replace the OBU's in handling the sheer volume of currency trading, for example. 
When considering the continuing health of the OBU's, the most significant 
factor is undoubtedly the state of Bahrain's business within the Arab region. This is 
widespread; about seventy percent of funds come from Arab countries of which about 
fifty percent is reinvested in the area. This shows the local importance of Bahrain 
which, as stated previously, cannot merely be a centre for recycling oil revenues to 
the outside world for this would have left the locally-based OBU's under-employed 
with such transactions being carried out in the London and New York euromarkets. 
Although Bahrain may not hold quite the attraction to Western-owned financial 
institutions that was evident in the early 1980's, it would be too sweeping a statement 
to write off the island's role as an intermediary between the countries that are net 
borrowers and those that are net depositors both within the Middle East and outside 
i t . Bahrain serves many functions and it would be a mistake to do more than identify 
the weight that appears to be given to each separate service in terms of clients' 
demand. As an offshore money market, Bahrain could for example, be identified as 
a tax haven as it operates outside the regulatory control of the national institutions 
whose currency is traded on the island. Although not all ofishore markets can be 
classed as Eurocurrency centres, Bahrain certainly functions in this sense because 
deposits are made in currencies other than Bahraini dinars. 
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In trying to identify new trends in financial activity, it seems logical to examine 
the opportunities for expansion within the Arab world. At the moment, Bahrain 
is an important centre for short-term finance within the Arab world and the Gulf 
in particular. In fact, is it considered wise that Bahrain should rely so heavily on 
income from money market transactions? New activities could include fee-earning 
services that come from merchant and investment banking where the OBU's serve 
as intermediaries on acquisitions in the Western world. Trading in certificates of 
deposit and futures dealings look set to replace earlier OBU activities; indeed, some 
bankers no longer regard Bahrain itself as a wholesale banking centre. Whether or 
not it is inaccurate, such a statement does not suggest that Bahrain has given up its 
aspirations to a regional role in finance. 
I t has been suggested that with the emphasis on bank diversification, it looks 
likely that the market will become an intra rather than an inter-bank one. Arab 
banks working within the framework of the GCC are still well placed to continue in 
the area even if foreign banks decide to move out. It is extremely difficult to make 
statements of fact or even accurate predictions from behind secondary source material. 
It was considered far more difficult to identify the role of Islamic financial institutions 
within such a fluid situation, especially when one realises that they are newcomers 
to a relatively young banking community. That said, over the past fifteen years, 
financial activity has become rather predictable and, on the individual level, banking 
is now a somewhat staid activity. A discussion with a young English banker working 
in Bahrain revealed that career progression has become steady and unremarkable as 
the dynamism that accompanied the boom cycles of the 1970's and 80's oil industry 
has left the area having been replaced by an attention to bank hierarchy. In certain 
cases, it would appear that flair is less important than office politics — at least from 
the point of view of career progression. Obviously, such a view is a subjective one 
and tells less than half the story. This is not necessarily the case in all non-Arab 
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institutions; those that set up operations purely to make a fast profit have already 
left. Many others have found it worthwhile to persevere even though this decision 
has entailed an adjustment in financial practice and working harder, often at greater 
risk, for similar rewards. 
To acquire a balanced view at first hand, interviews were conducted in Bahrain 
with individuals from both Islamic and conventional banks in an attempt to place 
the role of Islamic finance within this arena of change. 
5.3 The Financial Situation of The Arab Gulf in The Context of 
International Market Changes 
Already, the 1990's promise to be a very different decade for the international in-
vestor from the previous one with a new emphasis upon greater sophistication and an 
accompanying need for more careful investment. 1989 saw some momentous changes 
around the world, and these have an important bearing on the Gulf investor. Europe 
cannot fail to make headline news; the single market of 1992 is given added impe-
tus by the imminent German reunification and the peaceful break-up of the Warsaw 
Pact is likely to shift the area defined as Europe increasingly eastward with the new 
Germany at its centre. A further ramification of Soviet liberalization towards its 
satellite states is a decreased expenditure on defence. The end of the cold war and its 
promised Peace Dividend should also see a reduction in the US budget deficit with 
the concomitant benefits of greater investments and stronger growth in the following 
decade. 
Moreover, with the growing importance of Europe comes a changed emphasis 
on the distribution of world currencies; more players are taking an important part 
in the world economy. Up until recently, the US dollar remained unchallenged as 
the key reserve currency. Although the dollar still accounts for 60 percent of world 
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reserves, an increasing regionalization in the world economy has seen the role of the 
dollar diluted in favour of the DMark. Some 25 percent of world monetary reserves 
are in DM compared to only 9 percent in 1975.^ 
What is the effect of these changes on the Gulf investor? As suggested, none of 
the above factors serve to make the management of investment portfolios any easier; 
having achieved what may appear to be a reasonable balance amongst the various 
instruments available in the international markets, constant adjustment is necessary 
to maintain an equilibrium. Thus far, Bahraini banks cannot claim a particularly high 
degree of involvement: Gulf investors since the early years of the oil boom have had 
sizeable investments overseas, this applies to governments, wealthy private investors 
and financial and trading institutions. Investments have ranged from bank deposits 
and fixed income securities to shares, real estate and direct investment in businesses 
abroad. Most importantly, a significant proportion of these investments has been 
made through intermediaries in London, Zurich, New York or Tokyo, leaving the Gulf 
important for its pool of investors but perhaps less so for local financial institutions. 
It may be that this situation is undergoing a change, one that could be par-
ticularly beneficial to Islamic financial institutions. Whilst some OBU's have left 
the island, others continue to apply. These latter have observed an upturn in Gulf 
economic activity and a consequent slowing down in the outflow of capital towards 
international markets. Funds invested in the region will serve to expand businesses 
already located there as well as establishing new ones or will take advantage of the 
recent surge in the region's stock and real estate markets. Mr Henry Azzam of the 
Gulf International Bank was eager to point out that this was a matter of proportion: 
whilst there should be a noticeable if slow repatriation of some of the funds invested 
abroad, it should also be observed that despite the improvement in investment op-
portunites at home, they remain limited. Considering the high propensity to save in 
the region, it is as yet unlikely that enough domestic outlets can be found to soak up 
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the surplus funds that result. 
As a postscript to this section, it may be useful to observe the group on which 
the financial activity in the Gulf turns; the private investor. G I B places them in three 
broad groups: institutions, wealthy individuals and less wealthy private investors. 
Institutions, both financial and commercial as well as the wealthy individual investors 
have maintained a high profile in the international markets and have been actively 
sought out by international financial institutions who have been able to offer them a 
wide range of services. 
Despite the important differences between these groups, all of whom are likely 
to have different expectations for their investments and are Ukely to take differing 
positions on risk exposure, there are similarities running through them. Speculation 
tends to be less important to the investor than the conservation of his investment 
and that investment tends to be short-term, suggesting a preference for liquidity and 
quick return. What may be termed a lack of adventurousness is further reflected in 
the Gulf investors preference for his money to be invested in a familiar environment 
such as his domestic market, USA and Europe rather than in the Far East. Products 
such as direct investment in real estate rather than leveraged buyouts and precious 
metals rather than commodities appeal once again because of their familiarity. A 
precis of GIB's research into investment priorities leaves a "league table" that runs 
as follows. 
Equity ranks highest amongst G C C investors with a bias towards local stock 
markets. Internationally, the US stock market leads the field for investments, followed 
by Germany, Japan and the U K . Liquidity preference has been expressed via a means 
unavailable to Islamic banks; bank deposits ranking second on the list with the major 
currency of deposit being the US dollar but with increasing importance being attached 
to Gulf currencies as well as to the DMark and the Japanese Yen. 
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Real estate comes third internationally and clear first if only domestic invest-
ment is considered. This is followed by bonds, attractive by their liquidity and low 
risk. Increasing sophistication among Gulf investors has seen the once-attractive gold 
and other precious metals decline in popularity, moreover this type of investment is, 
unsurprisingly, rather too speculative for the average Gulf investor. The same attitude 
applies to commodities, as in addition to their speculative nature, it is diflficult for the 
investor to obtain the information support that is available with more conventional 
instruments. 
This then, is how investment priorities measure up against each other in the 
Gulf. It is encouraging for Islamic financial institutions to observe that their partic-
ularly local appeal is now increasingly accompanied by a trend towards regionalisa-
tion; further improvements in telecommunications have eroded Bahrain's position as 
a money market centre as a result of its time zone situation. Longer dealing hours 
from London to the Far East have made such an intermediary position increasingly 
irrelevant and obsolete. However, the section above has demonstrated that the same 
problems face Islamic OBU's as pertain to their commercial banking counterparts. 
Liquidity tends to be high in the Gulf and the preferred ways of investment are not 
all available to Islamic financial institutions. The following sections describe how the 
separate arms of two Islamic OBU's, Al-Baraka and Massraf Faisal Al-Islami (also 
known as F I B or Faisal Islamic Bank), operate within this framework of time and 
preference. 
5.4 AI-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank, Bahrain 
Al-Baraka has an important presence in Bahrain. In addition to the main office, 
there are also two subsidiary companies; Al-Tawfeek Company for Investment Funds 
and Al-Amin Securities. Discussions took place at the main office and also at Al-
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Tawfeek which is 99.5 percent owned by its parent company and is responsible for 
short-term investments. Dr Faisal Lakhwa kindly agreed to give a broad outhne 
of the activities of Al-Tawfeek, as did Mr Abdullah Abol-Fatih of Al-Baraka. The 
material that follows is as a result of two separate interviews but as the fortunes of 
the companies are so closely connected, they are treated under one heading. Further 
information was gathered from annual reports and working papers. 
The bank offers two investment accounts; the Joint Investment Account for 
which the minimum deposit is US$5000, and the Specific Investment Account for 
sums over half a million dollars. The return on investment ranges from ten to twelve 
percent on the bank's own funds, with the most recent figure for the Joint Investment 
Account being an 8.56 percent return, the bank having taken a maximum of two 
percent as mudarib. 
Since coming to the island in 1985, Al-Baraka has had the intention of expanding 
its scope of operation outside the Arab world, with special attention having been paid 
to the Far East. For the time being however, seventy percent of the bank's investment 
remains in the Middle East, Turkey, Pakistan and North Africa. 
The term structure of AI-Baraka's funds was one of the first features that in-
dicates the importance of retaining a separate arm for short-term investments; 75 
percent of funds being committed for one year or less. No Islamic bank officer inter-
viewed in Bahrain denied that a longer term commitment of funds required greater 
education in Islamic investment methods and this could only come about as a result 
of a higher degree of exposure to the consumer / depositor of safe and profitable 
operation by institutions such as Al-Baraka. Presently, Gulf investors, contributing 
the Ron's share of deposits, are not offered a particularly wide range of investment 
packages. 
Islamic banks, although aware of the narrowness of their reach in comparison 
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to their competitors, are certainly not covetous of every type of investment that is 
available to traditional banks, not even those that are Islamically acceptable. The 
greatest perceived problem is that of reconciling risk management with a competitive 
return on investment. Al-Baraka does not imagine itself unique in facing this conun-
drum; the trade-off between caution and reward is faced by persons from all walks 
of life, not just within the banking community. Yet, as a relatively new concept in 
international finance, Islamic banks have to perform safely and profitably on a broad 
scale if they are to achieve their wider objectives. 
"... we in Al-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank, Bahrain, surely wish to see such 
Islamic financial institutions play a pioneering role in achieving economic and social 
development and establishing economic integration among Islamic countries. And 
this — we believe — will not be achieved unless Islamic banks first outdistance tradi-
tional banks working in our countries in every aspect such as providing all banking 
servies and gaining the clientele of the mass."^ 
The international commodity market is seen by Al-Tawfeek as a safe arena of 
operation but one that offers little in return. Similarly, the process of placing funds 
at one over L I B O R is not the way to keep a bank's shareholders content and so its 
unavailability to Islamic institutions is a source of inconvenience rather than missed 
opportunity. Although acceptable to Muslims and often quite profitable, returns on 
real estate are nevertheless considered very cyclical. Housing booms and business 
district development cannot sustain themselves indefinitely and one ponders on the 
balance of the Kuwait Finance House's investment portfoho, one third of which is 
directed towards real estate. A similar trend is noticeable at the Dubai Islamic Bank. 
\ 
In considering the problem of the lack of an Islamic capital market, a discussion 
on Islamic securities took place. The idea of a securities company is under study 
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although this can barely be labelled a definite objective of this Islamic bank, much less 
actual practice. An Islamic security would be distinguished through being fully backed 
on the operations side by an identifiable Islamic transaction. The chief objection of 
the shari'a committee to the conventional alternative is that, while many banks issue 
paper, certificates for example, investors cannot be sure whether they are indirectly 
supporting a chain of chemists, a casino or an arms manufacturer. 
In this case, the action would revolve around murabaha or lease contracts. Here, 
a minimum level of for example US$ 10-15 million is raised by public subscription; 
an investment towards a specific fund.'* The public would also be the source of re-
financing. There are three main features of the share certificate which should make 
them attractive to the pubUc. Firstly, since the maturity date of the transaction is 
known, the date-^that the dividend is to be paid is also known. Secondly, having 
negotiated, the investor will be aware of the return on a given transaction as well as 
on the overall fund: although it is not of course fully guaranteed, simply defined and 
expected. Thirdly, the investor has the right to buy, sell or redeem his certificate to 
the issuing company, the price being posted weekly. 
There are two lines of thought within the Al-Baraka group in Bahrain and they 
centre on the future function of the island. That its importance as an international 
money market centre has dwindled somewhat is unquestioned. However, considering 
the increasing weight given to trade finance, is Bahrain the ideal location from which 
to oversee the transactions incurred? One estimate places the ceiling on trade within 
the Arab world at US$300 million annually. The evidence suggests that this does not 
represent the vanguard figure of a regional trade boom, and makes dismal reading. 
One opinion views Dubai as a candidate for handling the financing of trade, 
both outside and inside the Arab world. The Emirates in general and Dubai in 
particular are much more competitive in terms of comparative advantage; Dubai is 
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more open than Bahrain and keen to attract further custom. Whilst long haul routes 
between Europe and the Far East are increasingly doing away with a Middle Eastern 
stop, Dubai is attracting any existing traffic by offering half-priced landing charges. 
Dubai has a more cosmopolitan and dynamic spirit, it is anticipated that similar 
terms combined with a naturally growing financial importance will see international 
banks located there in the not too distant future. Bahrain's advantages that acrue 
from its offshore status will simply be undercut by Dubai. 
The reasons why Bahrain should retain its primacy as a Gulf financial centre 
seem however, far more cogent, not least because the Gulf investor, as well as being 
cautious and conservative also seems to appreciate a degree of permanency which has 
only recently been achieved. During the 1970's, any observer of the almost frantic 
competition within the Gulf to build the most modern hotel, the tallest office block 
or the most imposing monetary agency headquarters would attest to the fact that an 
entrenchment has taken place. If this should run contrary to nomadic origins, so be 
it: a change of lifestyle has been marked in lasting terms. 
To recreate a banking community on the scale of Bahrain would require the 
wholesale relocation of the players themselves, an unlikely prospect and one which 
may well lose money for any company prepared to try. The OBU's that have already 
left Bahrain have left the Gulf altogether; no amount of regional relocation would have 
persuaded them to stay. Consider the chief factors behind their departure. Bahrain is 
geographically perilously close to Iran and the Gulf war drove some financial players 
away under the shadow of possible annexation of the island. Secondly, the economic 
situation has changed since the days of the development boom when banks were 
clearing three or four percent over L I B O R due to the demand for funds. To realise 
that kind of profit these days would require the shouldering of unacceptable risks. 
There can nevertheless be no doubt of the need for a Middle East financial 
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centre; theoretically, improved telecommunications would allow London to carry out 
Bahrain's money market dealings, but there is an increasing emphasis being placed 
on the provision of services. Here, greater confidence might be placed in a centre that 
is visible to local investors, 'local' in this case denoting MusHms / Arabs from the 
Gulf. Evidently, conjecture on the future of Bahrain does not involve the uprooting 
of Al-Baraka, nor, for that matter, of the Faisal Islamic Bank. The rents may be high 
in Bahrain, but it will take more than a few cut-price incentives from Dubai for the 
Islamic banks of Bahrain to give serious attention to the question of relocation. 
5.5 Past and Future is Tied to Saudi Arabia 
It is inevitable that Bahrain should have strong ties with Saudi Arabia. Not only is the 
island linked to its mainland neighbour by a 25 kilometre causeway paid for entirely 
with Saudi money, but it is inevitably the focus of attention for Saudi investors, 
corporate and private, for whom the attractions of Bahrain's offshore status are most 
apparent. Within the G C C , there are no controls on the transfer of funds and it is 
consequently unsurprising to see that eighty to ninety percent of Al-Tawfeek's funds 
come from the Gulf area. The greater proportion of these come directly from Saudi 
Arabia, there being no requirement for a collection agency or any other such financial 
intermediary. 
Al-Baraka, which is seventy percent Saudi-owned reflects the wider situation 
in Bahrain at present; the fortunes of the two being inextricably linked. In the past, 
banking expertise in Bahrain allowed it to act without competition as an investor 
of Saudi funds. At the time, Bahrain appeared to be an offshoot of mainland Saudi 
Arabia, an impression which was further strengthened by the building of the causeway. 
Recent independence on the part of Saudi banks due to increasing expertise has left 
bank staff in Bahrain at best under-employed, but the fact remains that Bahrain is 
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not of a sufficient size to exist independently of its next door neighbour. It does not 
have the trading links that stretch all around the Indian ocean that so favour Dubai's 
progress, nor does the racial^ mix of Bahrain result in the same entrepreneurial spirit 
that pervades Dubai. There can be little doubt that Bahrain is casting about for 
another role, nor that it is most logical, considering the human resource development, 
that Bahrain's future remains in banking. Obviously, there is no single panacea for 
the symptoms of economic woe; the future will depend on the island's ability to adapt.. 
The introduction of Islamic banking to the island is a good example of the efforts 
being made by the Bahrain Monetary Agency to ensure that every chance is given to 
the banking community— as a Middle Eastern base for international Islamic finance, 
Bahrain is the scene of regular seminars and conferences on the subject. It may 
well be in the interest of the BMA to aid the development of an Islamic interbank 
market, a concept that will be examined as a conclusion to this chapter. Inevitably, 
this will directly aid Islamic banks, but in the light of other institutions such as the 
Gulf International Bank and the Arab Banking Corporation offering Islamic finance, 
it is perhaps not far off the mark to suggest that encouraging Islamic finance and 
bringing to it the experience of nearly two decades of Offshore operations would aid 
the banking community as a whole. 
5.6 Further Obstacles to Islamic Finance 
Al-Baraka is as keen as any other Islamic bank to build up the Islamic financial 
markets but cites the well-known shortcoming of a lack of suitable opportunities, 
putting an approximate figure of US$500-600 million at most. 
A further difficulty faced by Islamic banks centres on a lack of information; 
not just ignorance on the part of the consumer of Islamic banking services, but also 
on the part of the authorities towards the more basic principles involved in Islamic 
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financial practice. In the case of murabaha financing, for example, the question of 
whether or not banks should establish commercial companies or not was raised. It was 
necessary to explain to the authorities that murabaha was a commercial transaction, 
for with the bank actually owning sponsored goods for a certain length of time, it had 
appeared to be an investment. It was pointed out that existing laws were still not 
suitable for Islamic operations to be recognised on account of their merits instead of 
being questioned with every innovation. This is not a problem faced by conventional 
banks. Ironically, I was given to understand that the West is more amenable to 
some principles of Islamic finance, although they may not be labelled as such; less 
difficulties would be faced in accepting the idea of ownership of goods as a service 
for a client rather than as a speculation on the bank's own account. As mentioned 
by the London branch of Al-Baraka, murabaha should imply that the bank actually 
holds goods before selling them. However, if this is taken in its literal meaning and a 
commercial company considered, the final decision rests on the opinion of the religious 
supervisory board as well as the extent to which mark-up finance is used by the bank 
concerned. 
The status of equity trading remains unclear and Al-Baraka considers that this 
is a further reason why the Islamic Unit Trust conceived by the IDB has yet to make 
headway. There is to date, no fatwa that examines the buying and seUing of equities 
for companies that deal with traditional banks. Only the shari'a board of the Islamic 
Bank of Jordan has declared that private Muslims may invest in companies' equity 
but it has delivered no statejjient on banks. Therefore, the Islamic Unit Trust has 
encountered the drawback, of less than one hundred percent approval from the banks 
that would be major initial contributors. In Jeddah, the Majm'a al-Fiqh or Society 
for Jurisprudence has decreed that when financing is needed by a company, muqarada 
certificates may be issued in the process of floating a Hmited company for the required 
funds. This decision was only directed to Jordan. To each separate Islamic bank, 
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the situation vis-a-vis shares trading is largely a matter of personal choice and in-
terpretation which has led to a variety of different positions being adopted on the 
issue. Until there is a consolidation of the process of judging upon the legality of new 
financial instruments, especially those adapted from Western financial practice, there 
will continue to be a lack of synergy in the performance of Islamic banks worldwide. 
0 
5.7 Massraf Faisal Al-Islami, Bahrain 
F I B has been in Bahrain since July 1982 and presently, its authorised and paid-up 
capital is US$30 million. It is principally owned (89%) by the Dar Al-Maal Alrlslami 
Trust which in turn is administered by its wholly owned subsidiary, DMI in Geneva. 
Of the remaining eleven percent, the Islamic Takafol Company of Bahrain holds ten 
percent and H R H Prince Mohamed Al-Faisal Al-Saud owns a one percent stake. 
Between 1984 and 1988, customer deposits have grown from US$2.3 miUion to 
nearly one billion dollars with investment accounts forming the vast majority of the 
total. One quarter of these deposits were utilised in financing operations of which the 
major portion was used in trade finance. The percentage breakdown of the bank's 
total financing portfolio runs as follows: 
Trade Finance 74.0 
Manufacturing 5.4 
Agriculture 1.8 
Construction 5.1 
Others 4.0 
The liquidity situation at F I B does not differ from the norm of Islamic banks: 
"In pursuant to the policies estabUshed at the Bank, a high level of Hquidity 
was maintained. A total sum of US$1,007 million was invested in short term, quickly 
101 
realizable instruments of the maturity terms extending up to one year. This comprises 
98.7% of the Bank's total assets. Of these, US$258 million, i.e. 25 percent of the 
assets and 26 percent of the short term investments were realisable within a period 
of 30 days."^ 
The Faisal Islamic Bank of Bahrain makes good use of its extensive network of 
offices around the world. This is most obvious when examining the source of funds 
for the 1989 financial year.^ Out of the one billion dollars that were managed by 
F I B , $450 million came from the DMI headquarters in Geneva and $550 million was 
collected in the Gulf area, of which Saudi Arabian investors contributed 80%. These 
funds are gathered and transferred to Bahrain via collection agencies throughout the 
kingdom. 
The range of international banking services that F I B offers its clients is wide, 
encompassing foreign exchange operations, letters of credit and letters of guarantee 
as well as leasing. Islamic securities and Islamic syndication. Peculiar to F I B is a 
system of parallel purchase and sale of currencies and commodities'. However, none of 
the above truly break new ground, and at interview as well as in hterature provided 
by the bank, it is the difficulties the bank has faced and the means by whichsthey are 
to be overcome that gained the most attention. 
Foremost amongst these is the pace of recent developments in conventional 
financial markets which conspire to leave those such as Islamic banks in a position 
that suggests a lack of flexibiUty and competitiveness on their part, in terms of services 
provided and return on investment. One of the more pressing problems, mentioned 
in almost every interview has been liquidity management and the related issue of 
finding hquidity instruments to overcome the unnecesarily high level of idle funds 
that Islamic banks find themselves obliged to maintain. 
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Liquidity constraints, further conspire to hold back longer-term investments 
as much of the crucial short-term returns normally accruing to conventional banks 
are unavailable to their Islamic counterparts due to the investment instruments or 
products that are employed. In consequence the latter must devote time, energy 
and funds to those activities that are both stable and profitable in order to satisfy 
customers and demonstrate the efficacy of the system. Restricting the withdrawal of 
deposits is not an answer as Nabil Nassief argues: 
"To overcome even a part of this constraint, it may be argued that withdrawals 
could be minimised by restricting investors to specified projects or longer term pools 
of funds relating withdrawals to the maturity of a relevant project, funds or time 
the actual cash flow is generated. In a highly competitive and flexible market, this 
situation will severely restrict choice and in turn the system's success."^ 
As most interbank market activities fall within the category of the Euromarkets, 
it will be observed that much of the subject has been covered in chapter three. Entry 
into this type of activity or an Islamic equivalent thereof will involve careful prepara-
tion. Within the foreign exchange market alone, transaction volume is estimated at at 
US$150 billion a day; players include banks, institutional investors (insurance compa-
nies, for example), individuals and brokerage houses. There is no reason why Islamic 
banks should not fit into this scheme, but at F I B , those responsible for researching 
the issue are aware that the market is extremely competitive and only the most cost 
effective and efficient players will be able to survive and prosper. The future need 
not be bleak however. It was pointed out that necessity on the part of Islamic banks 
has bred invention and innovation. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that they could adapt some of the market products to suit their own objectives and 
norms of practice. 
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The aim to establish such a market is well known, as are the twin problems of 
speculation and unearned gain within the existing one. There follows a study of the 
subject considered as a feasible bank project with its attendant aims and conditions. 
5.8 An Islamic Interbank Market 
The absence of an inter-Islamic bank market does not affect the development of 
Islamic banks alone. When the lending policies of such institutions are taken into 
account, it is likely that the corporate sectors in Islamic countries are suflFering as 
a result of the inefficient transfer of surplus funds from one geographical section of 
Islamic society to another. The problems faced by the banks themselves due to an 
inability to borrow and invest funds on the interbank market are more direct, and 
they fall into three main scenarios. 
Firstly, Islamic banks are unable to realise a return on their funds if a suitable 
investment opportunity does not present itself. Secondly, unless the bank has suffi-
cient funds of appropriate maturity available, a suitable investment may be missed 
due to an inability to quickly find additional funds from elsewhere. Thirdly, having 
found a good investment and with suitable funds available to go ahead with the trans-
action, the bank may yet be hamstrung if it is subsequently faced with withdrawals 
on such a scale as to be unable to meet the depositors' calls. The adverse effect on 
the bank as well as on Islamic finance in general are obvious and far-reaching. 
The products and instruments created for the inter-Islamic bank market must 
both conform to the shari'a at the same time as being suitably Uquid. Unfortunately, 
Islamic countries are seldom able to provide a combination of the qualities required 
by Islamic banks to draw up products, which include an acceptable yield, easy cash 
convertibility and general recognition by other Islamic banks. The absence of a cen-
tral bank hints at further problems with a proper regulatory environment and legal 
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framework. Moreover, in many Islamic countries, strict exchange controls are main-
tained, impeding the free movement of funds. In spite of a desire on the part of those 
involved, such a situation can lead to aii inadequate supply of investors without whom 
the system is bound to founder. 
Further limitations on the development of Islamic marketable instruments are 
outlined by Nabil Nassief. He points out that thus far, the number of such instruments 
developed by Islamic banks which may be used on an interbank basis or which may 
be traded on a secondary market is relatively small. Most obviously, Islamic financial 
institutions, being relatively new to thie banking scene and few in number, are not 
in the same strong position as mainstream banks to develop new financial products. 
The possibilities for adapting conventional money market practices are of course very 
limited due to their inherent interest element. 
Any interbank product created and traded by an Islamic bank must fill a number 
of basic pre-requisites. It has been suggested that mutual funds or participation 
certificates may comply with the injunctions of Islamic law, where relevant to market 
operations. The funds must necessarily comprise transactions that generate extra 
capital to be subsequently distributed among the participants in the scheme. It is 
anticipated that investors should be kept constantly abreast of the value of the assets 
in each investment pool, preferably on a daily basis. In this way, it will become clear 
which bank is managing its fund most efficiently, consequently attracting liquidity 
whUst poor performers will be unable to do so. An alternative to the investment pool 
idea is provided by relating the certificates to an underlying financing programme 
with a single corporate cUent. The return will relate to the actual activity in which 
the funds are invested. Once again, the assets must be frequently valued in order to 
calculate returns to the participants. 
Problems with such a scheme tend to revolve around the anticipated small size 
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of the market. Specifically, when a client wishes to leave or enter the pool, each 
movement must be matched by finding funds f rom other sources; not an easy task 
and one which w i l l involve an uneconomical amount of time, so defeating interbank 
market objectives. 
A n alternative to longer term Eurobonds has been promoted by F IB . The bank 
has pioneered the technique of syndicating individual financing transactions under 
short term murahaha contracts. The receipts f rom this process are structured into a 
pool, a mudaraba in fact which,is then utilised for a syndicated transaction. FIB has 
handled seven such transactions to a total value of US$600 million over the past two 
and a half years. The most obvious drawback here is that the transactions cannot be 
instantly implemented on demand. They have however proved popular wi thin and 
outside the sphere of Islamic banking. 
Guaranteed reciprocal loans, whereby a borrowing bank agrees to provide the 
same service to the lender at a later date, runs into problems even at conception. 
Whils t a number of Islamic banks may agree in principle to deferred repayment in-
dependent of the prevailing conventional interbank rate, religious scholars argue that 
reciprocity on the part of the borrower is not obligatory in the case of an interest-free 
loan. The stumbling block this provides to what may have been a workable system 
is a gigantic one. 
I n conclusion, i t is clear that any foray by Islamic banks into the conventional 
interbank market must be planned wi th great care; the latter has after all, taken a 
number of years to develop flexibility and the speed of innovation and development 
that i t boasts at present. I t is equally clear that Islamic banks must draw up products 
and operations that would gain favourable attention f rom conventional banks in order 
to make f u l l use of the size and efficiency of the market. Islamic banks have four basic 
processes, musharaka, mudaraba, ijara and murabaha f rom which to develop further 
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products. This and the creation of new 'core' products wi l l take further research 
as well as study of and cooperation w i t h riba banks i f anything worthwhile is to be 
achieved. 
There is no doubt that Islamic banks entering into the system would give 
Bahrain's interbank market a boost and a further reason for pre-eminence in the 
Gulf. I t could well serve as a focus of interest for Islamic banks worldwide as a centre 
for adjusting their l iquidity. Thus, the fates of Bahrain as a banking centre as well 
as Islamic finance as a viable means of handUng money. 
Nabi l Nassief's concluding remarks connect cooperation in this venture wi th 
the well-being of Islamic banking in general: 
"Islamic banking has made tremendous strides during the past two decades. 
W i t h progress, their needs have also grown considerably. I t is high time that they 
got together, pool their resources— manpower, infrastructural and monetary— to 
take care of their fast-growing needs. I t is quite possible that i n the beginning, 
substantial assistance w i l l be derived f rom central banks of Islamic countries and 
the Islamic Development Bank but as products are developed which are acceptable 
universally and confidence grows in the efficiency of the system and players, a greater 
number of participants w i l l be drawn to the operation of the market."^ 
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C H A P T E R SIX 
T H E I S L A M I C D E V E L O P M E N T BANK 
6.1 Creation and Role of the IDB 
I n addition to its declared role as a development assistance agency, much is expected of 
the Islamic Development Bank outside this field. As a supra-national body, i t would 
appear to be the ideal candidate for the promotion of Islamic banking, particularly 
i n the sphere of international finance. The decade preceding the creation of the 
I D B saw a greater than ever polarisation between rich and poor MusUm countries 
as the oil import bills of resource-poor countries rose substantially, in fine wi th the 
oi l price increase which left the net oil exporters of the region very much better ofi". 
Considering the historical links provided by extensive trade wi th in the Middle East 
and, most significantly, the religious conviction that draws Muslims to Mecca at least 
once in their fives, i t is not surprising that the members of the OIC (Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference) should be jo in t ly informed, as well as concerned about this 
increasing wealth gap. Nor is i t unusual that, amongst beUevers of different countries, 
altruism should be a major factor behind the establishment of an insti tution whose 
aim is to cure at least some of the symptoms of economic inferiority and thus help to 
redress inequality wrought by a lack of resources. 
I n order to highlight the significance of the I D B and its activities wi th in the 
Middle East, i t may be worthwhile to consider the following points. The uniqueness 
of this inst i tut ion derives f rom a combination of factors. The I D B is one of only 
two mult inat ional Th i rd World financing agencies in the Middle East.^ I t is the sole 
ins t i tu t ion that conducts its funding activities according to the shari'a law and, most 
important ly for this study, the Islamic Development Bank is uniquely placed to over-
see and promote the spread of Islamic banking throughout the Muslim world. Acting 
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as central bank and lender of last resort, this agency could help reassure other central 
banks of the solidity of Islamic financial practice outside the Middle East. In support-
ing such projects as Islamic Certificates of Deposit by underwriting the market, the 
I D B has gone some way towards achieving a wider recognition of and participation 
i n s/ian'a-based financial instruments. 
Evidently, much is expected of the I D E and i t is inevitable that a disparity 
should arise between this and what is actually , achieved. Considering the size and 
composition of the inst i tut ion, i t is perhaps remarkable to note what has actually 
been achieved to date, for the decision-making machinery could not possibly be as 
well-oiled as i t would be i n a single, homogenous entity. Nor do the vested interests 
of one party necessarily coincide w i t h those of another. This chapter aims to examine 
the aims and expectations of the I D B w i t h reference to material taken f rom wri t ten 
work about the bank as well as f rom interviews wi th its oflicers. Thus i t is hoped 
that a balanced view is given of the IDB's aspirations and activities. 
Established to undertake long-term financing of development projects and the 
short- term financing of trade, the I D B comprises forty five members, an increase of 
more than one hundred percent on the original twenty three at the bank's inauguration 
in 1975. These are qualified for inclusion through membership of the OIC and a 
willingness to conform to the bank's decisions. Thus, f rom the outset, i t is clear that 
membership of this financial body is far f rom restricted by considerations of wealth, 
pohtical persuasion or even by a history of antagonism through boycott, as i n the 
case of Iran.^ 
Taking into account the fact that the I D B is placed to make the greatest impact 
on Islamic finance in general, many of the issues that concern this institution are 
directly relevant to commercial Islamic banks. Possibly the most closely connected 
issue is that of financing procedure. In spite of a different mode of funding its capital 
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base, the problems that the I D B faces w i t h equity participation projects are basically 
the same as those encountered by its commercial counterparts. Evidently, the recent 
depreciation of member countries' currencies against the Islamic Dinar has done l i t t le 
to help the situation. Identification of and competition for feasible projects that 
anticipate a sure and speedy return is equally tough, but as a development assistance 
agency, the I D B is more likely to take a long term view about infrastructural projects 
that are less attractive i n respect of repayments. Such projects tend to have a strong 
socio-economic impact and, since its inception, the Bank has financed 126 of these 
operations to a to ta l value of nearly ID649 mil l ion. Repayments have been scheduled 
for between twenty fiye ,and th i r ty years. 
Nevertheless, i t would be a mistaike to identify the I D B as a charity; a further 
examination of the source of the bank's capital is included later in this section but for 
now, i t is sufficient to state that i t is not easy to augment these funds. Unlike other 
development agencies that are able to raise funds in the market place, the I D B has 
been almost solely funded by members' capital subscription. In view of the worsened 
economic circumstances of its member countries, calls for an increased subscription 
would be most unlikely to be met. Hence i t is highly desirable that loaned funds 
should revolve and inevitably, the safest return tends to come f rom trade finance. 
More than any other Islamic financial inst i tut ion, the I D B is placed to challenge 
and overcome the problems faced by the genre and i t does so wi th skill and imagi-
nation. Projects such as the Islamic Banks' PortfoUo develop finks w i t h commercial 
entities that benefit both parties. Indeed, any project backed by the I D B has a far 
greater chance of success than one i t avoids. Moreover, the size of the Islamic Re-
search and Training Institute ( IRTI) which occupies one of the bank's three buildings 
at its headquarters in Jeddah suggests that any operation conceived by this body 
is Hkely to be far f rom a flash in the pan. A l l the evidence points to the suggestion 
that the I D B actively co-operates w i t h other Islamic financial institutions rather than 
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stealing their market and crowding them out. 
I t is evident that in order to increase the funds at its disposal, even to maintain 
them at the same level, the I D B must be innovative. The question of developing 
Islamic securities and a dedicated market is therefore a relevant one when i t is re-
membered that the I D B , like any other financial insti tution, must ultimately show 
a profi t i n order to remain in business. Viewed as a development assistance agency, 
i t is arguable whether or not Islamic financing in this sphere is the most effective 
way of disbursing funds. W i t h few good investment opportunities available, i t has 
been stated that government funding is not ideal being to some extent at the expense 
of private capital finance.^ I n what follows, i t is suggested that there are even more 
fundamental questions such as the future of the IDB's development role which must 
be resolved before i t is possible to assess the true impact of its funding. 
6.2 Background to Capital Subscription 
The idea of founding an Islamic development inst i tut ion was conceived and first dis-
cussed by the OIC in the late 1960's w i t h a strong impetus for action resulting f rom 
the oi l price boom in the early 1970's. I n simple terms, those enriched by the oil price 
rises were i n a position, even under an obligation, to aid those Mushm countries who 
had become increasingly worse ofl?" as a result of an event that had enriched them. In 
effect, such a windfal l was viewed as unearned profit . 
A second meeting of finance ministers in August 1974 set narrower aims and 
definitions to the proposed bank. Primarily, financial activity was to be in accordance 
w i t h the shari'a law. A great amount of leeway was given wi th respect to raising funds 
when i t was stipulated in the Bank's charter that that i t could accept deposits and 
raise funds i n any other manner: the significance of this clause wi l l become apparent 
later on. 
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Contributions to the authorised capital of 2 billion Islamic dinars, to be spfit 
into 200,000 shares of IP.1Q,000, each, varied f rom Saudi Arabia's 200 milfion to the 
nominal contributions f rom the poorer Islamic states such as Chad, Guinea, Yemen 
and Afghanistan who raised 2.5 mil l ion each. Arguably, some countries were re-
markably modest about their comparative economic status wi th Syria pitching its 
contribution at Mauritania's level and wi th Turkey offering no more than Sudan, but 
at the end of the first round of contril;»utions, ID793 mill ion had been raised. Ben-
efi t t ing f rom the 1979-80 oil price rise, oil rich member states were able to comply 
w i t h the 1981 resolution to pay up the balance of the authorised capital; the paid up 
capital now stood at; ID1820 mil l ion. ; ; • 
Al though rnost ' o f the rest of the shortfall between paid up and subscribed 
capital was later made good, this looks at present to be the fimit of funds expansion. 
Having gladly accepted debt rescheduling arising f rom the 1988 Toronto summit of 
the industrialised countries,:.it is evident that the poorer I D B member countries are 
s t i l l not i n a ppsitipn to increase their modest subscription to the Bank's capital. 
The economic situation w i t h regard to the IDB's more developed member coun-
tries provides a contrast, but not an encouraging one. The oil exporting countries 
actually recorded a negative growth figure in 1987 following the downward pressure 
on oil prices in the middle of that year. I t has been predicted that figures for 1989 
w i l l reveal a further reduction in GDP growth rates in all groups of IDB member 
countries following a slight rally in the figures for the previous year."^ Faced wi th such 
budgetary problems, the oil rich states are equally unlikely to contribute further to 
the Bank's capital. The expansive mood of 1975 where share capital funding on a 
no-return basis was acceptable, is definitely over. 
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6.2.1 Shortcomings of Funding by Capital Subscription 
I n the case of the I D B , the greatest disadvantages resulting f rom this mode of fund-
ing is a reliance upon i t . The financial resources of the Bank are derived mainly 
f r o m its paid up capital, the receipts of its Investment Deposit Scheme and its re-
tained earnings. During the financial year 1988-89, these resources were distributed 
in the following way: "paid up capital stood at ID1645 mill ion compared wi th the 
ID67 mil l ion raised through the Investment Deposit Scheme. Total retained earnings, 
including the previous year's profits, amounted to ID22 mill ion. 
On first reading, this may look satisfactory but problems become apparent when 
one considers the Bank's aspirations to a multinational role. A t ID2 billion, its capital 
is not significantly higher than that of the Saudi Fund for Development which stands 
at US$3 bil l ion, a ceiling which may in any case be raised at the discretion of the King-
dom's Council of Ministers. Viewed alongside the resources of the World Bank, those 
of the I D B are bound to look very modest, but the important consideration is that 
the latter cannot raise money in the market place by conventional arrangements such 
as bonds. Therefore, all subscribed capital must be actually paid in . Perhaps only 
approximately eight percent of the World Bank's capital base stands 'idle', leaving 
callable capital of more than ninety percent. As a direct result of the denomination 
of its activities, the I D B encounters yet another drawback. Heavy currency deprecia-
t ion in recent years has made subscription in a strong Islamic dinar more expensive in 
real terms as well as increasing the servicing and repayment burden for any borrower 
whose premiums are i n these hard currency denominated terms. Unfortunately, the 
problem is further compounded by the appreciation of the Islamic dinar against the 
US dollar. This has made borrowing in that currency f rom the World Bank a shghtly 
less unattractive proposition than borrowing in Islamic dinars f rom the I D B . 
Inevitably, difficulties in quickly raising funds in the market has a bearing on 
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resource mobilisation and the Bank must rely on activities which tend to be short term 
i n nature and likely to produce a safe return. In order to be able to provide longer 
term project financing, whether i t is done on the basis of equity participation, leasing 
or instalment sale, the Bank is consequently obliged to maintain a high concentration 
on trade finance. Whereas ID169.59 milf ion worth of project financing was provided 
by the Bank last year, import trade financing which does not include the relatively 
new Longer Term Trade Financing Scheme accounted for ID459.74 million of total 
financing figure of ID668.89 mil l ion approved by the bank last year. 
There is a fur ther knock-on effect which comes as a direct result of the weight 
given to trade finance. Although there is a tendency to believe that developing 
countries require long-term financing for infrastructural projects whereas commodity 
finance is actually a more pressing need, problems can nevertheless stand in the 
way of successful musharaka transactions. Obviously, the greatest stumbUng block 
in the case of countries such as Sudan or Mal i which require soft loans, grants, or 
financing w i t h a long repayment schedule is that trade finance loans tend to mature 
too quickly. However, even in the situation of a commodity loan where the mudarih 
has earned a sufficient profi t to repay wi th in the maturi ty date, i t is quite possible 
that the mudariVs country does not have the hard currency wi th which to meet his 
obligation. The I D B is aware of this problem and tries to counter i t . A t present 
however, the Bank has found i t necessary to compromise between long term and 
short term financing in order to survive in the market. The implications of this state 
of affairs w i l l be examined in a later section. 
6.3 Augmenting the Bank's Resources 
There are a number of issues that are raised by this question, not least the means 
by which the I D B aims to accompUsh this task. The question of whether anything 
115 
other than a substantial increase in these resources would have a noticeable effect 
on investment policy is a particularly relevant one. This in turn begs the further 
question of how to define the Bank's financing procedure and disbursement; whether 
the I D B is making headway in achieving the aims set out in its charter. 
I t should not be forgotten however, that the size of the capital base is not 
the only risstraining influence on the Bank's financing operations. Just as wi th its 
commercial counterpiarts, the' I D B has a policy on the mode of financing that i t wishes 
to undertake in order to achieve its goals on a wider front. Hence, wherever possible, 
feasible long-term projects may take precedence over short-term success through 
more t radi t ional and secure operations financed by the murabaha method.^ 
Constraints on the supply side are matched by those imposed by the fimits 
of demand. Once again, this is a characteristic shared w i t h the commercial Islamic 
banks where attractive opportunities for investments of a specific maturi ty date are 
not always available. Moreover, the competition to fund such projects is not neces-
sarily l imited to development institutions; conventional banks and local government 
subsidies number amongst the strong alternatives. 
Nevertheless, to satisfy the perceived need to augment the funds of the Islamic 
Development Bank, two schemes were drawn up in 1987, one of which has the added 
bonus of promoting interaction amongst Islamic financial institutions. 
6.3.1 The Islamic Banks' Portfolio 
The Islamic Banks' Portfolio is an investment facil i ty to contribute to the promotion 
of trade links between Islamic countries. Its basic structure is made clear by the first 
condition that attaches to i t , informing prospective participants that financing is to 
be based on the Islamic murabaha principle.^ The document further stipulates that 
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trade is to be external and that the currency of transaction is the US dollar. 
Twenty one Islamic banks joined in the foundation of the scheme by subscribing 
US$65.5 milf ion to be administered by a 'participants' committee' comprising thirteen 
of the founding banks. This capital, which is now fu l ly paid in , is divided into share 
certificates worth $100 apiece and which can be traded amongst the Islamic banks 
themselves. 
Quoting the price of the certificates is tricky; supply and demand within the 
market helps to establish the financial position of the portfolio itself but in the ab-
sence of a regular market i n the certificates, the I D B announces the price every three 
months, and trades at that price itself. Annual profit distribution allows five percent 
for the I D B as portfofio manager; the certificate holder taking ninety percent while 
five percent is set aside to support the financial position of the fund. 
Officers wi th in the Bank responsible for the portfofio see two separate stages 
to the successful operation of the fund , ,the first phase being to attract contributions 
f rom potential participating banks. This was achieved readily enough after an ini t ia l 
contribution of $25 rnillipn by the I P B . The Al-Baraka group as a whole has con-
tr ibuted $17.75 mil l ion w i t h $9.25 mill ion coming f rom the Bahrain branch. Various 
branches of the D M I group have added a, l i t t le over $10 mil l ion to the fund. 
The second phase involves creating or issuing the instuments through which 
the fund is to be invested. The Bank is t ry ing to acquire the sort of assets, such 
as equity-based or leasing products that w i l l enable i t to further raise the amount 
under management. Thus far however, only trade financing on a murabaha basis has 
been involved, mostly because of the relative security and ease of operation that i t 
provides, coupled w i t h the need to estabfish a satisfactory record in order to attract 
contributors ouside the Islamic financial field. Leasing, for example, requires a great 
deal more appraisal and running management; at present in the I D B , there is only 
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one member of staff to deal w i t h this.^ 
Obviously, increasing the size of the fund depends upon the demand for cer-
tificates and the results they show. In addition to these more obvious indications 
of what constitutes a successful operation, there are also the benefits that accrue to 
the commercial banks through co-operation wi th an inst i tut ion the size of the I D B 
which, as the largest Islamic financial body, is likely to have a more substantial chen-
tele in favour of s/ian'a-based financial practice. Further proof of the drawing power 
of the Islamic banks' portfolio is attested by the presence of five Sudanese institutions 
amongst the founding member banks, and this in the face of economic hardship and 
a dearth of hard currency. 
Such sacrifice and forward thinking was sure to pay long-term dividends and 
indeed i t has. In addition, the certificates can ease the ever-present problem of 
short- term l iquidi ty management. By the beginning of August 1989, twenty five 
trade financing operations worth approximately US$72 miUion had been approved 
by the Bank. Profits increased 68 percent over 1987-88 to stand at nearly US$5.3 
mil l ion last year. 
The future of this investment faci l i ty looks promising. W i t h periods of credit 
ranging f rom six to eighteen months, the funds can be quickly recycled and profit 
speedily realised. Furthermore, despite its success and popularity, the scheme should 
remain manageable because, in considering further issues, the I D B has undertaken 
not to exceed ten times the in i t ia l capital at any stage. 
Taken overall, the Islamic Banks' PortfoUo is an extremely sound scheme. As 
mentioned above, commercial Islamic banks benefit f rom co-operation wi th the I D B 
i n terms of being able to offer a wider choice of investment facilities to their clients. 
I n turn , the I D B gains contact w i t h a wider cross-section of clients who may have 
been overlooked were i t not for the intermediation of the smaller, commercial banks. 
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6.3.2 The IDB Unit Investment Fund 
Outline 
Ever since 1980, the Islamic Development Bank has sought to increase the scope 
of the financial instruments at its disposal and in particular those aimed at raising 
revenue f rom the market place. The Islamic Banks' Portfolio and the Longer Term 
Trade Financing Scheme have helped mobilise resources by encouraging trade. This, 
while effective, could not be considered innovative. Meanwhile, the Unit Investment 
Fund, formerly the I D B Uni t Trust, has been under consideration for some time; 
what appeared to be a comprehensive set of regulations for its launch was agreed 
upon in December 1986. Yet the scheme is st i l l under review, giving an indication of 
the difficulties involved in entering a new and constantly evolving area of finance. 
As a result of much internal dialogue as well as extended consultation wi th 
Robert Fleming of London who w i l l continue to advise on the scheme, the amended 
regulations approved in September 1989 provide an outline to the workings of the 
fund . A n in i t ia l US$100 mill ion worth of funds is to be offered and, as wi th the 
Portfolio scheme, i t w i l l be administered by the Bank and is to be denominated in 
US dollars. Financing in this instance takes place wi th in the concept of mudaraba. 
Once again, the I D B w i l l act as mudarib, responsible for buying into a number 
of projects w i th in the I D B member countries as well as company equity in non-
member countries, 'pr imari ly ' , states the Bank's literature, ' in the world's major 
capital markets.' 
Herein lies a problem, one which may help explain the gap between the scheme's 
conception and its implementation. On one hand, many financial institutions, par-
ticularly those of the Gulf, consider that investment in the equity of riba companies 
is un-Islamic. The government of Kuwait , for example, is a major shareholder in the 
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Kuwait Finance House, the, decisions of government ministries often being reflected 
in the general policy of K F H . This is a very serious drawback: as the ini t ia l issue of 
$100 mil l ion is being targeted towards Islamic institutions, i t is vi ta l to have a speedy 
consensus on what constitutes an Islamically ethical investment because a banking 
community as new as this one cannot afford to be seen to disagree about such fun-
damental matters. To this end, investment in riba equity is to be replaced by leasing 
contracts. Of course, this alternative soon provides its own problems: primarily, in 
a package of leases such as might be presented as part of the fund, there w i l l be a 
number of lease contracts that w i l l have been guaranteed by an unrecognised guar-
antor. A further plan, whereby the I D B guarantees the guarantors in terms of the 
performance of contracts approved by them, looks likely to be ratified in the near 
future. . I ' i: •• 
,. • . ..;, . :i •• A • . -i 
On the other hand, many of the projects being carried out wi th in the I D B 
I. 
member countries are unsuitable for unit investment. Whereas the latter should be 
repurchaseable on demand, the foriner tends to involve a commitment over a long 
period of t ime, either to leased machinery or to a project that matures gradually — 
neither of which promise easy tradeability. Should the I D B oblige itself to buy into 
a half-used i tem of equipment, i t is extremely diff icult to form a basis for a price 
quotation and equally tough for the new investor to assess the value of a part share 
i n a depreciating asset. 
Obviously, asset depreciation is just one issue amongst many. One of the more 
knot ty problems involves the procedure to be followed i f unit prices are revised. Is a 
complete revaluation necessary, and i f so, based upon what criterion?^ 
A source wi th in the I D B is keen to see a more homogeneous product than is 
presently envisaged. Needless to say, the decision to remove riba equity f rom the 
fund has helped achieve soUdarity amongst the participating banks. The contract 
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performance guarantee is also a welcome development. Yet homogenuity does not 
only contribute to a more manageable investment instrument: the fund product could 
be used as a guarantee itself and could provide a bond-like security i f homogeneous 
enough. Moreover, to ^ive an example, a product containing nothing but high quality 
equity would be very much more simple to bring to the secondary market than one 
containing a mixture of this and convertible warrants. 
A unit trust must 'therefore be based on liquid assets, namely quoted (or 
quotable) shares. This is 6ispecially iiriportant i f the scheme is to be used for success-
f u l resource mobilisation. The underlying stock prices determine the value of each 
unit trust and the I D B envisages the stock being quoted on the Amman and Karachi 
exchanges. However, i t is anticipated that out of one milUon shares, the Karachi 
exchange could efficiently handle only four thousand at a time.^ Worse st i l l , i t is an-
ticipated that i t would require an unacceptable length of time to repatriate money in 
each instance. 
I t is evident that the teething troubles of this scheme cannot be eradicated 
overnight, yet this does not appear to unduly trouble its creator. Whilst i t would be 
absurd to suggest that the I D B is equivocable to the scheme's outcome, i t must be 
allowed that neither of these two schemes, however imaginative, look likely to increase 
the Bank's resources by a significant amount. 
A Variation on the Unit Trust Scheme 
There is an alternative mode of resource mobifisation that has been considered at 
the same t ime as the unit trust, although i t takes a very different path to reach 
its goal. This is the Investment Trust and the differences go deeper than a matter 
of semantics. Unlike the unit trust, this would be a closed end fund and although 
greater problems would have been encountered initially, this scheme has the advantage 
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of being ultimately easier to run. To set the operation going, a secondary market for 
Islamic securities would need to be set up; no easy task but one that has been at 
the heart of liquidity ^problems for some time. It would surely be in the IDE's own 
interest to create such an entity and arguably, this action lies within the spirit of 
the bank's charter which undertakes to promote Islamic financial practice within its 
member countries. 
Although intrinsic to the success of an investment trust, the question of a sec-
ondary market for any tradeable Islaniic investments is important enough to stand 
alone. The two basic factors that surround the creation of such a market are a 
combination of the resources, both human and financial that are required, and the 
perceived need for the market in the first instance. To date, talk between the I D E 
and commercial banks on this question has been no more than that: dialogue with 
no tangible result. Meanwhile, there are only two countries whose economy is run on 
Islamic Unes. Other, countries see ^p pressiing need to develop a market pecuhar to 
Islamic securities and once more, deyelopment is confined to discussion until funds 
and expertise are committed. The actual location of the market is a less important 
factor at this stage; until a more ,definite plan is drawn up, it is unHkely that any 
country will bid for an idea that has barely reached the drawing board. At present, 
the best that can be expected from countries both outside and within the I D E is a 
passive stance towards the market. Eahrain for example, might once have welcomed 
the business, but due to the present recession this is now unUkely to happen. In any 
event, beyond providing an appropriate legislative background, little else would be 
contributed without a sign of strong backing from the I D E . 
Outside the Middle East, it is possible to see a market established in Europe, 
perhaps Denmark. This is not as unfeasible as it may seem. After all, SAMA's 
principal bank, Saudi International, is located in London but few difficulties are 
encountered in terms of service. As mentioned above, location is no longer such an 
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important factor due to, improved communications. 
In short then, the final shape of the unit investment fund will give some indi-
cation of the I D E ' s priorities arid policy. Either way, the Bank has departed from its 
normal financing procedure^ for both permutations are innovative. Yet the benefits 
arising from a functioning Investriieht Trust would amount to considerably more than 
the modest increase in resoiirciss offered by the Portfolio and Unit Trust schemes. 
However, the colossal effort which would have depended on the enthusiasm of the 
participating institutions'is now arguably out of reach. Islamic banking has certainly 
passed its honeymoon period where any initiative was applauded as momentous. 
Perhaps the sanie could be said of the budgetary situation of the oil price increase 
beneficiaries. It may be some time beifore goodwill and good fortune combine again 
in such proportions. 
The I D B may have taken the course of least resistance and although the reshuf-
fling of funds towards the unit trust has raised only US$30 miUion in the market, it 
is possible to view this operation as an exercise in ingenuity and worthwhile research. 
The I D B can maintain its present operations through what it earns in trade finance, 
which is not to say that it views itself as a trade bank. Nevertheless, having remarked 
upon the difficulties of setting up any kind of unit-based investment it is fortunate for 
the scheme's instigator that an operating surplus and no pressing need for an increase 
in capital has allowed it to take time to examine and alter an idea before thrusting 
it unready into public scrutiny. 
6.4 Project Finance 
The extent of the socio-economic benefits arising from certain projects makes this the 
activity that most closely equates with the developmental aims of the IDB. The Bank 
offers project finance in the form of interest free loans, equity participation, leasing 
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and instalment sale; the chart pverleaf shows the distribution of funds according to 
mode of financing, latter of these two. 
Chart 6.1 
Amount Approved For Ordinary Operations 
by Type of Financing (ID million) 
Type of 
Financing 
1408H 1409H Total (1396-1409) 
• No.' Amnt •'No. Amnt % No. Amnt % 
Loan 13 "48.3 29.2 ' 13 52.6 30.3 126 648.8 34.3 
Equity 2 ' • 2.3 • 1.4 2 1.4 0.8 60 253.1 13.4 
Leasing 2 • • • • • ''' - • 3 27.3 15.7 53 438.8 25.6 
Instalment ' 12 ' ' 92.0 55.7 11 88.3 50.8 53 424.8 22.4 
Sale 
Profit 2 13.8 8.3 - - - 4 21.1 1.1 
Sharing 
Sub Total 29 156,4 94.6 29 169.6 97.6 296 1831.7 96.8 
Tech. Assist. 19 
, • . 
. 5.4 15 4.2 2.4 141 61.4 3.2 
Total Ord. 
Operations 
48 165,2 100 44 173.8 100 433 1893.1 100 
Source: I D E 14th Annual Report. 
Within the sphere of promoting enterprise, these methods of financing give some 
indication of the financial well-being of each borrower, whether that is a government 
department or an approved private entrepreneur. To a certain extent one can assume 
that an interest-free loan will not be offered for any other purpose than as aid to 
a deserving case that is unlikely to meet the repayment schedule demanded by the 
terms of an equity participation project. 
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At the more conventional 'business end' of the spectrum, instalment sales have 
the advantage of the beneficiary owning the asset in question immediately after de-
livery, unlike in leasing, where the bank holds title to the asset until the fuU value 
is repaid. Outright ownership then allows it to be used as a counter-guarantee to a 
financing institution providing guarantees to the Islamic Development Bank for the 
timely payment of instalments.^^ Whilst the generous terms of interest-free locuis were 
advanced in one third ot all projects financed last year, the proportion of financing 
by instalment sale has become more and more significant since 1984-5. Last year, it 
represented more than one half of the ID169.59 million project finance total.^^ 
Within project financing itself, the IDB favours equity participation as it en-
compasses the values of shared effort and shared risk. However, this is a difficult 
area in which to identify suitable opportunities. Inevitably, competition is stiff for 
attractive projects. This is riot to suggest that Islamic finance must necessarily cede 
to conventional funding but, as I D B officials were swift to point out, an entrepreneur 
who is reasonably sure of a forthcoming profit may prefer to stretch his finances at 
the outset rather than be obliged tO' share his profits later. Moreover, the IDB may 
lose out to a local, commercial Islariiic bank. 
An example has already been given of a successful enterprise encountering dif-
ficulties because of a country's external payments problems. Over recent years, this 
has become an increasingly famiUar scenario: budgetary upsets have led to foreign 
exchange controls hampering the remittance of profits. The consequences of this 
situation to an institution such as the I D B are obvious. 
These disadvantages have had a telling effect upon the Bank's equity portfolio. 
Last year, only three projects were financed by this method, none of which were 
entirely new. Thus, the question that springs to mind is; under what circumstances is 
equity participation a success? Given that this represents the core of Islamic financial 
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principles and has already gained the attention of the world's international banks as 
a possible alternative to debt finance, this question is a particularly topical one. 
6.5 Major Issues in Equity Participation 
In the experience of the I D B , the opportunities for equity participation have tended 
to present themselves in the more economically developed of its member countries. 
These include Turkey, Tunisia, Malaysia and Pakistan where private sector activity 
is accompanied by a demand for enterprise funding of all methods. 
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the story does not end with approval 
given for funding to go ahead: 
"Actual disbursements of equity finance have often lagged considerably after 
approval is given, partly due to slow project implementation, but also because of 
lax accounting standards on; the ^part of the businesses being supported, and delays 
over auditing. Less, than sixty percent of the equity funding approved by the Islamic 
Development Bank during its first decade of operations was actually disbursed." 
To date, ID253 million has been spent on the Bank's equity portfolio, repre-
senting nearly 13.5 percent of total financing operations. In many cases the Bank has 
received no dividend and is often unaware of a given project's progress. Both sides 
can be responsible for this lack of information; a state of disorganisation may exist 
on the part of the beneficiary whilst a shortage of manpower at the IDB contributes 
to the problem. 
Evidently, it is the lack of precedents in this field as much as the terms of the 
musharaka arrangement that prevent this method of finance from gaining acceptance 
amongst the more established companies. Certainly, a combination of the two factors 
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that has led to disappointing perforraance of equity participation amongst Islamic 
financial institutions in general and the I D E is no exception. As the 1988-89 Annual 
Report states, " A major review of the Rank's equity portfolio is under way." 
Increasingly, the I D E is subscribing to lines of equity arranged by other, local 
banks rather than in the equity of each separate project. This switch from direct to 
portfolio investment does not place siich heavy demands on the Bank's workforce and 
it spreads risk more evenly. Moreover, it marks an increasing level of co-operation 
amongst Middle Eastern finaincial institutions. 
In drawing conclusions from the above information, it should be noted that 
this has been the experience of the I D E and cannot therefore hope to represent the 
main issues of equity participation in general. Commercial banks in particular may 
be considerably more sensitiye to the speed and security of return and less interested 
in the welfare aspect that a deyelopment institution is liable to consider. 
Above all, the I D E has been unable to identify suitable opportunities for this 
type of investment; opportuiiities ,tha,t^  dp not bear the hallmark of previous failures. 
Equity stakes appear to be unattractive to other investors; to date, the I D E has not 
managed to pass on a single one of its stakes to another party. Nor for that matter 
has any interest been shown in taking over the management of the whole a venture 
itself. This reflects on the iUiquid nature of this method perhaps more than the choice 
of investment by the I D E . 
Infrastructural projects, whilst vital to the country concerned, are not suitable 
for equity participation. Investment in a road for example, would bring in only the 
most indirect of revenues and even that would accrue over a lengthy period of time. 
It would be impossible to quantify and distribute those revenues in any case. Possible 
investment in countries such as Sudan, Guinea Eissau and Somalia tends to produce 
hidden problems. Funding a textile mill for example may appear a sound prospect 
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until it is understood that the proposed site is entirely devoid of land communications. 
Obviously, an institution that is part bank, part development assistance agency must 
evaluate the socio-economic impact at the same time as the financial rewards that 
accrue from its investments. 
6.6 Conclusion. The Relationship between Capital Base Size 
and Financing Activities 
The casual observer might, be forgiven for believing that the IDB is suffering an iden-
tity crisis. It styles itself as a supranational institution yet naturally it is often subject 
to conflicting national interests.: It aspires to a role as a multinational development 
agency yet its financial clout is little more than that of the national development 
funds of the Gulf. Moreover, despite the wide remit in its charter for raising deposits, 
it lacks the means for increasing the size of its capital base that are available to 
institutions more than twice its size. 
Over the last forty five years the World Bank, for example, has raised funds 
in the market pla.ce between fifteen and twenty times whereas the IDB has had to 
rely almost solely on capital subscription. Although the observation is academic, for 
the sake of comparison it is worth noting that were the IDB to have a conventional 
capital structure, it could issue bonds on the security of its callable capital. With an 
authorised capital of 2 miUion Islamic dinars, a minimum of only 200 million need be 
paid in. 
In an average taken of the transfer of reserves to developing countries, the 
IDB's contribution of just over ID300 million per annum does not figure when placed 
alongside the amounts put forward by the Asian Bank or the World Bank. The I D B 
must make a special effort to increase the funding available or face criticism, for if 
the Bank makes no real headway in resource mobilisation, then it has proved itself 
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unable to nieet its bbligatiohsi. Worse still, more has been paid in subscription to the 
I D E by its meinbers than lias been contributed by them to the World Eank which 
appears to be operating more effectively. 
For the same reason, namely an insufficient capital base, it is difficult to view 
the I D E as a central bank for Islamic commercial institutions. Many further problems 
surround the assumption of this role, not least the possible conflict of interest with its 
other activities. Yet it is not worth contemplating a solution to these more peripheral 
difficulties before the central problem is resolved with a substantial increase in the 
Bank's funds. 
. . . , , 1 ' ;!:: 1 , . . ... 
All the indications point to a need for change. It would not be enough to 
rationalise activities to fall in Unei with the funds available. Although the IDE's 
articles of agreement place an emphasis on promoting trade, it is not envisaged as a 
trade bank above all else. Recycling of trade finance is a much easier proposition than 
equity participation schemes and other modes of finance appropriate to developmental 
objectives.^* However, if the I D E were to operate within its financial means and 
restrict itself to trade finance alone, it is unlikely that its members would remain 
satisfied with the utilisation of their capital. Were they seeking to invest profitably, it 
is improbable that the I D E would have been their first choice. Undoubtedly, altruism 
was a major factor behind the more developed countries' initial contributions and a 
desire to see some of the economic imbalance between them and the less developed 
countries redressed. This refiects a similar mentality amongst private investors in 
commercial Islamic banks where, in some cases, the individual is prepared to forego a 
certain amount of profit in order to be satisfied that his funds are utilised according 
to the principles in which he believes. 
It is not enough to suggest that subsidised commodity financing or even the 
initiative taken in the Longer Term Trade Financing Scheme is sufficient to fulfill 
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the Bank's obligations to aid the economic development of its less fortunate member 
countries. While the' I D B remains unable to commit sizeable funds over extended 
periods, its financing will continue to be aimed at those countries most able to use the 
finance productively: those that are able to meet the repayment schedules. Inevitably, 
this confounds the developriiental aims of narrowing the gulf between rich and poor as 
it exacerbates the condition. Until the issue of insufficient resources for development 
is resolved, it is expected that any attempt to strengthen the Bank's role as a serious 
institution for develof)ment assistance will be both temporary and unsatisfactory. 
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1 "Arab Aid: Who Gives It?" in Arab Banker, Vol.5, No.l, 1985. 
2 Iran was admitted as a member in 1989. Iraq received ID 10 million (US$13.61 
miUion) in trade finance last year despite its existing debt to the outside world. 
Source: I D B 14th Annual Report. 
3 Rodney Wilson, Saudi Arabia: The Islamic Development Bank's Role as a Pan-
Muslim Agency, in Islamic Financial Markets, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 196. 
4 Source: I D B Annual Report, 1409H (1988-89). 
5 This may simply be a matter of degree. Trade finance for example, can also 
take place over an extended duration as encouraged by the Longer Term Trade 
Financing Scheme to which a total of ID301.5 miUion was committed last year. 
6 Source: Islamic Banks' Portfolio, Information Bulletin, Islamic Development 
Bank, 1410H (1990). 
7 Interview at the I D B , Jeddah, 13 May 1990. 
8 Rodney Wilson, op cit, p. 197. 
9 Interview, 13th May 1990. 
10 The Islamic Banks' Portfolio has increased the IDB's capital by less than 2.25 
percent. Rodney Wilson, op cit, p.207. 
11 ibid, p.208. 
12 The total does not include technical assistance worth ID4.22 million. 
13 Rodney Wilson, op cit, p.212. 
14 More than eighty percent of short term trade credit is repaid on time. 
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C H A P T E R S E V E N 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Preliminary Remarks on The Assessment of Islamic Bank Performance 
Much has been achieved by Islamic banks in recent years despite a number of obstacles 
to their progress. However, greater progress could have been made by Islamic banks 
had the nature of the Middle East's relationship with the West placed them in a 
position to develop in a less prejudiced environment. Islam does not separate religion 
and daily life and yet the Muslim world has, until very recently, been dominated 
intellectually by western countries. This has tended to thwart the development of 
an Islamic ideology for everyday life and indeed, for everyday financial activity. The 
extravagant claims made by Islamic economists are consequently an easy target for 
derision, considering the gulf that exists between the aims and the actual achievements 
of Islamic finance. 
This concluding chapter aims to look at the strengths and weaknesses in the 
performance of a representative group of banks and to question whether their re-
sults were inevitable, that is beyond the control of each particular bank, or whether 
management policy made a significant contribution to the result. 
7.2 Degree of Integration into Western Financial Markets 
Before embarking on a more empirical assessment of banking according to the tenets 
of Islam, it may be worthwhile to consider the implications of competition in a system 
about which Islamic banks have fundamental ideological reservations. It is inevitable 
that the whole ethos of a financial market should be determined by the outlook of its 
major players. In effect, the system is almost inextricably n6a-based and only the 
unlikely scenario of a complete Islamic bank monopoly would change this fact. 
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Most obviously, the time factor is an important one. No new ideology can 
be expected to have a great impact on an entrenched system built up over a long 
period and whose participants have become skilled in adapting their practice to meet 
changing conditions. 
While financial market activity remains h6a-based, the only way in which Is-
lamic banks can compete on equal ternis is to concentrate on financing which resem-
bles that of its opposition without actually deaUng in interest. To a certain extent, 
this is already the case: ari emphasis on trade finance by mark-up, for instance, does 
not really fulfill the Islamic principles of partnership and risk sharing and this has 
shown itself a favoured method of financing. To steer too close to the financial prac-
tice of the West is to defeat the object of Islamic finance, and yet the experiment 
would quickly fail if some sort of compromise was not reached. Riba is acceptable to 
non-Muslims, most of whom do not give the idea a passing thought, because it is 
seen to work and financial institutions are trusted to turn the system to the client's 
advantage. Islamic banks, on the other hand, must presently undergo the scrutiny to 
which anything new is subjected, although ultimately, their operations may be very 
much more equitable, both in theory and practice. At present, the disinterested indi-
vidual remains uninspired and uninformed about Islamic finance, while the potential 
customer is less concerned about the wider economic benefits than about the com-
petitiveness and range of service offered by Islamic banks. Only when their system is 
recognised as safe and profitable can these institutions afford to assert themselves as 
more particularly Islamic. 
Meanwhile, there is some evidence of a rapprochement between Islamic and 
non-Islamic practice. Ethical investment, whereby certain commercial activities are 
avoided and others encouraged, is very similar in outlook to investment according 
to Islamic principles. The pitfalls of debt financing are similarly recognised in the 
West and, while it may be some time before riba banks place an emphasis on equity 
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financing, their expertise in investment banking generally, would help promote the 
idea and the developrhent of derivatives such as tradeable participation certificates. 
Competition from Islamic banks in this scenario would be wholehearted, that is to 
say, untainted by the suspicion that they were not fulfilling their wider economic 
objectives of more efficient and fairer distribution of wealth. 
The concluding factor which concerns the state of the Islamic banks' challenge 
to riba institutions is each institution's hunger and need for success. The lack of a 
central bank on one hand highlights the terminal nature of any bank failure and so 
can be said to inspire profitable activity, but at the same time, it stifles innovation 
and places a premium on caution! Such a policy does not contribute to real success. 
Conversely, an institution such as the Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami group which has 
strong poHtical affiliations is far more able to withstand the occasional disasterous 
management decision than even a bank supported by a lender of last resort. This 
is due to having a backer determined to see the venture succeed. In contrast, a 
central bank stands ready to avert a confidence crisis in the whole banking system, 
not to guarantee the fortune of each separate institution. It would be a mistake to 
exaggerate the extent of the support offered, but taken to extremes, it would seem 
that the ultimate result of profligacy and of reactionary attitude to innovation is 
much the same. It is fortunate that Islamic banks seem to have learned the need for 
accountability for their actions as well as the need to offer a wider range of services 
at more attractive rates of return if they are to lure customers away from their rivals. 
7.3 Supervision of Islamic Financial Institutions 
This work has addressed the problems Islamic banks face through the absence of a 
lender of last resort. Central banks in the West have varying degrees of power and 
autonomy, but generally speaking, they all serve three main purposes: to guarantee 
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the safety of their countries' monetary system, to control the supply and demand for 
credit, and lastly, they oversee the activities of banks and protect depositors.^ It is 
considered unlikey that any Islamic bank could fit comfortably into a system that is 
based and supervised according to western criteria. 
From the outset; it should not be assumed that the host central bank is expected 
to supervise a radical change in its financial market simply to accommodate the 
arrival of Islamic banks to approved status. The latter could not contemplate an 
instant conversion to their system. Even if this were their ultimate objective, a more 
reasonable initial goal is that of providing devout Muslims with a full range of banking 
services. Nevertheless, the presence of Islamic banks as licensed deposit takers would 
necessitate changes in procedure that supervisory authorities would not be prepared 
to contemplate. 
Obviously, it would be equally undesirable from the point of view of Western 
bank authorities for Islamic banks to operate outside their supervisory cordon. A 
far-reaching crisis of confidence may be precipitated by the 'uninsured' collapse of an 
unlicensed deposit taker which would have been closely identified with the estabhsed 
banking community. 
The practical problems of calculating an Islamic bank's capital are vast. In 
the case of conventional institutions, the supervisory authority imposes a prudential 
ratio calculated on the value of its assets. This criterion is inoperable for Islamic 
banks whose asset value fluctuates. A significant part of the latter's revenue has been 
demonstated to derive from administrative charges or where payment on a loan is 
tied to actual revenues from projects that were the object of the loan. This is similar 
to the way venture capital is used in the West, except that venture capital activities 
form only a fraction of a conventional bank's portfolio because of the risky nature 
of this activity. Although returns may be attractively high on occasion, they are 
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slow and unreliable compared with regular interest payments, further confusing the 
assessment of risk in the calculation of a bank's capital. 
Another factor that concerns central banks in the West is the status of the 
depositor. Participation in P L S arra.ngement8 blurs the distinction between depositor 
and shareholder. Problerns arise in a situation of reduced profitability and outright 
loss. Riba banks pass on their losses to shareholders in the form of reduced dividends, 
while depositors funds remain safe except in the most extreme situations. Depositors 
with an Islamic bank are actively investing in that institution's future; failed projects 
are passed directly on to depositors. Whilst the preceding chapters have indicated the 
scarcity of P L S arrangements on the balance sheets of Islamic banks, the principle of 
joint fortune remains the same rega,rdless, of the percentage. 
In spite of the efforts made by Islamic banks to develop instruments appropriate 
to money market activity, their actual involvement has been, at best, peripheral. The 
overall impression to the regulatory authorities can only be that Islamic banks have 
little to offer in this sphere and at the same time, they would be immune to primary 
instruments of monetary control such as foreign exchange regulations. This is not a 
pleasing prospect for any central bank. 
In an interview conducted in 1984, DMI's Prince Mohamed conceded this point, 
admitting that countries who have opened their doors to Islamic banks have been 
obliged to adapt their control procedures.^ This applies to those Arab countries who 
have accepted and encouraged the development of Islamic Finance. The creation of 
Islamic Bank International (IBI) in Denmark and its status as a licensed deposit taker 
does not mean that the host country has relaxed its tough banking laws. How very 
much less Hkely that a country such as Great Britain, already an important financial 
centre, should bother to alter its legislation simply to guarantee the good behaviour 
of a non-performer. 
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After fifteen years of growth. Islamic banks still have not gained a real foothold 
in western financial centres. Deposit swaps with conventional banks do not really 
constitute integration between the two systems, l E I has had to meet Danish banking 
law halfway and is consequently exposed to criticism as a pseudo-Islamic institution, 
and still no Islamic bank is licensed to solicit deposits in the United Kingdom. Repre-
sentative offices and carefully-worded nomenclature does not encompass the broader 
aims of Islamic finance, namely to offer an interest-free banking alternative to Muslim 
communities around the world. ' 
It is difficult under any circumstances to define the acivities of Islamic banks in 
Great Britain and Europe, but the subject is an important one. There is no doubt 
that the institutions mentioned in this work are able to provide funding to those that 
seek it and agree to bide by the ternis issued by the bank in question. However, unless 
they are able to accept 'ordinary' deposits. Islamic banks cannot be self-supporting 
without their Gulf backers. Furthermore, for reasons Hsted in the summary to this 
chapter, it is unlikely funding from this source will continue on the scale of recent 
years. i ; : 
With this in mind, it seems logical to examine the different categories of work 
that Islamic banks presently undertake including that to which they aspire. This 
latter category should need no explanation — it is banking itself, in terms of deposit-
taking and being free to invest those funds as the institution sees fit. In the case of 
Islamic banks, this also means that deposited funds cannot be guaranteed, the basis 
of supervisory authorities' unwillingness to grant them a license. 
Nevertheless, much of the financing undertaken by institutions such as Dar 
Al-Maal Al-Islami coincides with the practice of conventional banks. Although a 
large percentage of financing is directly set aside for trade, it would be inaccurate to 
describe any Islamic bank as a trading company. The situation whereby an Islamic 
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bank actually holds t i t le to traded goods is part of the procedure that distinguishes i t 
f r o m a riba ins t i tut ion. However, the shari'a does not insist on the financier actually 
holding the ^oods themselves ; the t i t le to them suffices to allow him to bear the risk 
of non-purchase. The aim of this process should be understood and not mistaken for 
speculation in commodities, an activity that may otherwise be taxed. 
Finally, a distinction must be made between an Islamic financial institution 
and an investment company, as defined in the West. Two points are valid to this 
definition. Firstly, institutions such as Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami or the Kuwait Finance 
House avoid the term 'bank' in their t i t le only because of the connotations of usury 
. . . . .: : : . ; , , . . . ' . . i - - -
that they believe is involved, not as a result of the activities i n which they engage. 
Secondly, i n the West, i t is only the restrictions placed upon them by regulatory 
authorities that prevent Islamic banks f rom providing similar services to conventional 
banks — i t is not the aim of Islamic banks to conduct the sort of business whereby 
their only unfailing responsibility is to fill an annual tax return. 
As long as this information is borne in mind, then i t is reasonable to observe 
that a certain Islamic bank may seem to concentrate on trade finance, or that an-
other happens to conduct business similar to an investment trust or a mutual fund. 
Inevitably, these institutions w i l l invest in activities that are both Islamically accept-
able as well as profitable. The situation wi th respect to Islamic finance remains fluid 
and i t is likely that its investment practice and services offered by interest-free banks 
w i l l change as they gain further experience and the whole concept of interest-free 
finance becomes more widely recognised and accepted. 
7.4 An Assessment of Islamic Banking Practice 
There are two yardsticks against which a system such as Islamic finance may be 
measured, the first being between its ideology and reality. A substantial part of the 
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introduction has helped illustrat.e th,e fut iUty of such an exercise; unti l the strands of 
religion and economic theory are teased apart, broad interpretation wi l l form the only 
l ink between its aims a,nd a,chieyements. A more feasible and valuable examination 
contrasts the experience of Islamic banks w i t h that of their conventional counterparts. 
I t would be most unimaginative to suggest that Islamic banking, after its ini t ial 
rapid expansion, has been an under-achiever. In view of the factors that impede 
its fur ther progress, the most important consideration is that Islamic banks remain 
competitive and therefore, i n business. Even in countries w i th Islamised economies 
such as Iran and Pakistan, the restraints imposed by Islam conspire to make the 
banking system almost , inoperable^ even in the absence of conventional n6a-based 
competition. : : ,: ; : , .,. 
This situation is exacerbated in the West by a number of factors, competition 
being only one. In those areas where they have been able to be active to the fullest 
extent,^ Islamic banks have proved that they provide a viable alternative to riba 
finance. This however, gives l i t t le cause for celebration: the opportunities where 
the shari'a gives its unreserved approval, demand is at an attractive level and where 
conventional practice has proved unworkable or unacceptable to its cUents, are n i l . 
Hence, to claim that Islamic banking has found a lucrative niche is either over-
optimistic, and also places too much emphasis on its attractiveness to Muslims at the 
expense of conventional banks. 
Obviously, the prohibit ion of riba severely narrows the breadth of opportunities 
available to Islamic banks and, in any case, there is almost always a conventional 
instrument to satisfy demand. 
A number of sections in this study have dealt wi th the demand for Islamic fi-
nancial procedures, particularly in the area of participation finance.^ However, these 
projects require careful consideration before implementation which makes strong de-
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mands on manpower and experience. Furthermore, even where a project is judged 
workable, and the mudarib of the highest reputation, the returns are inevitably long 
term. 
The investing bank may be wil l ing to bide its time but, acting in the capacity of 
mudarib to its depositors, i t must produce worthwhile results to prevent them invest-
ing elsewhere. Consequently, a cautious approach to investment has been adopted 
in an effort to secure a degree of loyalty f rom investors as well as borrowers. In the 
West, results are al l that matters; the charitable, profi t and loss sharing aspect being 
of l i t t le importance to a corporate client seeking the best possible deal w i th httle room 
for manoeuvre. Unfortunately, from, the point of view of loyalty, the best that can 
be expected at such an early stage is an objective, unsuspicious approach to Islamic 
finance: approval due to negative reasons. Outsiders tend to make' no distinction 
between the various entities that belong a wider group. This is a very intolerant 
att i tude, where the slightest mistake on the part of one player leads to condemnation 
or suspicion of the whole concept to which he subscribes.^ I n the absence of any ma-
jor management mistakes by Islamic banks in the near future, companies may take 
advantage of a more attractive financing package offered by an Islamic bank without 
being prejudiced by its iinconventional nature. 
Companies such as A l - R a j h i are also endeavouring to package their wares in 
such a way as to be less demanding for their clients as well as easier to understand. 
Al though this may only mean reducing paperwork to a minimum, i t helps to make 
Islamic finance more accessible to new clients. Af te r all , the greatest and most un-
derstandable prejudice against the interest-free financing experiment is the lack of 
information that is available about i t . 
The issue of staffing was regularly discussed during the interviews, particularly 
the two way learning process that is necessary for those involved and the problems 
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this presents. A serious deficiency for Islamic banks is their inexperience of western 
financial markets. This problem can be only gradually overcome, for in addition to 
a thorough understanding of the sphere in which they choose to compete, Islamic 
bankers must be aware of their own system's potential to succeed there. Difficulties 
are encountered when recruiting western-trained staff; not only is this an expensive 
process, but the retraining requirements are equally rigorous, i f not more so. I t is not 
possible for any one person to be total ly aware of the characteristics and potential of 
Islamic finance — not only is financial knowledge becoming ever more specialised, but 
Islamic banking has an added dimension that cannot be ignored i f the system is to 
maintain its identity. This is, of course, the religious connection; there has yet to be 
a banker w i t h a commanding kriowledge of the shari'a or a reputable religious scholar 
who is involved in the day to day running of a financial insti tution. A consistent flow 
of information is required, both wi th in each bank as well as between institutions in 
general i f Islamic finance ii^ to emerjge as a serious, working alternative to interest-
based financing. . 1 . . : 
7.5 Summary 
The experience of interest-free Islamic financial institutions has brought to Ught a 
discrepancy between the ideology of Islamic finance and its practice. Inevitably, i t is 
very diff icul t to achieve a perfect balance between developmental aims and commercial 
performance as the two are almost diametrically opposed. Experience has shown that 
emphasis on one aspect tends to be at the expense of the other and this has proved 
relevant to a commercial bank as much as i t is w i th a development assistance agency 
such as the Islamic Development Bank. 
Al though this discrepancy has not prevented Islamic banking f rom achieving 
success on a wide scale, further growth in both areas cannot take place without a 
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significant amount of firiahcial innovation. This fact has been recognised by Islamic 
institutions, especially i n the international banking sphere where competition is ex-
tremely fierce and profit margins small. Ac t iv i ty in the Euromarkets highlights this 
situation; an established reputation for quality is certainly at a premium, but this 
w i l l not prevent a financial inst i tut ion f rom losing business i f its service and compet-
itiveness do not remain first class. This reflects a very different atmosphere f rom the 
suq of Al-Rajhi ' s origin; customer loyalty and a relaxed co-existence of rival mon-
eychangers is not paralled in the financial markets in the West. Indeed, even i f the 
in i t ia l accusations that attribute the success of Islamic finance in the Arab world to 
an extremely favourable economic cUmate were accurate, that situation has changed 
considerably i n recent years. W i t h countries such as Saudi Arabia having experi-
enced budgetary deficits, the uneasy political climate of the Gulf, and the slowdown 
in financial activity in Bahrain, the Middle East could not be described as an ideal 
location in which to nurture an'unworkable banking system. 
Off'shore institutions in Bahrain are aware of the restrictions that are placed 
on their activities by the prohibit ion of riba but they continue to make headway. 
This is achieved not simply by borrowing conventional instruments and hiding the 
traces of usury, but by well thought-out plans for the creation of their own banking 
infrastructure; the development of an inter-Islamic bank market, for example. The 
outline for such a market, given in chapter five does not claim to be solely inspired 
by the Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain, which is encouraging. A n unrestricted flow 
of information and ideas amongst Islamic banks is as necessary as healthy competi-
t ion between them. Furthermore, the application of identical standards amongst all 
Islamic banks would help define the parameters wi th in which they are to operate. In 
this respect, a standardisation of what is considered haram and halal-would make the 
implementation of the Islamic Unit Trust a very much easier task for the I D B . A cen-
t ra l religious supervisory board may be considered for this task. What is important 
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is that Islamic finance should not divide into sects, one faction displajdng a 'hoUer 
than thou ' att i tude whilst the other offers Islamic finance in name only. Although 
such an extreme result is urilikely, the dangers of offering a less than united front are 
easy to understand. ' ' 
. • - J ' . .,1. \ : . ••• • , 1 . ; • 
Islamic finance is here to stay. Although the options for Islamic banks are 
somewhat restricted i n comparison to conventional banks, i t is circumstances, not 
dogma, that prevent, the, achievement of wider objectives such as a more equitable 
distr ibution of funding, envisaged by the proponents of PLS financing. A t the present 
time, the impact of Islamic finance on western financial markets has been minimal. 
I t should be understood that the ability of this system to make its mark depends 
upon its abi l i ty to rnake profits. This is not as facile as i t sounds; profits are not 
set aside for charitable distribution,to jame duck entrepreneurs who are ineligible for 
conventional funding. Instead, they generate confidence on the part of investors and 
consequently the bank. A successful inst i tut ion is able to take a longer-term view 
of its operations without the fear of insufficient turnover for everyday requirements. 
As efficient l iquidi ty instruments 3,r,e, devised by Islamic banks, the profitable use of 
short term funds w i l l allow a more flejgible attitude towards long term investment. 
Once this has been achieved, then the real impact of Islamic finance as the practical 
application of the Islamic ethical code can be assessed. Unt i l that time, the only 
obvious difference in the day to day operation of an Islamic financial insti tution wi l l 
appear in the fo rm of a more restricted range of service than is presently offered 
by the conventional bank opposition. Undoubtedly, Islamic banks can participate in 
international financial market activity as the experience of those examined in this 
work has shown. Although their activity is, so far, quite restricted, i t is considered 
almost certain that the reach of international Islamic finance w i l l increase wi th the 
matur i ty of the interest-free banks themselves. 
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Footnotes , i ,-.. 
1 Volker Nienhaus, Le Gontrole Bancaire et la Politique des Banques Centrales: 
Etude Comparative, m Les Capitaux de I'Islam, CNRS, Mesnil-sur-l'Estree, 
1990, p.165. 
2 Chalk and Cheese, i n Arab Banking and Finance, Banking Journal of the MEED 
Group. Vol.3, No.ii 1984. 
3 Due to a lack of harmonisation, the activities that are condoned without reser-
vation by all of the various supervisory boards are remarkably few in number. 
This has the effect of restricting the opportunities for co-operation between 
Islamic banks. 
4 See chapters two, foui: and six. 
5 See D M I , chapter four. 
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